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I defend a naive conception of material objects, according to which there are such 
things as stones, statues, cats and their tails, but no “strange fusions” of such things as my 
nose and the Eiffel Tower. Virtually everyone in the literature rejects the naive 
conception in favor of some revisionary theory of material objects. Eliminativists (e.g., 
Unger, van Inwagen, Merricks) deny that there are such things as statues and stones and, 
in some cases, cats as well. Universalists (e.g., Lewis, Rea, Sider) hold that for any 
objects you like—even my nose and the Eiffel Tower—there is a single object composed 
of those objects. These revisionary theories are manifestly counterintuitive, but there are 
powerful arguments for preferring them to the naive conception.  
The first part of the dissertation is devoted to showing how these arguments can 
be resisted. First, I assess the charge that, given the correctness of the naive conception, it 
would have been a miraculous stroke of luck for us to have hit upon the privileged 
conceptual scheme. Second, I examine the Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness for 
unrestricted mereological composition, Third, I show that the grounding problem for 
coincident modally discernible objects can be solved. Fourth, show that the causal 
exclusion argument as applied to ordinary objects can be resisted without either 
systematic overdetermination or epiphenomena. 
In the second part of the dissertation, I argue that the prima facie conflict between 
revisionary theories and our ordinary discourse, beliefs, and intuitions about material 
objects proves to be an insurmountable problem for those theories. First, I argue that 
existing attempts to reconcile revisionary theories of material objects with folk discourse 
are unsatisfactory, Second, I provide a perspicuous statement of the “challenge from folk 
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  1 
Introduction 
 
 I will defend a view according to which the world is very much the way it seems 
to be. There are cats, tails, mountains, baseballs, statues, and lumps of clay. There is 
nothing at all composed of my nose and the Eiffel tower, nor are there such things as 
incars, snowdiscalls, or trout-turkeys.1 Cats can survive the loss of their tails, lumps can 
survive being flattened, and statues cannot. I call this the naive conception of material 
objects. Not everyone will agree that it is properly so called; indeed, many philosophers 
will deny that our pretheoretical beliefs genuinely committed us to tables, or that they 
genuinely rule out the strange things just mentioned. But the view nevertheless seems to 
me deserving of this name, for it is the view that is most likely to attract those who (like 
myself) are typically disinclined to surrender their pretheoretical beliefs and intuitions on 
the basis of highly theoretical considerations.  
My project is best viewed not as an attempt to show that the naive conception is 
correct, but rather as an attempt to show that the costs of accepting the naive conception 
as not nearly as great as they are widely believed to be. For instance, reflection on the 
range of alternative, strange conceptual repertoires that we might have come to employ is 
meant to leave the proponent of the naive conception with the following two options: 
• Deny that our conceptual scheme is privileged with respect to strange schemes. 
• Admit that it is somehow miraculous that we acquired this conceptual scheme. 
In the first chapter, I argue that one can accept the naive conception without incurring 
either of these costs. So long as one accepts (i) the already widely accepted view that 
which concepts we employ is determined in part by the kinds of things with which we 
                                                
1 See chapter 1 for more on these strange kinds. 
 
  2 
interact, and (ii) the already widely accepted view that human beings are sufficiently 
intelligent to understand their our concepts, one can embrace the natural view that our 
scheme is privileged with respect to extraordinarily strange schemes and that there is 
nothing the least bit miraculous about our having come to have acquired the privileged 
scheme. 
 In the second chapter, I address the “argument from vagueness,” which is widely 
believed to show that one can avoid unrestricted mereological composition only by biting 
one of the following bullets: 
• Composition never occurs 
• There cannot be borderline cases of composition 
• Some logical vocabulary (e.g., ‘∃’, ‘∀’, ‘=’) is vague 
I show that the argument from vagueness can be resisted without incurring any of these 
costs. The strategy will be to show that a sentence can lack a determinate truth value as a 
result of Soritical phenomena without containing vague vocabulary. This can be 
independently motivated and, intuitively, is exactly what is going on in the apparent cases 
of borderline composition at issue in the argument from vagueness.   
Since the proponent of the naive conception countenances both lumps of clay and statues, 
and takes the former to have a property that the latter lacks—namely, being able to 
survive flattening—the commitment to distinct but wholly co-located material objects is 
pretty much unavoidable. No single object can be both able and unable to survive 
flattening. Proponents of the naive conception can take some comfort in the fact that, 
however counterintuitive the co-location of distinct concrete entities may be, co-location 
can be avoided only at far greater cost:  
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• Eliminating statues, lumps, or both 
• Accepting highly revisionary theories about the properties these items possess 
• Accepting a highly revisionary semantics (e.g., the nonrigidity of proper names) 
• Rejecting the indiscernibility of identicals 
But co-location is often held to have an important further cost of its own, namely, 
commitment to brute modal facts: there are no nonmodal differences between the statue 
and clay that can serve as an ultimate explanation, or “ground,” of their modal 
differences. In the fourth chapter, I show that one can accept that the statue and clay are 
distinct without incurring this cost so long as on accepts either (i) a mereological 
pluralism on which the parthood relation that holds between the statue and its parts is 
distinct from the parthood relation that holds between the lump and its parts, (ii) the 
thesis that an artifact cannot come into existence in the absence of de re creative 
intentions, or (iii) the thesis that what it is for the statue to exist is different from what it 
is for the lump of clay to exist. I argue that, if any one of these theses is correct, the 
modal differences between statues and lumps can be grounded. Thus, the price of co-
located statues and clay is far lower than is widely believed. 
 In the fourth chapter, I discuss the causal exclusion argument against ordinary 
macroscopic objects. The argument is meant to establish that one cannot accept that there 
are baseballs without incurring one of the following costs: 
• Baseballs are epiphenomena—they altogether lack causal powers. 
• Events caused by baseballs are systematically overdetermined. 
• Baseballs have emergent properties. 
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There is already good reason to wonder whether these costs themselves are so great. But I 
argue that one can accept that there are baseballs without incurring any of these costs. 
One need only hold that there is a division of causal labor: baseballs cause windows to 
shatter, while the microscopic parts of baseballs cause the microscopic parts of windows 
to shatter. And baseballs need not have emergent properties in order to do this causal 
work.  
 The costs then are minimal. The costs of revisionary conceptions, by contrast, 
seem extraordinarily high, for they evidently are deeply at odds with our discourse, 
pretheoretical beliefs, and intuitions about material objects. Proponents of revisionary 
theories typically deny that there is any great cost, either because they deny that their 
theories are in any way at odds with folk ontology, or because the deny that flouting folk 
belief is such a great cost. In the final two chapters, I argue that the costs of revisionary 
theories are far greater than is widely believed.  
In the fifth chapter, I focus on those revisionary theorists who maintain that, 
despite appearances, their theories are compatible with folk belief. Universalists, for 
instance, often maintain that the folk restrict their quantifiers so as to exclude strange 
composites when the things that they say seem to suggest that they take there to be no 
strange composites. I argue that these semantic hypotheses are unacceptable. There is no 
evidence—linguistic, psychological, or otherwise—supporting any of them. The cost of 
such compatibilists strategies lies in their implausible and seemingly unmotivated 
semantic commitments. 
Those who admit that their theories are in conflict with folk ontology recognize 
that they thereby incur some kind of explanatory burden, but the nature of that burden has 
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not been fully appreciated. In the final chapter, I provide a perspicuous statement of the 
challenge posed by folk belief and argue that the standard strategies for meeting the 
challenge are unsatisfactory. The cost of such incompatibilist strategies lies in the fact 
that they are entirely unable to account for the reasonableness and resilience of the folk 
beliefs that conflict with their theories. 
 If my arguments are sound, it would seem that the costs of the naive conception 
are sufficiently low—and the costs of the alternatives sufficiently high—that the naive 
conception should be preferred or, at the very least, taken far more seriously than it is at 
present. 
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I 
Ordinary Objects and the Argument from Strange Concepts* 
 
1. Introduction 
 A snowdiscall is something made of snow that has any shape between being 
round and being disc-shaped and which can survive taking on all and only shapes in that 
range. So a round snowdiscall (unlike a snowball) can survive being flattened into a disc 
but (unlike a quantity of snow) cannot survive being packed into the shape of a brick. 
Ernest Sosa maintains that one can avoid commitment to snowdiscalls (and things of 
countless other strange kinds) only by embracing either a nihilist thesis on which there 
are neither snowballs nor snowdiscalls or a relativist thesis on which material objects do 
not exist simpliciter but only relative to some conceptual scheme or other.2  
Curiously, Sosa does not even mention (let alone provide an argument against) a 
naive conception of material objects according to which there are snowballs but no 
snowdiscalls and on which material objects enjoy a scheme-independent existence. But 
many philosophers have followed Sosa both in invoking strange concepts in support of 
revisionary theories of material objects and in failing to make explicit how they are meant 
to render a naive conception untenable. The literature is now overflowing with examples 
of strange kinds: apceans, bligers, carples, cdogs, cpeople, dwods, emeroses, 
gollyswoggles, incars, klables, monewments, shmees, shmrees, slithy toves, snowdiscalls, 
                                                
* Thanks to George Bealer, John Bengson, Reid Blackman, Josh Dever, Matti Eklund, 
Adam Elga, John Hawthorne, Eli Hirsch, Cory Juhl, Mark Sainsbury, and Ted Sider. 
2 See his (1987, 178-82), (1993, 619-25), and (1999, 132-4).   
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trables, trout-turkeys, and wakers.3 I will examine why the mere availability of strange 
kind concepts is meant to pose a threat to the naive conception, and I will show that the 
proponent of the naive conception has the resources to defuse the threat.  
 
2. The Naive Conception and Strange Concepts 
There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our present 
conceptual scheme.4 There are things so distant or so hidden that we have yet to discover 
them. The proponent of the naive conception would not have it any other way. What the 
proponent of the naive conception does deny is that there are highly visible things that we 
encounter on a daily basis but that we have yet to discover; there is a more or less exact 
correlation between the highly visible kinds of things that we frequently encounter and 
our concepts of the kinds of things that we take ourselves to frequently encounter.5 
Furthermore, our conceptions of these kinds of things—in particular, our conceptions of 
their persistence conditions—are largely correct.   
Strange concepts are concepts that correspond to strange ways of classifying and 
individuating objects. All strange concepts are not created equal. There are three 
varieties: those that actually have instances, those that could not possibly have had 
                                                
3 The examples of gollyswoggles, bligers, and dwods come from van Inwagen (1990); 
Shoemaker introduces klables (1988, 201); Ginet, monewments (1985, 220); Sosa, 
snowdiscalls (1987, 178); Goodman, emeroses (1955, 74-5); van Cleve, shmees (1999, 
487-8); Merricks, slithy toves (2000, 50); Lewis, trout-turkeys (1991, 80); Sider, wakers 
(2001, 157). The rest are due to Eli Hirsch (1982 and 1993a).   
4 By ‘conceptual scheme’, I mean nothing more than the collection of concepts that we 
(collectively) employ. Strange conceptual schemes, in this sense, need not be understood 
as exhibiting the kind of incommensurability with our present scheme that Davidson 
(1974) found so objectionable. 
5 By “our concepts,” I mean to exclude the strange concepts listed above which appear 
only in the conceptual repertoires of a handful of philosophers.     
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instances, and those that have no instances but could have. By the lights of the naive 
conception, strange property concepts often do have instances: some things are grue, for 
all it takes for there be something grue is for there to be something that is both green and 
observed before t. There also are toddlescents, where a person is a toddlescent from age 
two until age fourteen. Strange artifact concepts, on the other hand, typically do not have 
instances, but would have had someone decided to make something of the relevant 
artifactual kind. There happen not to be any snowdiscalls, though one could make a 
snowdiscall if one wished.  
Strange counterparts of our natural-kind concepts, on the other hand, are often 
necessarily vacuous. Consider the concept indog. An indog (at its full size) is like a dog 
in nearly all respects except that, unlike a dog, it is metaphysically impossible for an 
indog to survive leaving a house. An indog that comes to the doorway of a house begins 
to shrink at the threshold of the house, at which time an outdog pops into existence and 
begins growing. By the time the outdog has grown to its full size, the indog has shrunk 
and gone out of existence altogether. What it looks like for an indog to shrink at the 
boundary of a house and be replaced by an outdog is exactly the same as what it looks 
like for a dog to leave a house; but an indog is not just a dog that is inside a house, for a 
dog that is inside a house can survive leaving a house.  
On the naive conception, there are no indogs. But there do not just happen not to 
be any indogs; there could not possibly be indogs. In trying to imagine a world more 
hospitable to indogs, one might imagine a world whose laws of nature dictate that, 
whenever an animal attempts to pass through a doorway, it is vaporized and seamlessly 
replaced by a new animal with new matter. But, if this is to be a world in which there are 
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indogs, the animals that are vaporized as they pass through doorways not only must be 
nomologically incapable of leaving a house, but metaphysically incapable. They must be 
incapable of leaving a house even in worlds like ours in which doorways do not vaporize 
anything. But could there really be animals like this, which cannot make it through a 
doorway even under more favorable conditions? This seems impossible. There can be 
dogs that are nomologically incapable of leaving houses but, intuitively, there cannot 
have been indogs.  
 
3. The Argument from Strange Concepts 
How are strange concepts meant to pose a problem for the naive conception? 
There are at least two sorts of worries that one might have, both having to do with the 
apparent arbitrariness of our present scheme. The first is a metaphysical worry that the 
line drawn by the naive conception between the kinds that do and do not have instances is 
intolerably arbitrary.6 The second is an epistemological worry about the likelihood of our 
having acquired the (allegedly) privileged conceptual scheme, given the kinds of factors 
that lead to our acquisition of this scheme.   
My primary focus will be the epistemological worry—not because the 
metaphysical worry is any less serious, but because we are not yet in a position to 
properly assess the metaphysical worry. We cannot assess the claim that it is intolerably 
arbitrary to countenance the kinds of things that the naive conception does but not their 
strange counterparts until we better understand the tacit principles that underwrite our 
pretheoretical judgments and intuitions about the kinds of things that there can and 
                                                
6 See Horgan (1993) and Sidelle (2002, 119). 
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cannot be. Only then will we be in a position to decide whether these judgments comprise 
an arbitrary and unsystematizable hodge-podge or, rather, a complicated but nevertheless 
natural division among fundamentally different kinds of objects. Nevertheless, the 
taxonomy of strange kinds that I provide in the paper will hopefully go some way 
towards showing that these judgments are not as unprincipled as one might initially think. 
The epistemological worry posed by strange concepts is, roughly, that it would be 
an inexplicable coincidence if the kinds of things that we take there to be map perfectly 
onto the kinds of things that there in fact are. Theodore Sider raises this kind of 
epistemological concern: 
On one version of the [naive] view, the entities that exist correspond exactly with 
the categories for continuants in our conceptual scheme: trees, aggregates, statues, 
lumps, persons, bodies, and so on. How convenient! It would be nothing short of a 
miracle if reality just happened to match our conceptual scheme in this way.7 
Sider’s worry appears to have the following form: If the naive conception is correct, then 
there is a correlation between our conceptual scheme and reality which cries out for 
special explanation. But no explanation is available to the proponent of the naive 
conception. So he must regard this correlation as a miraculous stroke of luck. Let us call 
this (simply) the argument from strange concepts. In service of clarifying the argument, I 
will first address the following three preliminary questions: (1) What sort of explanation 
is required? (2) Why is the proponent of the naive conception meant to be unable to 
supply such an explanation? (3) Why (and to what extent) are revisionary theories not 
subject to the same argument? 
                                                
7 Sider (2001, 156-7).   
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 (1) Suppose that a magician takes what appears to be an ordinary, well-shuffled 
deck of cards, shuffles them three times, and produces a well-ordered deck. Intuitively, 
the fact that the deck is now well-ordered stands in need of special explanation. A 
mundane causal explanation—for instance, specifying where each card went in each 
shuffle—would not be entirely satisfactory. Some further explanation is needed because 
the resultant ordering is (in some sense) privileged with respect to various other orderings 
that the cards might have come to have as a result of the shuffling. Likewise, if the naive 
conception is correct, then our present kind concepts are privileged with respect to many 
of their strange counterparts. Unlike their strange counterparts, our concepts have things 
answering to them; ours are “metaphysically successful.” A mundane historical or 
psychological explanation of how we came to have our present conceptual scheme would 
not be entirely satisfactory, for what is needed is an account of why we had a history and 
a psychology that lead us to a metaphysically successful conceptual scheme, rather than 
one that lead us to an unsuccessful scheme. This is the kind of special explanation that is 
required.  
 (2) Why is the proponent of the naive conception meant to be unable to provide 
such an account? The idea, I take it, is that even supposing that the naive conception is 
correct about what kinds of things there are, the fact that those are the kinds that there are 
has no role to play in explaining why we have concepts that apply to them, rather than 
strange counterparts of those concepts. We have the conceptual scheme that we do 
largely as a result of interests (survival, convenience, etc.) that “are scarcely implanted in 
us by nature in order that our beliefs or theories should mirror nature itself.”8 Many 
                                                
8 Wiggins (2001, 141). Here Wiggins is speaking on behalf of his opponents. 
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strange conceptual schemes would serve these interests just as well—schemes which, 
according to the naive conception, are metaphysically unsuccessful.9 Accordingly, it is at 
best fortuitous that we ended up with a metaphysically successful scheme. There is no 
reason to expect the processes by which we acquire our concepts to have endowed us 
with the privileged conceptual scheme rather than some strange counterpart. Since they 
are not designed to select for the privileged scheme, they cannot provide the kind of 
special explanation that we are looking for.  
(3) By denying that our conceptual scheme is in any way privileged, proponents 
of familiar revisionary theories of material objects are spared the burden of having to 
provide a special explanation of why we came to have this scheme. According to 
explosivism, there are objects answering to most (if not all) of the strange counterparts of 
our kind concepts.10 According to eliminativism, most (if not all) of our kind concepts 
fail to apply to anything at all.11 According to relativism, relative to our scheme there are 
exactly those kinds of things that we take there to be, but had we had a strange scheme 
the relevant strange kinds would have existed relative to the scheme that we would then 
have had.12 On any one of these views, our concepts turn out to be no better equipped to 
pick out objects than are their strange counterparts. Accordingly, no special explanation 
                                                
9 Assuming that individuals who employed the in/out repertoire were endowed with the 
kind of cognitive make-up needed for quick dispatch of those concepts, they presumably 
would be no less fit to survive than someone with our conceptual scheme. See Hirsch 
(1993a, ch. 5).  
10 Sosa endorses explosivism (1999, 143), as do Sider (2001, 134-9), Eklund (2006), and 
Thomasson (forthcoming).  
11 Eliminativists include Unger (1980), van Inwagen (1990), Merricks (2001), and Dorr 
(2005). Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) explore (though do not explicitly endorse) an 
especially radical strain of eliminativism. 
12 Relativists include Goodman (1978) and Sidelle (1989).  
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is required for why we have the conceptual scheme that we do, rather than some strange 
counterpart.  
Eli Hirsch, more or less following the lead of Hilary Putnam, defends an 
alternative view—“the doctrine of quantifier variance”—which is meant to allow that our 
concepts are not privileged without incurring commitment to these highly 
counterintuitive revisionary positions.13 According to Hirsch, dogs exist and indogs do 
not exist. Indogs do, however, “shmexist”; and just as we are correct about which kinds 
of things exist, those who employ the indog scheme are correct about which kinds of 
things shmexist. So the two schemes are on a par. But this response seems only to 
postpone Sider’s original worry. For what would then be miraculous is that we came to 
employ the concept existence rather than the concept shmexistence (or thmexistence, or 
khexistence,…). Had our current scheme included the concept shmexistence in place of 
the concept existence, we would have had all manner of false beliefs (e.g., that dogs 
shmexist). And there is no reason for natural selection to have favored a scheme that 
combines our present concepts with the concept existence rather than some strange 
combination. So Hirsch’s view seems no less susceptible to the argument from strange 
concepts than views on which our concepts are privileged with respect to their strange 
counterparts.14 
I will attempt to answer the argument from strange concepts without abandoning 
the natural view that many of our kind concepts are privileged, as is our concept of 
                                                
13 See Hirsch (2002b and 2004), and Putnam (1981 and 1987).   
14 This, however, is not to say that Hirsch cannot answer the argument from strange 
concepts. My proposed answer to the argument will be available to Hirsch as well—the 
key idea being that intelligent individuals who understand their concepts can be expected 
not to make these kinds of a priori errors.   
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existence. But, as I suggested in §2, strange concepts come in importantly different 
varieties, and not every concept in our present scheme is privileged with respect to all of 
its strange counterparts. A proper defense of the naive conception against the argument 
from strange concepts will therefore have to be sensitive to these differences among 
strange concepts. The defense will proceed in three stages. First, I address the argument 
as it applies to those strange concepts that do seem to us to have instances (e.g., 
toddlescent). Second, I address the argument as it applies to strange concepts that seem to 
be necessarily vacuous (e.g., indog). Third, I address the argument as it applies to strange 
concepts that evidently have no instances but could have (e.g., snowdiscall).  
In responding to the argument, I shall attempt to establish the following 
conditional claim: if the naive conception is correct, then nothing in need of special 
explanation goes unexplained. In establishing this conditional, I shall suppose its 
antecedent and argue on that basis for its consequent. Accordingly, one must bear in mind 
that when I assert (for instance) that there are no indogs, this occurs under the supposition 
that the naive conception is correct. I do not argue that the naive conception is correct. 
Rather, I assume that it is correct, and demonstrate that the proponent of the naive 
conception can meet his explanatory obligations.  
 
4. Strange Classifications 
 We begin by considering concepts corresponding to strange ways of classifying 
those things that the naive conception already takes there to be. Call these concepts 
“strange classificatory concepts.” The concept grue and the concept toddlescent each 
have objects answering to them, as does the strange disjunctive concept dwod (where 
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something is a dwod just in case it is a dog or a squid).15 The naive conception has no 
objection to there being things of any of these strange kinds—for they are the very things 
that fall under the kinds with which we are already familiar (children, squids, etc.).  
Since there are objects answering to the strange counterparts of our classificatory 
concepts, acquiring the classificatory concepts that we did is relevantly like acquiring an 
unremarkable poker hand. There may have been an exceptionally low probability of 
acquiring exactly those five cards, but no special explanation is required. Likewise, the 
fact that we acquired these classificatory concepts rather than their strange counterparts 
does not require any special explanation.16  
Of course, once we have the classificatory concepts that we have, there will be a 
privileged way of conceiving of the conditions on belonging to that kind.  For instance, a 
conception of toddlers as children between ages one and three is privileged with respect 
to a conception of toddlers as children between ages five and ten; a ten-year-old simply is 
not a toddler. But there is a perfectly straightforward explanation for why we have the 
right conception of toddlers and the like, and it is the same as the explanation of why we 
do not make other kinds of wild a priori mistakes: we are in good cognitive conditions, 
                                                
15 See van Inwagen (1990, 6).   
16 One might object that, even though their strange counterparts do have compliants, our 
classificatory concepts are in some other way privileged—in that they correspond to more 
“natural” ways of classifying objects—and their acquisition does require special 
explanation. But, even if this is right, it is equally a problem for the revisionary theories 
of material objects discussed in §3. Whatever considerations one might invoke in 
explaining how it is that we came to have natural classificatory concepts, e.g., a Lewis-
style theory on which some concepts are intrinsically eligible to be acquired (see his 1983 
and 1984), presumably will also be available to the proponent of the naive conception. 
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we are intelligent, and we understand our concepts.17 So nothing here that stands in need 
of explanation goes unexplained. Our having the classificatory concepts we do, and the 
correct conceptions of them, is in no way miraculous.  
 One must be careful, here and in what follows, to distinguish between 
individuative kinds and phased kinds. Instances of individuative kinds belong to the kind 
that they do, at all moments of their existence, as a matter of de re necessity. Dog, for 
instance, is an individuative kind: for any dog, it is metaphysically impossible for it to 
cease being a dog without ceasing to exist altogether. Phased kinds are kinds whose 
members can cease to belong to it without ceasing to exist. Toddler is a phased kind: 
when a toddler grows up, he ceases to be a toddler but does not thereby cease to exist. 
Island likewise appears to be a phased kind. When an island is submerged at high tide, it 
ceases to be an island, but does not cease to exist. When it re-emerges at low tide, it is 
once again an island, but has not suffered interrupted existence. As a matter of de dicto 
necessity, nothing that is an island can be wholly underwater. But there is no 
corresponding de re necessity: for any given island, it could have been wholly 
underwater.  
The view that the naive conception is intolerably arbitrary seems more plausible 
than it should when one fails to mark this natural distinction between phased and 
individuative kinds. To illustrate, consider van Inwagen’s argument against the view that 
there are statues but not gollyswoggles, where something is a gollyswoggle just in case it 
                                                
17 Some might suggest that we do not make this kind of a priori mistake because we 
know the definition of ‘toddler’. I, for one, did not. But even before consulting the 
dictionary, I knew (with certainty) that a ten-year-old is not a toddler. 
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essentially has precisely this shape [demonstrating some complicated and arbitrary 
shape].18 
[I]f you can make a statue on purpose by kneading clay, then you can make a 
gollyswoggle by accident by kneading clay. But if you can make a gollyswoggle 
by accident by kneading clay, then you must, as you idly work the clay in your 
fingers, be causing the generation and corruption of the members of a compact 
series of objects of infinitesimal duration.19 
The argument is compelling, but why? We do not ordinarily take creative intentions to be 
irrelevant to what (if anything) someone makes. A meteoroid that, as a result of random 
collisions with space junk, comes to be a qualitative duplicate of some actual statue is not 
itself a statue. Nor do the collisions bring into existence something with the persistence 
conditions distinctive of statues, something that cannot survive further collisions that 
deprive the meteoroid of its statuesque form. It would be a different story had God 
masterminded the collisions with the intent of sculpting a statue out of the meteoroid. 
Likewise, while one can successfully intend to make a statue or a gollyswoggle, there is 
no reason to think that idly and momentarily kneading some clay into the shape of a 
statue or gollyswoggle results in the creation of something that has the relevant shapes 
essentially. 
 Van Inwagen’s argument is compelling only when one runs together the 
individuative-kind concept gollyswoggle with the associated phased concept. A piece of 
clay may be gollyswoggle-shaped without being a gollyswoggle, for it can be 
                                                
18 See van Inwagen (1990, 126). Van Inwagen treats this as a reductio of the view that 
there are statues. 
19 1990, 126. 
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gollyswoggle-shaped without being essentially gollyswoggle-shaped. Let us call anything 
that has that shape a ‘gollyswogglep’. Idly kneading clay may indeed result in a 
gollyswogglep (and then a hollyswogglep, a jollyswogglep, and so on). But this does not 
involve the generation of any new object, any more than a four-year-old’s becoming a 
five-year-old involves the generation of any new object. It involves only a piece of clay 
coming to be, and then ceasing to be, a gollyswogglep. And the proponent of the naive 
conception will readily agree that there are gollyswogglesp. For a gollyswogglep (unlike a 
gollyswoggle) is just a piece of clay with a certain shape.  
So, if one starts thinking that there is nothing so bad about gollyswoggles, or 
snowdiscalls, or indogs—not on the basis of any argument, but just by failing to see how 
they are relevantly different from pieces of clay, snowballs, and dogs—it is worth 
pausing to consider whether one has in mind the phased or individuative versions of these 
strange kinds. Gollyswogglesp, indogsp, and snowdiscallsp are perfectly ordinary things 
(i.e., pieces of clay, portions of dogs, and pieces of snow) with ordinary persistence 
conditions. Gollyswoggles, indogs, and snowdiscalls, by contrast, are extraordinarily 
strange.  
 
5. Strange Unsatisfiable Concepts 
We turn now to strange concepts that, intuitively, are necessarily vacuous. Many 
strange individuative-kind concepts (e.g., the concept indog) are unsatisfiable by the 
lights of the naive conception, and insofar as our own individuative-kind concepts are 
satisfiable, they are privileged with respect to these strange counterparts. In the present 
section, I explain why we would expect to have acquired the privileged concepts and not 
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their strange, unsatisfiable counterparts. In the following section, I address the complaint 
that it is miraculous that our conceptions of the persistence conditions of the relevant 
kinds accurately reflect their persistence conditions. I will focus on natural-kind concepts, 
such as the concept dog, which are a paradigm case of concepts whose strange 
individuative counterparts are unsatisfiable.  
It has come to be widely accepted that which concepts we employ is not 
determined entirely by our internal states. We have the concept water, while our intrinsic 
duplicates on twin earth have the concept twater, a concept that does not apply to water 
but only to the superficially waterlike stuff on their planet. Had we acquired the concept 
twater or any of the countless other counterparts of the concept water, we would have had 
metaphysically unsuccessful concepts. But no one thinks that it is a miracle that we have 
the concept water rather than one of its vacuous counterparts. We have the concept water 
and not the concept twater because we have interacted with water and not twater. (Indeed, 
many philosophers hold that it is impossible to acquire the concept water unless one has 
interacted with water.20)  
Nor is it in any way mysterious that our natural-kind concepts work in this way. 
We evidently have tacit semantic intentions that certain of our words (but not others) 
express concepts that apply to all and only instances of the natural kinds with which we 
interact and, accordingly, to employ concepts of those specific kinds.21 This is why some 
of our words (like ‘water’ and ‘gold’) are “twin-earthable” while others (like ‘food’ and 
‘shelter’) are not. It is miraculous that our natural-kind concepts are metaphysically 
                                                
20 See, e.g., Putnam (1981), McGinn (1989), Sawyer (1998), and Nuccetelli (2003).  
21 See Bealer (2002, 108-9) and my (2006, 509). 
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successful only to the extent that we have these tacit intentions and that they are 
efficacious. And there is nothing especially miraculous about that.  
For exactly the same reason, it is no miracle that we employ the concept dog 
rather than the concept indog (or other strange counterpart of that concept). We have the 
former and not the latter because it is dogs and not indogs with which we are acquainted. 
That it is dogs and not indogs with which we are acquainted is relevant because we have 
the intention of employing a natural-kind concept that applies to those furry, barking 
animals of our acquaintance. And it is no miracle that we have these intentions or that 
they are efficacious. Given that we have these intentions, we can expect to have acquired 
metaphysically successful natural-kind concepts, so long as there is any natural kind there 
at all for a concept to latch onto. 
This is so even if one is partially in error about the features of the things with 
which one is acquainted. We mistakenly believed that Hesperus was a star, but our word 
‘Hesperus’ still managed to express a concept that applied to the planet Venus 
nonetheless. Likewise, we could still have come to possess the concept dog even had we 
mistakenly believed that the doglike things of our acquaintance had persistence 
conditions P, when in fact they have persistence conditions P*. Arguably, however, the 
relevant conceptions must be at least close enough to being satisfied by dogs in order for 
us to have the concept dog. I address the complaint that it is miraculous that our 
conceptions are not radically inaccurate in the following section.  
Here is one further reason that one might expect us to have metaphysically 
successful natural-kind concepts. David Lewis has argued that there is a special class of 
properties that are especially eligible to be referred to, and this plays a critical role in his 
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answer to skeptical arguments directed against the possibility of determinate reference.22 
If we are to have an answer to related worries concerning the possibility of determinate 
thought, there must likewise be a special class of intrinsically eligible concepts—though 
their eligibility may derive entirely from the eligibility of the associated properties. (It is 
crucial for Lewis’s purposes that the properties and concepts be intrinsically eligible, not 
just eligible relative to our specific psychological make-up.) I will not argue that there are 
eligible properties and concepts; but some proponents of revisionary theories of material 
objects (e.g., Sider himself: 2001, xxi-xxii) already accept that there are, and so might 
find the following compelling. 
Suppose, then, that concepts may be more or less eligible to be acquired. If our 
present concepts are more eligible than their necessarily vacuous counterparts, then there 
is nothing miraculous about the fact that we acquired these concepts rather than those 
counterpart concepts. And, given the naive conception, there is  reason to believe that our 
natural-kind concepts are especially eligible to be acquired. First, the very fact that we all 
naturally came to have the concept dog, rather than some strange counterpart of that 
concept, is at least prima facie reason to believe that the concept dog is more eligible than 
its strange counterparts. Second, if there really is this privileged class of intrinsically 
eligible concepts, one would expect them to have some special ontological status which 
sets them apart from other concepts. And the concept dog does have a special status: it 
can have instances whereas the relevant strange counterparts are necessarily vacuous.23 
                                                
22 See his 1983 and 1984.   
23 Lewis contends that the class of eligible referents (properties and things) just is the 
class of natural referents (properties and things). Things, for Lewis, are natural to the 
extent that they have “a boundary well demarcated by differences in highly natural 
properties” (1983, 187). Since all dogs have boundaries demarcated by differences in 
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So, if there are indeed intrinsically eligible concepts, it is no miracle that we came to have 
metaphysically successful concepts rather than their strange and unsatisfiable 
counterparts. 
Just as before, however, in order to acquire these eligible concepts our 
conceptions would arguably have to be near enough to being satisfied by the associated 
kinds. That is because, on the Lewisian account, the contents of our thoughts are 
determined only in part by the intrinsic eligibility of relevant concepts. The platitudes that 
we associate with the relevant concepts also have a role to play, and the concepts that we 
come to have will be the ones that find the best balance between eligibility and satisfying 
our platitudes. So, again, the proponent of the naive conception would need to explain 
why it is not miraculous that our conceptions come near enough to being satisfied by the 
things with which we are acquainted to ensure that we acquire kind concepts that apply to 
them. Let us now consider why we should expect to have appropriate conceptions of the 
kinds of things with which we interact, given the naive conception. 
 
6. Strange Conceptions of Natural Kinds 
We have seen that, given the correctness of the naive conception, there is good 
reason to expect there to be a strong correlation between the natural kinds that we 
encounter and the natural-kind concepts that we employ. But the proponent of the naive 
conception holds, not only that we have metaphysically successful kind concepts, but also 
that we have largely correct conceptions of the relevant kinds—in particular, as regards 
                                                                                                                                            
highly natural properties, while indogs do not, dogs are a more natural kind of thing than 
indogs. This might serve as one further reason for thinking that the concept dog is more 
eligible than the concept indog. 
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their persistence conditions. These tacit conceptions guide our judgments about whether 
some item that we have been perceptually tracking does or does not survive a given 
change.   
One might worry that I have only postponed the charge of miraculousness: for 
what explains the fact that we have the correct conception of dogs, rather than some 
strange counterpart conception? For instance, we might have come to have a conception 
of dogs as being metaphysically incapable of passing through a doorway, and upon 
seeing a dog leave a house we might have judged (even in excellent viewing conditions)  
that the dog outside the house is a different dog from the dog that was inside the house 
moments before. There are countless strange and incorrect conceptions of dogs that we 
might have come to have. The proponent of the naive conception must explain how it is 
that, among the countless strange conceptions of dogs that we might have come to have, 
we came to have the accurate conception of their persistence conditions. Or else, he must 
admit that it is a miraculous stroke of luck.24 
Here is a first (ultimately unsatisfactory) pass at explaining why we have the 
privileged conception of dogs. Dogs can survive passing through a doorway. To judge 
that the dog outside the house is different from the dog inside the house, upon seeing the 
dog pass through the doorway in good viewing conditions, would be a grievous error. We 
do not make these kinds of grievous errors because we understand the concept dog, 
because we are in good cognitive conditions (we are intelligent, attentive, not intoxicated, 
etc.), and because we do not have radically false empirical beliefs about doorways (e.g., 
                                                
24 The problem at hand is closely related to what Michael Rea has called the “discovery 
problem,” which concerns how we come to know the modal properties of the kinds of 
things that we encounter. See Rea (2002, 77-107).   
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that they vaporize and seamlessly replicate things that attempt to pass through them). So 
it is no more miraculous that we have largely correct conceptions of dogs than it is that 
we are intelligent and understand the concepts that we employ. Were we in extremely 
poor cognitive conditions, it would indeed have been surprising if we arrived at the right 
conceptions. But we are in good cognitive conditions, and it is idle skepticism to suppose 
otherwise. We are intelligent and we do understand our concepts, and there is nothing at 
all miraculous about that. So it is not at all miraculous that we have a largely correct 
conception of dogs. 
This explanation is unsatisfactory. While the claim that it is miraculous that we 
understand our concepts may at first seem unmotivated, it makes better sense in light of 
the externalist account of concept acquisition invoked above. Indeed it would be 
somewhat magical if the mere possession of concepts acquired in this way rendered us 
immune to such errors. On an internalist picture, which kind concepts we have would be 
in large part constrained by our conceptions of those kinds, leaving little room for 
misunderstanding our own concepts. But once this tight connection between concept and 
conception is severed, the possibility of error looms large—and the less concept 
acquisition is antecedently constrained by our conceptions, the greater the possibility of 
error.25   
For this reason, appealing to the fact that we understand the concept dog and other 
natural-kind concepts that are acquired by way of the indicated kind of tacit intention 
                                                
25 By way of analogy, consider an individual in the sort of position that Burge imagines—
who shares our concept sofa but misapplies it to overstuffed armchairs (1979, 80)—and 
suppose that Burge is correct that he has the concepts that he does largely as a result of 
the activities of his linguistic community. He possesses the concept sofa, but surely no 
amount of solitary a priori reflection or gain in intelligence will enable him to uncover 
the error.  
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cannot serve as a wholly satisfactory explanation of why we have the correct conceptions 
of the relevant kinds. Nevertheless, there is something right about explaining the fact that 
we have the correct conceptions of the relevant kinds in terms of understanding concepts. 
The key will be to focus on concepts that are not acquired in this way and that therefore 
are not vulnerable to this kind of error. I have in mind such basic elements of our 
conceptual repertoire as the concepts existence, identical, distinct, object, change, 
persistence, intrinsic, possibility, necessity, size, shape, color, part, and location. 
On a naive conception of material objects, not only is it impossible for there to be 
indogs, it is impossible for there to be anything that ceases to exist simply as a result of 
changing its location and without undergoing any intrinsic change. Anyone who 
possesses the concept persistence and is in good cognitive conditions will be aware of 
these and other platitudes about persistence.26 It is no more miraculous that we conceive 
of dogs as being able to survive the transition from being indoors to being outdoors than 
it is that we are intelligent, that we understand such concepts as persistence, intrinsicality, 
and location, and that we do not have radically false beliefs about what doorways do. 
And the reasons for worrying about whether we understand the concept dog (i.e., that its 
acquisition conditions are externally constrained) seem not to extend to such basic 
concepts as persistence, intrinsic, and location. 27 
                                                
26 Of course, it is possible to be in excellent cognitive conditions and understand the 
concept persistence (and related concepts) as well as anyone and yet not accept such 
platitudes. Explosivists like Sosa and Sider are a case in point. But the explanation of 
their error is straightforward: they have been misled by compelling but unsound 
philosophical reasoning. See Bealer (2002, 111-13) for an account of this familiar kind of 
intuitional error which does not require understanding these philosophers as in any way 
lacking mastery of their concepts. 
27 As indicated in §3, Hirsch may appeal to these same considerations in explaining why 
it is no miracle that we came to have privileged combinations of kind concepts and 
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Perhaps there is some other reason to worry about whether we are in a position to 
understand even these fundamental concepts. But it is hard to find reasons that do not 
give rise to a general skepticism about our ability to understand any of our concepts. And 
this general skepticism threatens to undermine everything that we take ourselves to have 
established on the basis of conceptual inquiry, including pretty much every premise of 
every argument that has been raised against the naive conception.28 So it seems that we 
must allow that, at least in general, we understand our concepts and do not make grave 
conceptual errors. The burden would then be on the opponent of the naive conception to 
find some special reason to think that we are prone to misunderstand such concepts as 
persistence, change, identity, and the like. Otherwise, the proponent of the naive 
conception may simply help himself to whatever turns out to be the correct account of 
how a priori knowledge is possible.  
This is all consistent with its being the case that, in the early stages of our 
cognitive development, we conceived of dogs as being unable to survive leaving a house 
(cave, enclosure, etc.), and that—since our conception was not near enough to being 
satisfied by dogs—we initially came to have the concept indog. Even so, as we became 
more intelligent, one would expect there to have been a conceptual “evolution,” or 
“shift,” away from radically strange conceptions and toward the privileged conception. 
                                                                                                                                            
“existence-like” quantifier concepts: suitably intelligent beings would naturally come to 
have privileged combinations, and can be expected not to come to have strange 
combinations, since employing strange combinations would result in countless a priori 
false beliefs. 
28 For instance, that there cannot be vague objects, that there cannot be materially 
coincidence objects, that statues (if they exist) cannot survive squashing, that having 
nonredundant causal powers is a prerequisite for the existence of material objects, that 
our acquisition of a metaphysically successful scheme stands in need of special 
explanation, and so forth.   
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Suitably intelligent beings would find it unnatural to continue employing radically 
strange conceptions because these conceptions would seem to them to be unsatisfiable. 
This process would likely continue even once we came to have conceptions that were 
near-enough satisfied, and finally acquired the privileged concepts. In the words of David 
Wiggins: “There is room for one and the same concept of what it is to be an f , anchored 
as it is to examples that are grouped together in virtue of resemblances that are 
nomologically grounded, to be unfolded gradually in a succession of different and 
improving conceptions” (2001, 82).   
Must we conclude, however, that we now possess exactly the right conceptions of 
the persistence conditions of dogs and the like? If we truly have acquired our present 
conceptual scheme as the result of the envisaged “succession of different and improving 
conceptions,” it would be immodest to suppose that that we have already reached the end 
point of this process. I am inclined to agree that our pre-theoretical beliefs about the 
persistence conditions of dogs and other natural kinds may not be entirely correct (and, 
thus, that the naive conception may not be entirely correct). This is exactly what one 
would expect from a realist conception of material objects as mind-independent, a 
moderate rationalism on which intuition is reliable but not infallible, and a modesty about 
our degree of intelligence. That said, our cognitive evolution occurred over such a long 
period of time that perhaps there was more than enough time for us to have reached this 
end point, even without any deliberate, intuition-driven investigation into the persistence 
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7. Strange Intuitions 
 A related worry has to do with whether it is miraculous or otherwise inexplicable 
that we have truth-tracking intuitions about the kinds of things that there can and cannot 
be. One might hold that we have the intuitions that we do largely as the result of arbitrary 
features of evolutionary history and upbringing, and would have had quite different 
intuitions had things gone differently. It might be claimed that the proponent of the naive 
conception must explain why we came to have the privileged intuitions—since, by 
hypothesis, any other pattern of intuitions about the persistence conditions that things can 
and cannot have would have led us to mistaken conceptions of those things—or else he 
must regard our coming to have truth-tracking intuitions as a miraculous stroke of luck. 
But, just as before, this understanding of intuition threatens to give rise to an 
extreme brand of skepticism, one which threatens to undermine much of what we take 
ourselves to have learned on the basis of intuition-driven philosophy: that knowledge is 
not justified true belief, that behaviorism is false, that content internalism is false, that 
organisms and artifacts have their origins essentially, that names do not have nonrigid 
descriptive content, and on and on. If there is no reason to expect our intuitions to be 
truth-tracking, then they plainly cannot serve as a justificatory basis for accepting these 
results. It is therefore no more incumbent upon the proponent of the naive conception to 
explain why one should expect our intuitions to be correct than any other armchair 
philosopher.    
 In light of this, one might grant that it is no miracle that our intuitions track the 
truth in general, but nevertheless hold that there are special reasons to worry about our 
intuitions about material objects in particular. I shall address four candidate reasons. 
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First, one might contend that the cognitive mechanism responsible for generating our 
intuitions about persistence is primarily responsive to certain contingent features of our 
language, not to the facts about persistence. For instance, one might suggest that this 
mechanism yields the intuition that there can be things of a given kind just in case (i) it is 
intuitively possible that there be things satisfying the nonmodal conditions for 
membership in the kind in question, and (ii) one has a sortal term that purports to apply to 
things having the persistence conditions associated with that kind. The suggestion, then, 
is that we can expect to have truth-tracking intuitions only if we are lucky enough to have 
a language containing just the right sortal expressions.   
But our intuitions about the kinds of things that there can and cannot be simply 
are not governed in this way. One does not first need to acquire the term ‘snowdiscall’ in 
order to have the intuition that it is possible that there be something made of snow that 
can survive taking on all and only shapes between being round and being disc-shaped. So 
having an appropriate sortal term is not a necessary condition for having the relevant 
intuition.29 Nor do (i) and (ii) provide a jointly sufficient condition for having the relevant 
intuitions. Readers of this paper will all have acquired the sortal term ‘indog’, but 
presumably do not now have the intuition that there can be things that are metaphysically 
incapable of leaving a house.30 So this cannot really be the mechanism underlying our 
intuitions about material objects. 
                                                
29 One might respond that we do have the relevant sortal term, namely, ‘artifact’. But if 
‘sortal term’ is to be understood in this broad way, then the proposed mechanism fails to 
provide a sufficient condition for having the intuition that there are things of a given kind, 
for incars are artifacts but we do not have the intuition that there can be things with the 
persistence conditions characteristic of incars.  
30 One might respond that this is because the term ‘indog’ has not yet been sufficiently 
entrenched in the language. But if we add, as a necessary condition, that a term be 
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Second, one might argue that we have reason to mistrust our intuitions about 
material objects because the distinctions that they lead us to draw between the kinds of 
things that there can and cannot be seem not to “carve nature at its joints.” For instance, 
one may contend that indogs and outdogs are not relevantly unlike other kinds of things 
that we are willing to countenance, for instance, islands. Just as in the case of outdogs, 
there would be no islands if landmasses did not protrude in the relevant way.31 But, as we 
have already seen, islands do differ from outdogs in relevant respects. Island is a phased 
kind, whereas outdog is an individuative kind. This is a real metaphysical difference, and 
one that our intuitions do track. For notice that, intuitively, there can be indogsp, where 
indogsp are simply portions of dogs inside houses. And there intuitively cannot be 
islandsi, where an islandi is a land mass surrounded on all sides by water and 
metaphysically incapable of existing underwater. So our intuitions do track relevant 
distinctions. As indicated in §4, it is likely that much of the apparent arbitrariness of the 
naive conception is the result of conflating individuative kinds with associated phased 
kinds.32 
Third, one might complain that the intuitions about material objects are especially 
dubious because they purport to be about what exists, and intuition cannot be expected to 
be reliable on such matters. This may well be right, but the intuitions at issue here do not 
                                                                                                                                            
sufficiently entrenched, then we cannot explain why people immediately have the 
intuition that there can be apceans, buncles, carples, and dwods. 
31 I thank Adam Elga for pressing me on this point. 
32 One might complain that we cannot trust our intuitions about material objects in 
particular because, for some reason or other, we cannot trust intuitions about what exists. 
But the intuitions that I rely on seem wholly innocuous. For instance, the intuition that, in 
a scenario in which a dog leaves a house, there is nothing that shrinks and vanishes at the 
boundary of the house seems just as innocuous as the intuition that, in a scenario in which 
a dog loses a hair, there is a something that survives the change.   
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purport to be about what exists. Rather, they are all either about what can possibly exist 
or about what would exist if these or those conditions were met, for instance, the intuition 
that, in a scenario in which a dog leaves a house, there is nothing that shrinks and 
vanishes at the boundary of the house. This intuition seems just as innocuous as the 
intuition that, in a scenario in which a dog loses a hair, there is a something that survives 
the change—and it is on the basis of such intuitions that virtually all metaphysicians 
reject mereological essentialism. And there seems to be no reason to think that these 
intuitions  are any more suspect than any other modal intuitions (e.g., about the necessity 
of origins, the modal status of the laws of nature, and other synthetic a priori matters).    
 Finally, one might suggest that our intuitions about what kinds of material objects 
there can and cannot be are primarily responsive to arbitrary features of our upbringing, 
on the grounds that there are members of other cultures who employ strange conceptual 
schemes, and to whom it seems (intuitively) that there are things answering to the strange 
concepts that they employ. Of course, real-life examples of strange conceptual schemes 
do not pose even a prima facie threat unless they include concepts that, according to the 
naive conception, cannot have instances. But none of the familiar cases of real-life 
strange concepts are like this. We sometimes find cultures whose members employ 
strange color concepts (corresponding to alternative ways of dividing up the color 
spectrum) or strange phased concepts (e.g., applying to the best friend of one’s uncle). 
But such strange concepts do have instances according to the naive conception; our 
intuitions do not diverge. We likewise have no trouble recognizing that there truly are 
different kinds of snowflakes falling under the fine-grained snowflake concepts that the 
Eskimo (allegedly) employ.  
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One might complain that, even if there in fact are no communities who have 
radically different intuitions about what kinds of material objects there can and cannot be, 
it is at least metaphysically possible that there be such a community. I agree, but I do not 
see why this is cause for any special concern. For it is likewise metaphysically possible 
for there to have been a whole community who had the intuition that Gettier-man does 
know that the man who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket, or that things can be red 
all over and green all over. It is likewise metaphysically possible for there to have been 
people whose sensory experiences are radically in conflict with ours, or who have 
radically different belief-forming mechanisms or who think that modus ponens is an 
invalid form of argument. But the mere possibility of such communities does not give us 
any serious reason to doubt the reliability of our own faculties. At best, it is just an idle 
skepticism. 
This concludes my discussion of skepticism about material-object intuitions. 
Rather than providing positive reasons for expecting to have intuitions that track the truth 
(which would have led us far beyond the scope of this paper), I have suggested only that 
there seem not to be any special reasons to think that these intuitions in particular only 
accidentally track the truth.  
 
8. Strange Artifact Concepts 
Let us now turn to strange concepts that have no instances but could have. (I will 
focus exclusively on artifactual kinds; I know of no other kinds belonging to this 
category.) There are no snowdiscalls (as far as I know) though one can presumably make 
one, for instance, by packing some snow into a ball while intending to make a 
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snowdiscall. One who makes a snowdiscall, however, does not thereby make a snowball, 
nor does one who makes a snowball thereby make a snowdiscall, even though the two 
products may be indistinguishable. That the kind of artifacts that there are depends in 
large part upon the creative intentions of producers is deeply a part of our naive 
conception of material objects;33 and, as indicated above, I will not argue that the naive 
conception is correct, but rather suppose that it is and argue on that basis that nothing in 
need of explanation goes unexplained. 
First, let us consider the argument from strange concepts as it applies to the 
original producers of various artifacts. There is a sense in which the artifact concepts 
employed by original producers are privileged with respect to their strange counterparts 
and another sense in which they are not. Consider the uninstantiated concept spoon*, 
where a spoon* is like a spoon but with different (yet satisfiable) persistence conditions. 
The concept spoon is not privileged with respect to the concept spoon* in that they are 
equally poised to be metaphysically successful: had producers come to have the concept 
spoon*, they would have made spoon*s. So the fact that, prior to production, the 
producers of spoons employed the concept spoon rather than spoon* does not stand in 
need of special explanation. Of course, there will be some explanation of how the 
producers came to employ one concept rather than the other, but this explanation can be 
given entirely in terms of mundane causal or cultural factors.   
On the other hand, since there are spoons but no spoon*s, the concept spoon is to 
that extent privileged with respect to the concept spoon*—for only the former has 
compliants. Accordingly, the fact that producers of prototype spoons have the former 
                                                
33 See, e.g., Thomasson (2003).   
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concept rather than the latter stands in need of explanation. But this is easily explained. 
For their success in creating a spoon depends upon their intending to create a spoon. The 
fact that they have concepts that apply to their products it no more miraculous than their 
ability to know what they intended to create.  
How about mere consumers and subsequent producers of artifacts? As before, 
since there are spoons but no spoon*s, the concept spoon is privileged with respect to the 
concept spoon*, and so the fact that they acquired the former rather than the latter stands 
in need of explanation. Again, though, there is reason to expect them to have the 
privileged concepts that apply to the artifacts that they encounter. As we learned from 
Tyler Burge, we wield our concepts deferentially;34 and since, as we just saw, there is 
excellent reason to suppose that those to whom we defer (in this case, producers of 
prototypes) had the metaphysically successful concepts, we can expect to have the 
appropriate concepts as well. It is likewise no miracle that we have the appropriate 
conceptions of the persistence conditions of the artifacts that we encounter. For it is a 
miracle that we have the correct conception of (say) spoons only to the extent that it is 
miracle that we know what kind of thing the makers of spoons intended to make. And 
there is nothing miraculous about that, insofar as we are likely to have acquired 
testimonial evidence concerning the nature of the products.  
Of course, since it is the beliefs and intentions of producers, not consumers, that 
determine the kind and nature of artifacts, we (consumers) should expect to be mistaken 
about the natures of artifacts when we are ignorant of, or mistaken about, the intentions 
of the producers—for instance, when we unearth ancient kitchen utensils and mistake 
                                                
34 Burge (1979).  
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them for religious relics. But, setting aside such cases, we can expect to have the 
privileged concepts and conceptions of the artifacts with which we interact.  
 
9. Conclusion  
 I have attempted to provide a general framework for answering the argument from 
strange concepts without adopting a revisionary theory of material objects. I have argued 
that, in the case of some strange concepts, the fact that we did not come to have them 
does not stand in need of special explanation and that, for others, the fact that we did not 
come to have them can be explained. In seeing how the framework might be extended to 
accommodate the countless kind concepts that I have not discussed here, one will have to 
attend carefully to one’s intuitions about the metaphysics of familiar kinds and their 
strange counterparts. If one finds these intuitions unmanageable at times, one should bear 
in mind that this may be because metaphysics is difficult, not because the naive 
conception is defective. And if one finds the resultant answer to the argument from 
strange concepts lacking in the elegance provided by revisionary answers, one should 
bear in mind that it is more important that a theory be correct than that it be elegant. 
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II 
Restricted Composition Without Sharp Cut-Offs* 
 
 
1. The Argument from Vagueness 
On the naive conception of material objects, mereological composition is 
restricted. Some objects together compose something (e.g., these atoms arranged 
tablewise), while others do not (e.g., my nose and the Eiffel Tower). A great many 
metaphysicians have rejected the naive conception in favor of universalism, the thesis 
that composition is unrestricted.35 Perhaps the most influential argument for universalism 
is the argument from vagueness, first advanced by David Lewis, and then elaborated and 
defended by Theodore Sider.36 The argument runs as follows: 
(A1) If composition is restricted, then it is possible that there be a soritical series 
for composition. 
(A2) Necessarily, for any soritical series for any F, either there are borderline 
cases of F in the series or there is a sharp cut-off with respect to F.37 
                                                
* This paper has a long history, and I has benefited greatly from discussions and 
correspondence with many people. In particular, I would like to thank Chad Carmichael, 
Josh Dever, Mike Huemer, Dave Liebesman, Aidan McGlynn, Trenton Merricks, Bryan 
Pickel, Ted Sider, and, especially, Matti Eklund for extensive comments on multiple 
drafts of this paper and Mark Sainsbury for many invaluable discussions on these topics. 
Finally, I am indebted to George Bealer who first suggested to me that vagueness might 
not be the source of the indeterminacy of Sider’s numerical sentences. 
35 See, e.g., David Lewis (1986, 212-3), Mark Heller (1990, 49f), James van Cleve 
(1999/1986), Michael Rea (1998), Theodore Sider (2001), Hud Hudson (2001), and 
Achille Varzi (2005).  
36 The argument appears in Lewis (1986, 212-3), Sider (1997, 214-22), and Sider (2001, 
120-32).   
37 To say that there is a sharp cut-off with respect to F in such a series is to say, not just 
that there is a pair of adjacent cases such that one is definitely F and the other is definitely 
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(A3) There cannot be sharp cut-offs with respect to composition. 
(A4) There cannot be borderline cases of composition. 
(A5) So, there cannot be a soritical series for composition. 
(A6) So composition is not restricted. 
To say that it is possible that there be a soritical series for composition is to say that it is 
possible that there be a series of cases leading from a case in which composition 
definitely does occur to case in which it definitely does not, where each case is extremely 
similar—in some respect or other—to adjacent cases. Only a proponent of restricted 
composition who denies that composition ever occurs will resist the first premise.  
Premise A3 has been the locus of most of the critical literature on the argument 
from vagueness.38 It is beyond doubt that this premise is false. One can easily construct a 
soritical series for composition that contains a sharp cut-off by varying adjacent cases 
with respect to a feature that is irrelevant to whether composition occurs (e.g., the color 
or price of the relevant items). But the argument from vagueness can be fortified so as to 
require one who wishes to block the argument without allowing for borderline 
composition to endorse a far stronger claim: 
(A1') If composition is restricted, then it is possible that there be a soritical series 
for composition in which there are no sharp cut-offs.  
(A2') If it is possible that there be a soritical series for composition in which there 
are no sharp cut-offs, then it is possible that there be borderline cases of 
composition. 
                                                                                                                                            
not F, but also that this existential generalization has a witness, be it (Fa1 & ~Fa2) or (Fa2 
& ~Fa3) or … or (Fan-1 & ~Fan)  
38 See Markosian (1998), Merricks (2005), Smith (2006), and Nolan (2006). 
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(A4) There cannot be borderline cases of composition.  
(A5') So, there cannot be a soritical series for composition in which there are no 
sharp cut-offs.    
(A6) So composition is not restricted. 
Premise (A3) falls out completely, and (A1') can be resisted only if one accepts that every 
possible soritical series for composition contains a sharp cut-off. But this is 
counterintuitive in the extreme. Suppose that I am assembling a table, by fastening the 
top to the base. Just as the removal of one grain cannot make the difference between a 
heap and a non-heap, moving the top and the base one fraction of a nanometer closer 
together cannot make the difference between composing something and not composing 
something. 
Those who hold this stronger thesis that every soritical series for composition 
contains a sharp cut-off may contend that the kinds of features that intuitively are relevant 
to whether composition occurs (e.g., spatial proximity, degree of unity) are not the 
features that in fact are relevant to whether composition occurs; and the genuinely 
relevant features, it may be argued, do not admit of degrees.39 I will not pursue this line 
of response. Suffice it to say that this response is not available to one who is interested in 
blocking the argument from vagueness in a way that respects our intuitions regarding the 
conditions under which composition occurs. 
Premise A4, by contrast, is highly questionable. There will be points in the 
assembly of the table at which the top and the base are just beginning to be fastened 
together and at which, intuitively, there is no fact of the matter whether they compose 
                                                
39 See, e.g., Merricks (2005). 
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anything. It seems just as clear that there can be borderline cases of composition as that 
there can be borderline cases of heaps or baldness.  
Those who for independent reasons accept universalism will deny that it is clear 
that there can be borderline composition; they will insist that any plurality of items 
composes, at the very least, a mereological sum. But even proponents of universalism 
may still have a vested interest in resisting Sider’s argument against borderline 
composition. For few metaphysicians are willing to accept that tables are mere sums.40 It 
follows that if some things definitely compose a table then they compose something in 
addition to a sum. But if it is indeterminate whether they compose a table, then it is 
indeterminate whether they compose something in addition to a sum. And if it is 
indeterminate whether they compose something in addition to a sum, then it is 
indeterminate how many things there are.41 But as we shall see in the following section, if 
the argument against borderline composition is successful, then such count indeterminacy 
is impossible. So even those who are sympathetic to universalism—on the grounds that 
whenever you have some things, they are the parts of a sum—have reason to resist the 
                                                
40 The most obvious reason for thinking that tables are not sums is that they have 
different persistence conditions from sums: sums, unlike tables, can survive arbitrary 
rearrangements of their parts. So, by Leibniz’s law, no table is identical to any sum. 
Some universalists (e.g., Lewis 1986, Sider 2001) resist this style of argument, 
maintaining that tables and sums are identical, but only contingently so; but their 
strategies for resisting these arguments face serious problems (see, e.g., Merricks 2003a 
against the metaphysical framework and Fine 2003 against the semantic framework of 
contingent identity theories). 
41 More cautiously (anticipating the distinction between the two types of borderline 
composition just below), if it is indeterminate whether they compose something in 
addition to a sum, and if it is not definitely the case that there is something in addition to 
the sum such that it is indeterminate whether they compose that thing, then it is 
indeterminate how many things there are.  
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argument against borderline composition, so long as they (i) are averse to sharp cut-offs 
and (ii) deny that tables can be identified with sums. 
In what follows, I present the Sider’s argument against borderline composition, 
identify what I take to be its false premise, and supply independent support for denying 
this premise. It is typically assumed that one cannot block this argument without 
incurring commitment to vague logical vocabulary and, in turn, to some form of ontic 
vagueness. I show that the argument can be resisted without denying that logical 
vocabulary is perfectly precise. Consequently, we must reassess the extent to which the 
proponent of borderline composition is committed to any kind of ontic vagueness.  
 A point of clarification before turning to the argument against borderline 
composition. There are two varieties of borderline composition. First, there are cases in 
which some object which definitely exists (e.g., Kilimanjaro) lacks precise boundaries—
that is, it is indeterminate which things are its parts. Second, there are cases like that of 
the top and the base in which there are some things such that it is indeterminate whether 
they compose something without there definitely being something such that it is 
indeterminate whether they compose it. Call the former ‘type-1 borderline composition’ 
and the latter ‘type-2 borderline composition’. In what follows, let us understand 
premises A1' and A4 as implicitly restricted to type-2 borderline composition. 
 
2. Against Borderline Composition 
 Here  is a reconstruction of Sider’s argument that there cannot be borderline cases 
of composition:42  
                                                
42 Sider (2001, 125-30). Cf. Lewis (1986, 212-3). 
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(B1) If there can be (type-2) borderline cases of composition, then there can be 
count indeterminacy.  
(B2) If there can be count indeterminacy, then it is possible that some numerical 
sentence lacks a determinate truth value. 
(B3) Necessarily, if a numerical sentence lacks a determinate truth value, then 
some expression in it is vague.  
(B4) Necessarily, no expression in any numerical sentence is vague. 
(A4) So there cannot be borderline cases of composition. 
Some points of clarification. Numerical sentences are sentences of the following form 
which say that there are exactly n concrete objects, for some number n (in this case, two): 
‘∃x∃y(Cx & Cy & x≠y & ∀z(Cz  (x=z v y=z)))’. To say that there is count 
indeterminacy is to say that there is no fact of the matter how many things there are—not 
just that it is unknown how many things there are. Relatedly, to say that a sentence lacks 
a determinate truth value is to say that the truth value of that sentence, if it has one at all, 
is not true and also is not false. Accordingly, as I am using the terms, those who accept 
bivalence (e.g., epistemicists) will deny that sentences ever lack a determinate truth 
value, and will likewise deny that there are ever borderline cases of heaps, baldness, and 
so forth. 
The first and second premises are plausible. If there indeed are borderline cases of 
composition in our assembly process, then it is indeterminate whether the two pieces 
compose something, in which case it is indeterminate whether there are two things (the 
top and the base) or three things (the top, the base, and a table). So this sort of borderline 
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composition does yield count indeterminacy.43 The second premise seems plausible as 
well, for if it is indeterminate whether there are n concrete objects, then the numerical 
sentence for n must lack a determinate truth value.44  
As for B4, the only piece of nonlogical vocabulary is the concreteness predicate, 
‘C’, which may be stipulatively defined it as follows: not a set, not a number, not a 
property, not a proposition….  Since none of these categorial expressions are vague, ‘C’ 
will not be vague either.45 Consequently, one who wishes to deny B4 must hold that some 
of the logical vocabulary in the numerical sentence is vague. The booleans certainly are 
not vague, and the reasons for thinking the identity predicate cannot be vague are well-
known.46 This leaves the quantifiers. Suppose (for reductio) that the universal or 
existential quantifier is vague. Vague expressions must (at some world) have multiple 
candidate extensions. In order for candidate extensions of the quantifiers to differ at all, 
there must be some item, x, that is a member of one but not the other. Since extensions 
exist only if their members do, x exists. But whichever extension does not have x as a 
member cannot be a candidate extension of the unrestricted quantifier, since any 
                                                
43 One might be inclined to resist premise B1 on the grounds that, as a matter of 
necessity, material objects are constituted of infinitely divisible gunk. If so, no matter 
how sparsely populated a world may be, so long as it is populated at all there will be 
infinitely many things in this world, as any hunk of gunk has infinitely many parts. 
Consequently, there would be borderline composition without count indeterminacy, since 
whether or not some gunky items compose a further item will not affect the cardinality of 
the items in that world.  
44 This premise is not entirely uncontroversial either. For suppose (per impossible?) that 
there are infinitely many concreta, but that it is indeterminate whether there are countably 
many or uncountably many. In that case, no numerical sentence of the (finite) kind that 
Sider considers that will lack a determinate truth value, despite there being count 
indeterminacy.   
45 See Sider (2001, 127). Elder (2004, 65) contends, to the contrary, that the concreteness 
predicate is vague.   
46 See Evans (1978) and Salmon (1981).   
 
  43 
admissible extension of the unrestricted quantifier must (definitely) range over 
everything. So the quantifiers cannot have multiple precisifications. So they cannot be 
vague.47 
 The third premise is left tacit in Sider’s presentation of the argument, but it is 
needed to secure the validity of the argument. The possibility of blocking the argument 
against borderline composition by denying this premise, and without maintaining that the 
numerical sentence or any of its constituent expressions are vague or otherwise in need of 
precisification, has simply been overlooked in the literature—even by Varzi 2005, which 
was meant to provide a complete catalogue of the ways of resisting the argument from 
vagueness.  
But the premise warrants close inspection. For there are a whole host of sentences 
that, at least on the face of it, lack a determinate truth value while containing no vague 
vocabulary: these include liar sentences, truthteller sentences, sentences involving 
presupposition failure, reference failure, ambiguity, and semantic underdetermination, 
and sentences about the future. One who holds, reasonably enough, that there are sources 
of indeterminacy other than vagueness has reason to question whether the numerical 
sentence in particular must contain vague vocabulary if it is to lack a determinate truth 
value. Moreover, this is exactly where the argument seems to go wrong: what we want to 
say about the relevant numerical sentences (if we can!) is that they lack a determinate 
truth value but that they contain no vague vocabulary. This is exactly what I think the 
                                                
47 Cf. Sider (2001, 128-9), Varzi (2005, 494-5), and López de Sa (2006, 399-402). One 
might try to resist this argument by embracing a (dubious) relativist view on which the 
extensions do not have to exist simpliciter in order for them to serve as candidate 
extensions for the quantifier. 
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proponent of the naive conception should say. What remains to be seen is whether there 




3. Soritical Indeterminacy Without Vague Expressions 
Those who wish to convince the proponent of the naive conception of the 
impossibility of borderline composition need to supply some further argument on behalf 
of premise B3 since, intuitively, B3 is false. In constructing such an argument, one might 
try to exploit the fact that the truth-value gaps mentioned above seem to have nothing at 
all to do with soritical phenomena. If numerical sentences do indeed sometimes lack a 
determinate truth value, it is surely as a result of soritical phenomena—in particular, the 
presence of borderline cases of composition. And soritical phenomena are known to be 
associated with vagueness.  
But, while it is beyond doubt that sentences that lack a determinate truth value as 
a result of soritical phenomena are typically vague, one who wishes to establish the 
contested premise on the basis of the association between soritical phenomena and 
vagueness must be prepared to posit a far tighter association—for instance, that every 
sentence that lacks a determinate truth value as a result of soritical phenomena must 
contain vague vocabulary. An argument for B3 may be constructed on the basis of this 
premise: 
(C1) Necessarily, if a numerical sentence lacks a determinate truth value, then it 
lacks a determinate truth value as a result of soritical phenomena. 
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(C2) Necessarily, for any sentence S, if S lacks a determinate truth value as a 
result of soritical phenomena, then some expression in S is vague. 
(B3) So, necessarily, if a numerical sentence lacks a determinate truth value, then 
some expression in it is vague. 
Both premises of this argument may be resisted. Those who embrace the Fregean 
view that quantification is intelligible only when (explicitly or tacitly) restricted to some 
sortal or other will reject this premise for they will hold that the numerical sentence—if 
its quantifiers are intended not to be tacitly restricted—is unintelligible. In that case, the 
numerical sentence lacks a determinate truth value, not because of soritical phenomena, 
but because it is meaningless. So C1 would be false.48 I will not pursue this line of 
response here; I leave that to those more sympathetic to the Fregean view.  
 I will now present some prima facie counterexamples to C2.  If the examples were 
less contentious than they are, I would simply call them counterexamples and take myself 
to have undermined the argument from vagueness. But they are not less contentious than 
they are, so I rather take myself only to be supplying the proponent of borderline 
composition with independent motivation for denying C2.  
First, suppose that I am told that Bill has a blue house. I reply:  
(1) I do too.  
But my house is a borderline case of being blue. Intuitively, this sentence (relative to the 
context of utterance) lacks a determinate truth value since, plausibly, what it says is that I 
have a blue house too. Furthermore, it appears to lack a determinate truth value as a result 
                                                
48 This, in effect, is Amie Thomasson’s response to the argument from vagueness. See 
her forthcoming, chapter 6).  
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of soritical phenomena: the reason that it lacks a determinate truth value is that my house 
is borderline blue. But the sentence uttered appears to contain no vague vocabulary.   
 Second, suppose that I am helping to organize a raffle, in which participants are 
assigned numbers between one and thirty. I am instructed to assign only small numbers. I 
have assigned one through eleven, all of which are definitely small for numbers less than 
thirty. Twelve is a borderline case of being small for a number less than thirty. I say to a 
friend, who is aware of my instructions and of my intention to follow them: 
 (2) Every number has been assigned. 
Plausibly (though not uncontroversially), what this sentence says is that every small 
number has been assigned. If so, then, relative to the indicated context, (2) lacks a 
determinate truth value as a result of soritical phenomena. But the sentence uttered 
appears to contain no vague expressions. (Perhaps ‘assigned’ is vague. But ‘assigned’ 
may simply be replaced with a relevant precise expression ‘assigned*’, and the resultant 
sentence ‘Every number has been assigned*’ will serve equally well as a counterexample 
to C2.) 
Third, consider the sentence: 
(3) Paul is in the extension of ‘bald’.  
where Paul is a borderline case of baldness. Since it is indeterminate whether Paul is 
bald, presumably it is also indeterminate whether Paul is in the extension of ‘bald’, in 
which case ‘Paul is in the extension of ‘bald’’ lacks a determinate truth value. Again the 
indeterminacy is evidently the result of soritical phenomena, and again there appears to 
be no vague expression in this sentence.49 (‘Bald’, of course, is vague, but it is not the 
                                                
49 Cf. Graff (2000, 47).   
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word but rather the name of the word that appears in (3). The name of the word is not 
vague; it determinately picks out the word ‘bald’.50 And, on the face of it, ‘extension’ is 
no less precise than the logical vocabulary featured in numerical sentences.) 
 Fourth, consider the sentence: 
 (4) ‘Paul is bald’ is true. 
Since it is indeterminate whether Paul is bald, it should likewise be indeterminate 
whether it is true that Paul is bald, in which case (4) lacks a determinate truth value, 
evidently as a result of soritical phenomena. But (4) evidently contains no vague 
vocabulary.   
 Not everyone will be convinced that these counterexamples are genuine. For 
instance, those who accept bivalence, even in the face of the Sorites, will think that these 
sentences do all have determinate truth values and, consequently, are not 
counterexamples to C2. Or if (as some contend) quantifier domain restriction is a 
pragmatic phenomenon, then what is said by (2) is that every number simpliciter has been 
assigned. Consequently, (2) would not be a counterexample to C2, since it would then 
have a determinate truth value, namely, false. Or if (as some contend) the word ‘small’ 
does appear in (2), albeit unpronounced or unarticulated, then the sentence does include 
vague expressions and so is not a counterexample to C2.51 Finally, some may be willing 
                                                
50 Some might contend that the sentence does contain the word ‘bald’, even though it 
appears inside quotation marks. This worry may be circumvented by modifying (3) to say 
‘Paul is in the extension of Jack’, where ‘Jack’ is introduced (in place of ‘‘bald’’) to 
name the word ‘bald’. Or, alternatively: ‘Paul is in the extension of the eleventh word in 
this footnote.’  
51 See Stanley and Szabó (2000, 236-245) on grammatical and pragmatic approaches to 
quantifier domain restriction.  
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to bite the bullet and accept ‘extension’ and ‘true’ are vague, despite their apparent 
precision. 
I will not argue that those alternative assessments are incorrect. But bear in mind 
that that it is the proponent of borderline composition who is under attack. It is not 
enough for the defender of the argument from vagueness merely to show that there are 
assessments of these sentences on which these sentences would not count as 
counterexamples to C2. The unfavorable assessments must be shown to be superior, not 
just available. But these assessments of the alleged counterexamples are all controversial, 
and the proponent of borderline composition is still within his epistemic rights in 
rejecting the C2 on the basis of these sentences, even absent decisive reasons for rejecting 
the unfavorable assessments. 
 
4. Numerical Sentences  
On the present account, a numerical sentence may lack a determinate truth value, 
but not as a result of the vagueness of any expression in the sentence. Numerical 
sentences are not vague, nor do they admit of multiple precisifications—they are already 
as precise as any sentence can be. There are then two different ways of developing this 
assessment of the numerical sentences, depending upon whether one thinks that they lack 
a determinate truth value as a result of the vagueness of some extrasentential expression, 
or whether one thinks that they lack a determinate truth value but not as the result of the 
vagueness of any expression. I will consider each of these assessments in turn (and in 
reverse order).  
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Assessment (i). My preferred assessment of the numerical sentences, as well as 
sentences (1) through (4) above, is that they lack a determinate truth value but not as a 
result of the vagueness of any expressions. For instance, the indicated occurrence of (1) 
lacks a determinate truth value because my house is borderline blue; (2), because twelve 
is a borderline case of being small for a number less than thirty; (3), because Paul is 
borderline bald. To illustrate, suppose that (as some think) in cases of quantifier domain 
restriction there is some unarticulated domain variable in the syntax of the sentence 
which gets assigned a semantic value by the context.52 For instance, the domain variable 
associated with a given utterance of ‘There is no beer’ might be assigned the set of things 
in the fridge. In the case of (2), the hidden variable will be assigned a set of numbers that 
are small for numbers less than thirty. It will be indeterminate whether this is the set of 
numbers one through eleven or the set of numbers one through twelve. As a result, it is 
indeterminate whether twelve has to have been given out in order for this sentence to be 
true. So the sentence lacks a determinate truth value. The reason that it is indeterminate 
whether the variable is assigned a set that contains the number twelve is not that ‘small’ 
or any expression (including the domain variable) in (2) is vague, but rather that twelve is 
a borderline case of being small for a number less than thirty. ‘Small’ is of course vague, 
but the vagueness of ‘small’ is not responsible for the fact that (2) lacks a determinate 
truth value. 
How about the numerical sentence? Suppose that the top and the base (from §1) 
are arranged in such a way that it is indeterminate whether they compose anything. (For 
                                                
52 Stanley and Szabó (2000, §7). More cautiously, we should allow that the content of the 
domain variable may be fixed by other quantifiers in the sentence, as in the sentence ‘In 
every student’s house, there is no beer in the fridge.’ 
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ease of exposition, let us ignore everything in the universe other than the top, the base, 
and that, if anything, which they compose.) Our numerical sentence, ‘∃x∃y(Cx & Cy & 
x≠y & ∀z(Cz  (x=z v y=z)))’, is true just in case every concrete thing that there is is 
identical to one of two particular (distinct) concrete things. But it is indeterminate 
whether everything is identical to one of two particular concrete things, because it is 
indeterminate whether there is something in addition to the top and the base. And the 
reason that it is indeterminate whether there is something in addition to the top and 
base—the source of this indeterminacy—is not that the quantifiers or any other 
expression is vague, but rather that the top and base are a borderline case of composing 
something. The vagueness of this or that expression does not enter into the explanation of 
the fact that the numerical sentence lacks a determinate truth value.   
The semantics for numerical sentences are just what one would expect: ‘∃x∃y(x≠y 
& Cx & Cy & ∀z(x=z v y=z)’ is true iff there is a sequence σ such that σ(1) ≠ σ(2) and 
σ(1) ∈ {x: Cx} and σ(2) ∈ {x: Cx} and for all sequences σ' and all n≠3 such that, σ(n) = 
σ'(n), either σ'(1) = σ'(3) or σ'(2) = σ'(3).53 The sentence lacks a determinate truth value 
because it is indeterminate whether, in addition to such sequences as <top, base, base, 
base, top, …>, there are sequences that include some further item as a member, an item 
composed of the top and the base. And it is indeterminate whether there are such 
sequences because it is indeterminate whether, in addition to the top and the base, there is 
a further item composed of the top and the base. On this account, it is indeterminate what 
there is, and this indeterminacy is not ultimately explained in terms of linguistic 
                                                
53 For artificial languages, the semantics would be given relative to some set D which 
serves as the domain. Here, we can understand the domain as being everything that there 
is, which (on pain of paradox) cannot itself be understood to be a set of things. Thanks to 
Josh Dever for help on the formal details. 
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indeterminacy. We will return to this feature of the account in the following section and 
see whether this amounts to an objectionable form of ontic vagueness.  
Assessment (ii). According to the second assessment, the numerical sentence, as 
well as the other alleged counterexamples, lack a determinate truth value as a result of 
vagueness, without containing any vague vocabulary. The thought is that a sentence may 
lack a determinate truth value as a result of the vagueness of extrasentential expressions. 
The occurrence of (1), for instance, lacks a determinate truth value because ‘blue’ is 
vague and my house is in some but not other admissible precisifications of ‘blue’. The 
word ‘blue’ does not appear in the sentence uttered but, according to the present 
assessment, is nevertheless responsible for the sentence’s lack of a determinate truth 
value.  
 One who favors this assessment might hold, additionally, that a numerical 
sentence can lack a determinate truth value as a result of the vagueness of ‘compose 
something’. If there indeed is borderline composition, then ‘compose something’ will 
have multiple candidate extensions. A set is a candidate extension of ‘compose 
something’ iff (1) it contains every set whose members definitely compose something 
and (2) it contains no set whose members definitely do not compose something. 
Supposing that the top and the base are arranged in such a way that they neither definitely 
do nor definitely do not compose something, ‘compose something’ will have one 
candidate extension that includes {top, base}, and another that does not include {top, 
base}.  
The door would then be open to explain why the numerical sentence lacks a 
determinate truth value in terms of semantic indecision with respect to the semantic value 
 
  52 
of ‘compose something’. The explanation would run as follows. The numerical sentence 
for two is true just in case every concrete thing is identical to one of two concrete things. 
But it is indeterminate whether every concrete thing is identical to one of two concrete 
things. This is because it is indeterminate whether the top and base compose something. 
And it is indeterminate whether they compose something because {the top, the base} is in 
some but not all candidate extensions of ‘compose something’. Since, intuitively, the 
reason that the relevant numerical sentences lack a determinate truth value is that there 
are some things such that it is indeterminate whether they compose something, it is no 
less plausible to appeal to the vague extrasentential expression ‘compose something’ in 
explaining why numerical sentences lack a determinate truth value than it was to appeal 
to ‘blue’, ‘small’, or ‘bald’ in explaining the indeterminacy of the sentences from §3. 
 There are two sorts of worries that one might have about this assessment; both are 
serious, but it is not clear that either is decisive. The first concerns the relationship 
between the precisifications of ‘compose something’ and those of ‘compose’. 
Precisifications of ‘compose’ will be sets of ordered pairs whose first member is a set and 
whose second member is a singleton set. A precisification will be admissible iff (1) it 
contains every pair of objects such that the members of the first member definitely 
compose the member of the second and (2) it contains no pairs such that the members of 
the first member definitely do not compose the member of the second. But ‘compose’ 
evidently has no precisification that includes a pair whose first member is {the top, the 
base}. For suppose that some precisifications included the pair <{the top, the base}, {the 
table}>. In order for such precisifications to exist, everything in the transitive closure of 
the pair must exist, in which case the table exists—in which case (contra hypothesis) it is 
 
  53 
not indeterminate whether there is a table. So the precisifications for ‘compose 
something’ cannot simply be derived from the precisifications of ‘compose’ in any 
straightforward way, for instance, by taking each precisification of ‘compose’ and 
constructing a set of all the first members of its constituent pairs.  
 This line of thought seems to take for granted the following principle: for any 
two-place predicate ‘R’, the precisifications of the one-place ‘R something’ are derived 
by taking the sets of the first members of the pairs in the precisifications of ‘R’. But this 
principle is open to counterexamples. There are borderline cases of wanting something. 
Andrew the ascetic is a borderline case of wanting an ice cream cone—though there is no 
particular ice cream cone such that it is indeterminate whether he wants it—and 
otherwise he wants naught. So Andrew will appear in some but not all precisifications of 
‘wants something’ but in no precisifications of ‘wants’ (since there would be nothing to 
be the second member of the relevant wanter-wanted pair). The only way to save the 
principle is by allowing “indefinite” objects, or some ersatz version of them, to appear in 
precisifications (e.g., <Andrew, an ice cream cone>). But then it is open to the defender 
of borderline composition to say that <{top, base},{a table}> appears in some but not all 
precisifications of ‘compose’. This would then yield the desired precisifications of 
‘compose something’. (Some might object that there is an important disanalogy between 
the two cases, namely, that ‘wants’ is an intensional transitive verb. But it is not clear 
why this disanalogy should be in any way relevant, for intensional or no, it still threatens 
to serve as a counterexample to the general principle under discussion.)  
 The second worry has to do with the explanation of why it is indeterminate 
whether the top and the base compose something in terms of semantic indecision with 
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respect to ‘compose something’. One generally expects explanations to support 
counterfactuals. Accordingly, supposing borderline composition is the result of semantic 
indecision, it follows that had there been no semantic indecision there would have been 
no borderline composition. But that is plainly false, for the same reason that pigs would 
not have been able to fly even had ‘pig’ meant bird. 
 But to the extent that this is a problem for the present appeal to semantic 
indecision, it seems to be a problem for all explanatory appeals to semantic indecision. 
For instance, Lewis famously claimed that “[t]he reason it’s vague where the outback 
begins is not that there’s this thing, the outback, with imprecise borders; rather, there are 
many things, with different borders, and nobody has been fool enough to try to enforce a 
choice of one of them as the official referent of the word ‘outback’.”54 But surely Lewis 
would not accept the counterfactual claim that had someone been fool enough to enforce 
a choice, the outback would have had precise borders. So anyone who wishes to appeal to 
semantic indecision in explaining such indeterminacies will have to deny that these 
explanations have to support the relevant counterfactuals.  
 
5. Ontological Vagueness and Indeterminacy 
I have tried to show that there is an intuitively satisfactory way of blocking the 
argument from vagueness. In particular, it can be blocked without having to say that there 
are always sharp cut-offs with respect to composition, and without having to say that any 
logical vocabulary is vague. Let us now turn to what has been one of the main concerns 
about borderline composition, namely, that it leads to ontic vagueness.  
                                                
54 Lewis (1986, 212). 
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Sider levies the charge of ontic vagueness in connection with the denial of B4 and 
the consequences of holding that either the identity predicate or the quantifiers are 
vague.55 Since I are here conceding B4 and instead resisting B3—and since there is no 
clear conception in the literature of what ontic vagueness is meant to be56—it is necessary 
to reassess the claim that proponents of borderline composition incur commitment to 
ontic vagueness. I will begin by considering whether one incurs commitment to vague 
properties, vague material objects, or to the vagueness or indeterminacy of the world as a 
whole. I will then consider whether one incurs commitment to anything else that may be 
considered a “mark” of ontic vagueness. We will find that virtually all of the usual marks 
of ontic vagueness are missing, and that the sort of ontic vagueness to which the 
proponent of borderline composition is committed is in an important sense merely 
superficial. 
One mark of an ontic theory of vagueness is a commitment to vague properties, 
that is, properties that admit of borderline instances. So, for instance, a semantic theorist 
and an ontic theorist will agree that falling under a predicate may be a matter of degree, 
but disagree about whether instantiating a property can be a matter of degree. For 
instance, they might disagree about whether, in addition to the perfectly precise 
properties answering to the various precisifications of ‘bald’ (bald1, bald2, etc.), there is a 
vague property, baldness, which admits of borderline instances. There is nothing to 
prevent the proponent of borderline composition from following the semantic theorist in 
denying that there is a property of being bald.  
                                                
55 Sider (2001, 127-129).  
56 See, e.g., Williamson (1994, 248-257), Sainsbury (1994), and Barnes (manuscript). 
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Nor is there anything to prevent the proponent of borderline composition from 
saying the same thing in the case of composition. There are just the perfectly precise 
(causal-cum-spatiotemporal) properties that collections of things may collectively 
instantiate, and it is indeterminate which of them answers to the predicate ‘compose 
something’. Commitment to an additional, vague property of composing something is 
optional. 
One might contend that the proponent of borderline composition is at least 
committed to the vagueness of the property of being true, since the sentence ‘∃x∃y(Cx & 
Cy & x≠y & ∀z(Cz  (x=z v y=z)))’ is a borderline case of being true. But the 
proponent of borderline composition has a number of options here; indeed, he has exactly 
the same options as the semantic theorist has with respect to the (apparent) borderline 
truth of ‘Paul is bald’. The semantic theorist may deny that this sentence is a borderline 
case of being true; rather, it is definitely untrue (which is not to say that it is false). This, 
of course, amounts to surrendering the T-schema, for ‘Paul is bald’ and ‘‘Paul is bald’ is 
true’ will diverge with respect to their truth values. But linguistic theorists (especially 
supervaluationists) are no strangers to abandoning the T-schema. Those who are 
unwilling to abandon the T-schema have the option either of insisting that there is no 
such property as the property of being true in addition to the precise properties truth1, 
truth2, … and truthn, or of conceding that the property of being true has borderline 
instances. The proponent of borderline composition has all of the same options. If it is 
acceptable to abandon the T-schema or to deny that there is any (one) property of being 
true, then he can avoid commitment to vague properties. If these are unacceptable, then 
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he must concede that the property of being true is vague, but so must the semantic 
theorist. 
Is the proponent of borderline composition committed to there being vague 
objects? There are various ways of understanding what a vague object is meant to be, but 
there seems to be no understanding on which (what I have called) type-2 borderline 
composition gives rise to vague objects. There is a nonvague top and a nonvague base 
and it is indeterminate whether there is something composed of them. It does not follow 
that there exists some x such that it is indeterminate whether they compose x. It does not 
follow that there exists some x such that it is indeterminate whether x exists.57 It does not 
follow that there exists some x that lacks sharp boundaries.58 And it does not follow that 
there is some object x such that, for some y, it is indeterminate whether x = y.59  This last 
point is especially pertinent, since one of the main worries associated with ontic 
vagueness concerns the incoherence of indeterminate identity, but type-2 borderline 
composition does not even purport to give rise to indeterminate identity.60  
 So far we have seen that the proponent of borderline composition is committed 
neither to vague properties nor to vague objects. Now let us consider whether he is 
committed to the vagueness or indeterminacy of the world as a whole. If this is to amount 
to anything more than the claim that the world contains vague objects, or objects that 
                                                
57 This seems to be what Lewis has in mind when he asks (rhetorically), “What is this 
thing such that it sort of is so, and sort of isn’t, that there is any such thing?” (1986, 212-
3).   
58 See Morreau (2002); cf. Tye (1990, 535-6) for this characterization of vague objects. 
59 This seems to be how Evans (1978) is conceiving of vague objects; otherwise, his 
argument from the incoherence of indeterminate identity to the impossibility of vague 
objects looks to be a nonsequitur. 
60 Yet another conception of vague objects is as objects that are a borderline instance of 
some vague property; see Rosen and Smith (2004, 187-88). We have already examined 
whether the proponent of borderline composition incurs commitment to vague properties.  
 
  58 
instantiate vague properties, the idea must be that in some sense there is indeterminacy 
“all the way down.”61 (For instance, one would not say that the world as a whole is vague 
by virtue of containing an object that is a fully determinate shade of turquoise, which 
happens to be a borderline case of being blue.) But the proponent of borderline 
composition may accept that facts about how many concrete things there are, and about 
whether some things compose something, always supervene on precisely describable 
facts about the arrangements of more fundamental items (e.g., mereological simples). To 
the extent that there is a more fundamental level at which there is no indeterminacy, and 
in terms of which soritical indeterminacies at less fundamental levels may be explained, 
the world itself is not vague or indeterminate. 
 The absence of commitment to worldly indeterminacy in the indicated sense has 
important implications with respect to the seriousness of the sorts of ontic vagueness that 
(as we are about to see) the proponent of borderline composition does end up committed 
to. Consider what Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith have to say in connection with worldly 
indeterminacy:   
Suppose our world is constituted by fundamental particles and fundamental 
properties both of which are entirely determinate: for an object a and property P 
in this catalogue of “base level” items, it will either be a fact that a has P, or a fact 
that it does not…. Suppose additionally that the totality of these base-level facts 
fixes everything else… Arguably, on this picture, any apparent ontic vagueness of 
the fuzzy-boundaried mountains etc. is merely superficial.62 
                                                
61 See Rosen and Smith (2004, 194-197) for a more detailed explication of worldly 
indeterminacy.  
62 Keefe and Smith (1997, 56). 
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Likewise, if all of the facts about composition can be explained in terms of fully precise 
facts about the (fully determinate) features and arrangement of fundamental particles, 
then it would seem that indeterminacy with respect to whether some things compose 
something is superficial as well. And if indeterminacy with respect to whether the top and 
base compose something is an unobjectionable, superficial indeterminacy—on account of 
its being explainable in terms of fully precise facts—then so is the resultant 
indeterminacy with respect to what there is and how many things there are.  
 To see why object-level indeterminacy is unobjectionable when it can be 
explained in terms of wholly determinate facts, it may be useful to consider why 
linguistic theories of indeterminacy are meant to be unobjectionable. Linguistic theories 
are presumably meant to avoid commitment to any objectionable kind of indeterminacy 
because the ultimate explanation of soritical indeterminacy does not invoke any 
objectionable kind of indeterminacy (the idea being that indeterminacy with respect to the 
meaning of words is an unobjectionable kind of indeterminacy). The proponent of 
borderline composition may likewise supply an ultimate explanation of all soritical 
indeterminacy without invoking any objectionable kind of indeterminacy—indeed, 
without invoking any indeterminacy at all.   
Similar points apply to the proponent of borderline composition’s commitment to 
what metaphysicians call “vague existence.”63 For there to be vague existence is for there 
to be some things such that its indeterminate whether they compose something, without 
there being something such that it is indeterminate whether it is composed of those 
things. That is, it is for there to be type-2 borderline composition. But what is so 
                                                
63 See Hawley (2002) and Merricks (2005).  
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objectionable about vague existence? After all, as we have just noted, this kind of 
indeterminacy can be wholly explained in terms precisely describable facts about fully 
determinate entities and their fully determinate features and arrangements. 
(Perhaps the worry is that the proponent of vague existence is forced to deny 
(instances of) the following compelling principle:  
(*) ∇∃y(Φy)  ∃y∇(Φy) 
But we know that relevantly similar principles are false, for instance, the Barcan 
Formula: ◊∃xΦx  ∃x◊Φx. It is possible for there to have been someone who is my 
sister, but there is no one such that possibly she is my sister (given the necessity of 
origins).64 So the Barcan Formula is false. The proponent of borderline composition 
rejects the relevant instance of (*) on the basis of similarly intuitive counterexamples: it 
is indeterminate whether there is anything composed of the top and the base, but it does 
not follow that there is something such that it is indeterminate whether it is composed of 
the top and the base. So it is difficult to see why one should be any more confident about 
(*) than one is about the Barcan Formula, which is known to be false.) 
What we have seen is that the proponent of borderline composition is not 
committed to ontic vagueness in any of the usual senses. He is not committed to vague 
properties, vague objects, indeterminacy identity, or the vagueness of the world as a 
whole. And insofar as he is committed to anything that might legitimately called ontic 
vagueness, it is ontic vagueness of a superficial variety, and it is far from clear that there 
is anything seriously objectionable about these kinds of ontic vagueness.  
 
                                                
64 See Menzel (2007). 
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6. Conclusion 
 I conclude that the argument from vagueness is not satisfactory as it stands. The 
premise that a numerical sentence must contain vague vocabulary if it is to lack a 
determinate truth value can be resisted. Unless this crucial premise can be adequately 
defended, one cannot expect to persuade proponents of the naive conception that 
borderline composition is impossible or that composition is unrestricted by means of the 
argument from vagueness. 
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III 
Three Solutions to the Grounding Problem for Coincident Objects* 
 
1. The Grounding Problem 
Despite being alike in nearly all respects, a statue and the clay of which the statue 
is made are evidently discernible. Intuitively, the statue cannot survive being flattened; 
the clay can. I shall assume that these intuitions are correct and that the statue and the 
clay do indeed differ with respect to their modal properties. Since identicals must be 
indiscernible, it follows that the statue and clay are distinct, despite occupying exactly the 
same region of space. This is the majority view among metaphysicians, its 
counterintuitive consequences notwithstanding. My goal is to answer the most serious 
objection facing the majority view—the “grounding problem” for coincident objects—by 
explaining how it is possible for coincident objects to differ modally.65  
Modal differences between material objects can sometimes be accounted for in 
terms of their physical differences—for instance, because of their difference in size, a 
mite can pass through the eye of a needle while a camel cannot. But, given their physical 
indiscernibility, this kind of explanation is not available in the case of the statue and the 
clay. In fact, it may at first seem that a statue and the clay of which it is made will be 
indiscernible in all nonmodal respects. On closer inspection, however, one finds that 
there can be all sorts of nonmodal differences between the statue and the clay of which it 
                                                
* Thanks to George Bealer, John Bengson, Josh Dever, Shieva Kleinschmidt, Rob Koons, 
Dave Liebesman, Trenton Merricks, Bryan Pickel, Luke Potter, Mark Sainsbury, Ted 
Sider, Briggs Wright, and Dean Zimmerman.   
65 The grounding problem has been advanced by Heller (1990, 30-32), Burke (1992), 
Zimmerman (1995, 87), and Olson (2001), among others.  
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is made. The clay may be well-made while the statue is not well-made, for instance, if the 
clay is made out of top-shelf ingredients and yet the statue ends up looking nothing like 
the person it is meant to be a statue of. The statue may be damaged without the clay being 
damaged.66 The statue and clay may differ with respect to their temporal properties: 
typically, statues come into existence only after the clay of which they are made. And 
they also invariably differ in kind: the statue is a statue but the clay is not a statue.67 
But none of these differences seem poised to serve as wholly satisfactory 
explanation of the modal differences between the statue and the clay.  For instance, there 
is no plausibility to the claim that the clay is able to survive flattening while the statue is 
unable to survive flattening because the clay but not the statue is well-made, or because 
the clay but not the statue existed yesterday. The difference in kind between the statue 
and the clay, by contrast, does seem poised to explain their modal difference.68 But, 
although it is plausible that the statue cannot survive flattening because it is a statue, 
while the clay can because it is clay, this difference in kind seems just as much in need of 
explanation as the modal difference that it is meant to explain. So we have yet to locate 
explanatory bedrock for this modal difference between the statue and the clay.  
The grounding problem is the problem of locating the explanatory bedrock for the 
modal differences between coincidents. Here, more specifically, is the grounding 
problem as it arises for the indicated modal difference between the statue and the clay. 
The fact that the clay can survive flattening while the statue cannot survive flattening 
appears to stand in need of explanation, and yet there appear to be no further differences 
                                                
66 See Fine (2003) and (2006); see Frances (2006) for criticism.  
67 Here I mean that the clay is not a statue in the predicative sense. There may well be a 
sense of ‘is’—the ‘is’ of constitution—in which the clay is a statue. See Wiggins (1968).  
68 See Burke (1992, 16). 
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between the statue and the clay that (i) can explain this modal difference and (ii) are 
themselves “grounded.” Further differences are grounded just in case either they do not 
themselves stand in need of explanation or else they stand in the ancestral of being 
explained by differences that themselves do not stand in need of explanation. One solves 
the grounding problem by showing that things are not as they appear. One may contend 
either that, despite appearances, the modal differences do not stand in need of explanation 
or that, despite appearances, there is some grounded difference between the statue and 
clay that is poised to explain their modal difference.69 
A note about the sort of explanation that is at issue here: In looking for an 
explanation of the indicated modal differences, we are looking for what one might call a 
“metaphysical explanation”: the reason that, or that in virtue of which, or that because of 
which, the statue and the clay have the modal features that they do. It is a search for the 
source, or the ground, for the modal differences. This is to be distinguished from another 
sort of explanation—what we might call a “conceptual” explanation—which serves to 
illuminate an unfamiliar concept, and which may be better or worse depending upon the 
sophistication of the person receiving the explanation. These kinds of explanation come 
apart, for what is metaphysically prior need not be conceptually prior. For instance, it 
may be that in (conceptually) explaining what the force of gravity is, one must appeal to 
its effects, even though the force of gravity (metaphysically) explains those effects.    
Let us be careful to distinguish between the grounding problem and the related 
issue that one who countenances distinct but co-located entities must reject the doctrine 
                                                
69 Logical space allows at least one other option, which is to maintain that the modal 
differences may be explained without appeal to any further difference between the statue 
and the clay. I will not pursue this line of response. 
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of microphysical supervenience, namely, that all of a thing’s intrinsic properties 
(including its modal and sortal properties) supervene on the intrinsic properties and 
relations exemplified by their microphysical parts.70 Those who deny this supervenience 
principle may adopt a more global supervenience principle in its place, one that permits 
microphysically indiscernible items to differ modally.71 But one can identify a 
supervenience base for the modal features of the statue and clay without thereby 
explaining why the statue has the modal features that it does while the clay has the ones 
that it does, rather than the other way round. So the grounding problem remains unsolved 
even once one finds an amenable principle of microphysical supervenience.72 
There is a general skepticism in the literature—both among those who do allow 
for distinct but coincident entities and those who do not—about finding the kinds of 
differences between the statue and clay that would be needed to solve the grounding 
problem. Many advocates of distinct coincidents deal with the grounding problem by 
conceding that the modal differences between the statue and clay do not admit of further 
explanation; while many opponents of distinct coincidents find brute modal facts to be 
intolerable. What I will try to show is that the skepticism about finding a ground for the 
modal features of the statue and the clay is premature and that the proponent of distinct 
coincidents might be equipped to give a more satisfactory solution to the grounding 
problem. I will propose three novel ways of solving the grounding problem, each of 
which involves identifying a grounded difference between the statue and clay. The first 
involves an alleged difference in the mereological relation that holds between the statue 
                                                
70 See Rea (1997a). 
71 See, e.g., Rea (1997b) and Sider (1999a).  
72 Cf. Olson (2001, 342-345). 
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and its parts and the one that holds between the clay and its parts (§2). The second 
involves a difference with respect to the de re intentions involved in the creation of the 
statue (§3). The third involves a difference between what it is for the statue to exist and 
what it is for the clay to exist (§4). 
My main goal, in each case, will be to argue that the indicated differences are 
explanatorily adequate. To show that the differences are explanatorily adequate requires 
showing two things. First, I must show that they explain the modal differences (or, 
alternatively, that they explain the difference in kind, which in turn can explain the modal 
differences), rather than being explained by them. Second, I must show that these 
differences do not themselves stand in need of special explanation; they are poised to 
serve as an explanatory bedrock. Each of the proposals involves controversial 
background assumptions, and although I do attempt to supply some motivation for 
accepting these background assumptions, the considerations that I offer on their behalf 
are not decisive. However, since they all have a certain degree of independent 
plausibility, simply examining their potential for overcoming the grounding problem 
should go some way towards advancing the debate. In the final section (§5), I consider 
the extent to which these proposals can be extended to solve grounding problems 
involving other kinds of entities.  
  
2. Mereological Pluralism 
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 Mereological pluralism is the view that there is more than one basic parthood 
relation, and no single, overarching parthood relation under which they are subsumed.73 
If the parthood relation that holds between the statue and its parts is a different relation 
from the parthood relation that holds between quantities of matter and their parts, then 
there will a mereological, nonmodal difference between the statue and the clay, which 
may be poised to ground their modal differences. After a preliminary discussion of the 
reasons that one might accept mereological pluralism, I examine the prospects for 
grounding the modal differences between the statue and clay in this kind of mereological 
difference. 
Motivating Pluralism. Perhaps the main reason for accepting mereological 
pluralism is that fundamentally different kinds of entities differ systematically with 
respect to their relation to their parts. Masses of matter, for instance, are especially 
resilient when it comes to the scattering of their parts, but they cannot survive the 
destruction of any parts. Exactly the opposite is true of individuals (Aristotle’s “primary 
substances”): they can survive the destruction, but not the scattering, of their parts. A 
straightforward explanation of this fundamental difference in their relation to their parts 
is that there is a fundamental structural difference between quantities and individuals.74 
The postulation of distinct mereological relations would deliver just such a structural 
                                                
73 Mereological pluralism has been endorsed by Richard Sharvy (1983, 235-7), Peter 
Simons (1987, PPP), Iris, et. al. (1988), and Kris McDaniel (2004, 140-147). See 
Burkhardt and Dufour (1991, 664-6) for a discussion of Aristotle’s mereological 
pluralism.  
  
74 Some such criterion for individuating parthood relations is implicit in Fine’s argument 
(1994a, 137f) that aggregation and compounding are different methods of composition. 
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difference: it is a difference with respect to the very parthood relation that unifies the 
parts of the relevant entities.  
 A second reason for being attracted to this kind of pluralism has to do with the 
systematic differences in our use of mereological vocabulary in connection with 
quantities and in connection with individuals. We say that the back of the chair is a part 
of the chair and that the legs are parts of the chair, whereas we say that the wood is part 
(vs. a part) of the chair and that the chairs are part (vs. parts) of my furniture. This leads 
some to conclude that the being a part of relation is distinct from the being part of 
relation.75 Relatedly, ‘being part of’, but not ‘being parts of’, is interchangeable with 
‘being some of’. This suggests that the being part of relation must be distinct from the 
being parts of relation, since one but not the other is identical to the being some of 
relation. And since there is no sense in which the back is some of the chair, and no sense 
in which the wood is a part of the chair, there evidently cannot be any one mereological 
relation under which both of these relations are subsumed.     
 Third, the apparent counterexamples to the transitivity of the parthood relation 
may, motivate the adoption of some form of mereological pluralism.76 For instance, 
Adam is part of the conga line, Adam’s kidney is a part of Adam, but Adam’s kidney is 
not part of the conga line. The tree is part of the forest, the cellulose is part of the tree, but 
the cellulose is not part of the forest. A proponent of mereological pluralism may hold 
that the relation denoted by ‘part’ varies from one premise to the next, that the (merely) 
                                                
75 E.g., Sharvy (1983, 235).   
76 Such examples have been widely discussed: see Lyons (1977), Cruse (1979), Sharvy 
(1983), Simons (1987), Winston, et. al. (1987), Iris, et. al. (1988), Moltmann (1997), 
Johansson (2004), Johnston (2005), and Varzi (2006). 
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apparent failure of transitivity is the result of equivocation, and that each of the parthood 
relations is transitive.77   
Some may prefer to take the examples at face value—as indicating that the (one) 
parthood relation is nontransitive78—though others feel that the principle of transitivity is 
so deeply a part of our understanding of parthood that “anyone who seriously disagrees 
with [it] has failed to understand the word [‘part’].”79 I shall not attempt to adjudicate this 
dispute here. But even those who accept that transitivity sometimes fails may themselves 
have reason to accept mereological pluralism. For some may be convinced that there are 
genuine failures of transitivity, yet still wish to secure some domain in which the appeal 
to transitivity is valid. For instance, one might hold that there is at least some 
mereological relation for which classical extensional mereology (in which transitivity is 
an axiom) holds.80 Furthermore, one can explain why transitivity sometimes fails in cases 
involving the parts of collections and individuals, while it never fails in cases involving 
masses and their portions or pluralities and their parts, if one holds that different parthood 
relations—only some of which are transitive—are at work in the different arguments.81 
                                                
77 One who holds that there is a single overarching parthood relation is committed to 
there being a true reading of the conclusions of these arguments (e.g., Varzi 2006). But if 
there is no such reading—and there seems not to be—this suggests that there is no one 
parthood relation for which the arguments go through. 
78 See, e.g., Johnston (2005, 645-6).  
79 Simons (1987, 11).  
80 Sharvy maintains that Goodman’s calculus of individuals is plausible only as a theory 
of parthood for quantities, not for individuals (1983, 236). Friederike Moltmann takes the 
transitivity arguments to show that one who rejects mereological pluralism must also 
reject extensional mereology (1997, 11). 
81 See Iris, et. al. (1988, 277-80) and Johansson (2004, 162).   
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Relatedly, by adopting a mereological pluralism, one may preserve another axiom 
of classical extensional mereology, namely, the principle of extensionality.82 The 
principle of extensionality is that objects are identical if every part of one is part of the 
other, and vice versa: ∀xyz((x < y ↔ x < z)  y=z). A statue and the clay of which it is 
made, since they are distinct, appear to violate this principle. However, if there is more 
than one parthood relation—say, <m for masses and <i for individuals—then one who 
holds that the statue and clay are distinct is free to hold that something is part (i.e., <m) of 
the clay iff it is a part (i.e., <i) of the statue and that the relevant principles of 
extensionality hold for each of these relations (i.e., ∀xyz((x <m y ↔ x <m z)  y=z) and 
∀xyz((x <i y ↔ x <i z)  y=z)). Or, alternatively, one may hold that the former but not 
the latter is correct, which would at least secure some parthood relation to be the subject 
matter of classical extensional mereology.  
Finally, one might take there to be an abductive argument in support of the 
mereological pluralism. For, in the absence of superior accounts of what grounds the 
modal differences between the statue and the clay, one may postulate the distinct 
parthood relations as the best explanation of how the statue and clay are able to differ 
modally. This may seem to be putting the cart before the horse, but bear in mind that 
comparable arguments are needed by proponents of other accounts of material 
constitution. For instance, those who hold that the statue and clay are identical must hold 
that such seemingly transparent contexts as ‘___ is well-made’ are in fact opaque in order 
to explain why names for the statue and the clay are not interchangeable in such contexts. 
                                                
82 Thanks to Josh Dever for helpful discussion of this point. 
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But there evidently is no independent evidence that these contexts are opaque, beyond the 
fact that they must be if the names of the statue and the clay are indeed coreferential.83  
Explanatory Adequacy. Having examined some reasons for accepting 
mereological pluralism, let us suppose that there indeed are different parthood relations 
for masses and individuals, and now consider whether mereological pluralism has what it 
takes to solve the grounding problem. In particular, we need to determine both whether it 
is plausible that the envisaged mereological difference can serve to explain the difference 
in kind and, in turn, the modal differences between the statue and clay, and whether it is 
plausible to treat the mereological differences as explanatory bedrock. 
First let me head off a certain confusion. Some might object that the envisaged 
mereological differences cannot possibly ground the modal differences between the 
statue and clay, for there is evidently no way to explain what the difference is between 
the different parthood relations except in terms of the modal and sortal features of the 
relata (e.g., that things standing in the partm relation to their parts are masses, and they 
can survive the scattering of their parts but cannot survive the loss of any parts). The 
proposal may then appear circular, since I am meant to be explaining the modal and sortal 
differences in terms of the mereological differences. 
But this is to conflate the two kinds of explanations mentioned in the previous 
section. When one introduces an entity as a theoretical posit, either in science or in 
philosophy, it is neither illicit nor uncommon to characterize (i.e., supply a conceptual 
explanation of) the entity in terms of the phenomena that it is invoked to explain (i.e., 
metaphysically explain). This does not reveal the posit to be in any way circular or 
                                                
83 See Fine (2003) and (2006).   
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explanatorily impotent. On the present account, one cannot analyze or explain (in the 
metaphysical sense) mereological differences in modal or sortal terms; rather these 
differences are meant to be understood as metaphysically primitive, explanatory bedrock. 
But this is wholly compatible with its being possible to illuminate the concepts of being a 
parti or partm only by appeal to familiar modal and sortal features of the kinds of things 
that stand in the different parthood relations. 
 Having now headed off this worry about circularity, we still must consider 
whether (i) the difference in kind is indeed plausibly explained in terms of the 
mereological differences, rather than the other way round, and (ii) whether the 
mereological differences can plausibly be treated as explanatory bedrock. To try to get a 
better handle on the explanatory adequacy of this proposal, let us turn our attention to the 
grounding problem as it applies to abstracta. Consider, for instance, the set whose 
members are the property of being red and the property of being round: {being red, being 
round}. There is a sense in which this set has the same components as the conjunctive 
property of being red and round. Just as with the statue and clay, there appears to be a 
difference in kind without any difference in components. And if the difference in kind 
between the statue and clay stands in need of further explanation, so presumably does the 
difference in kind between the set and the property.  
 (Some, following Lewis 1991, might deny that there is any sense in which the 
indicated set has those two properties as components, on the grounds that it in fact is built 
up out of its subsets, not its members. Alternatively, some might deny that the two items 
differ in kind, on the grounds that properties just are sets of a certain sort. The example is 
dispensable, however, for other grounding problems may be generated by considering (in 
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various combinations) the differences between the indicated set and conjunctive property, 
the disjunctive property of being red or round, the ordered pair <being red, being round>, 
the sum of being red and being round, and the disjunctive property of being {being red} 
or being {being round}. Or one might consider the grounding problem concerning the 
difference between the disambiguations of syntactically ambiguous sentences, or the 
differences between words built up out of the same letters.) 
In virtue of what, then, is the indicated set a set, rather than a conjunctive 
property? One natural reaction is to say that the set is a set rather than a conjunctive 
property because it stands in the having as a member relation to its components, as 
opposed to the having as a conjunct relation. It is the kind of thing that it is because of the 
structural relation that it stands in to its components. But why (one might ask) does the 
set stand in the having as a member relation to its components, rather than the having as a 
conjunct relation? No answer presents itself.84 But perhaps that should not trouble us, for 
all explanation must end somewhere, and surely the lack of further explanation in the 
present case should not lead us to worry about the existence and distinctness of the 
indicated property and set. Moreover, it seems perfectly reasonable to take this appeal to 
the structural relations that the relevant items bear to their components to be explanatory 
bedrock. But if it is reasonable to treat structural relations as explanatorily basic in the 
case of sets and properties then, by parity, it ought to be reasonable to treat structural 
relations as explanatorily basic in the case of the statue and clay as well. That the statue 
stands in the parti relation to its parts seems to be on a par, with regard to explanatory 
                                                
84 Actually, one might suggest that this structural difference can be explained on the basis 
of differences with respect to what it is for the respective entities to exist. One might then 
hold that the mereological differences and other differences between the statue and clay 
may be explained in like manner. I explore this possibility in the §4. 
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power, with the fact that the set stands in the having-as-a-member relation to its 
components.  
In fact, it is hard to find any other difference between the set and property that 
could serve to solve their grounding problem. One might suggest that what grounds the 
difference in kind between the conjunctive property and the set is that the former can be 
instantiated while the latter cannot, and that this is explanatorily basic. But this would be 
to ground the difference in kind in a modal difference, and if this is legitimate in the 
present case (which presumably it is not), then by parity it must be legitimate to take the 
modal differences between the statue and clay to be basic as well.85 Alternatively, one 
could hold that the difference in kind between the set and conjunctive property is 
explanatorily basic and explains both the modal differences between the two and the 
difference in the relations that they bear to their components. But, again, differences in 
kind are meant to stand in need of further explanation, so if this is not legitimate in the 
case of the statue and clay, it is not legitimate here either. 
What this shows is that if one is too stingy about the sorts of differences that can 
reasonably be treated as explanatory bedrock, then one is left without a solution to the 
grounding problem for abstracta. And, since grounding the differences between sets and 
properties in structural differences seems at least plausible (and perhaps unavoidable), we 
have at least some reason for thinking that mereological differences are poised to explain 
the relevant differences among coincident concreta as well. 
  
                                                
85 In any case, this solution will not extend to a grounding problem involving 
uninstantiable conjunctive properties (e.g., the property of being red and blue) and the 
associated sets.  
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3. Creative Intentions 
 The artifactual kind (if any) to which an item belongs is not entirely determined 
by its intrinsic properties. A quantity of clay that, entirely by chance, is a qualitative 
duplicate of the statue that I just made is not itself a statue, nor does it have the 
persistence conditions associated with statues. Something cannot be a statue without 
someone’s having intended for it to be a statue. If differences with respect to creative 
intentions can explain why the item that I made is a statue while its physical duplicate 
light years away is not, perhaps creative intentions can also be employed to ground the 
differences between the statue and the physically indiscernible lump that shares its 
location. In the present section, I explore the prospects of extending this explanation of 
the differences between disjoint entities to the case of coincident entities. 
The idea of grounding modal differences between statues and clay in differences 
in their extrinsic features is not a new one, but many solutions in this vein do not survive 
scrutiny. For instance, while it is true that one may admire a statue without admiring the 
clay that constitutes it, the fact that the statue (but not the clay) is admired certainly does 
not explain why it is a statue or why it cannot survive being flattened—if anything, that 
you admire it is, at least in part, explained by the fact that it is a statue. De dicto creative 
intentions are likewise unable to ground the modal differences between the statue and 
clay. This is especially clear in cases in which the statue and clay are created 
simultaneously. For, in those cases, it is true of both the statue and the clay that they 
came into existence as a result of my intention to create a statue. My de dicto intention to 
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create a statue therefore fails to differentiate them and, consequently, does not supply a 
difference upon which to ground their modal differences.86 
De Re Intentions. De re intentions, on the other hand, can serve to differentiate the 
statue and the clay, and (for better or worse) have an ineliminable role to play in the 
present account. As in the case of de dicto intentions, it may be that the statue and the 
clay both come into existence as a result of my de re intention with respect to the statue 
(call it ‘Goliath’; and call the clay ‘Clay’) that it be statue. But, unlike the de dicto 
intention to create a statue and to make some clay, the de re intentions yield other 
properties with respect to which Goliath and Clay do differ. I intend with respect to 
Goliath that it be a statue. But I do not intend with respect to Clay that it be a statue. I 
intend that it make up a statue, but not that it be a statue (in the predicative sense). The 
proposal would then be that the reason that Goliath is a statue is that, when I made it, I 
intended for it to be a statue. That is, I had a de re intention, with respect to Goliath—
before and during its construction—that it be a statue.  
Is it possible to have such de re intentions? There are two sorts of worries that one 
might have. The first is a general problem concerning the possibility of standing in 
relations to things that do evidently not exist. This is a problem that rears its heads in the 
literature on fictional entities, since one can think about Sherlock Holmes or look for 
Sherlock Holmes, even though Holmes evidently does not exist. Relatedly, one can 
admire Lincoln, even though he evidently is not around to be admired. This is meant to 
be a serious problem for presentists in the philosophy of time. 
                                                
86 There is a difference in the vicinity: the statue, but not the clay, vindicates my de dicto 
intention to create a statue. But surely it vindicates my intention because it is a statue. So 
its vindicating my intention cannot explain why it is a statue. 
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There are various ways of answering these worries. One might follow eternalists 
in the philosophy of time in holding that the statue that I intend to create is a future object 
and that future objects are no less real than present objects.87 One might follow anti-
existentialists in holding that one does not have to stand in any relation to Goliath in 
order to have that de re intention; one needs only to stand in some relation to its haecceity 
or its essential individuating property.88 One might follow neo-Meinongians in holding 
that the statue does not have to exist in order for one to stand in relations to it.89 Or one 
might follow Williamson in holding that, even prior to its creation, the statue does exist, 
but that it is an abstract object at those times.90 I will not take a stand on which of these is 
the correct view; the point is just that there are various ways of dealing with this problem, 
and one who is willing to take any one of these lines may well be in a position to solve 
the grounding problem. 
The second problem with having de re intentions toward the future statue has to 
do with singling it out uniquely in advance of its creation. This is related to the familiar 
Quinean worry about thinking about some possible bald man in the doorway; there are 
simply too many indiscernible possible bald men in the doorway and no way to get one of 
them uniquely in mind. Similarly, one might worry that there are too many possible 
statues that look just like the statue I intend to create in order to get one of them uniquely 
in mind. 
There is reason to think that this can be done, however. Consider a sperm and an 
egg cell that are about to unite. Plausibly, there is a unique zygote that will result from 
                                                
87 See, e.g., Sider (2001).  
88 See, e.g., Plantinga (1974). 
89 See, e.g., Fine (2005). 
90 See, e.g., Williamson (2002). 
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their union, and we can talk about and think about this zygote.91 Likewise, as I begin to 
work on the clay, there is a unique statue that will result from my present creative act.92 
Supposing that it is possible at least in general to have propositional attitudes towards 
things that do not presently exist, there seems to be no obstacle to intending for it (i.e., 
this future statue) to be eight feet tall, to be beautiful, and to be a statue. No explicit 
stipulation or baptismal ceremony is required, but only the tacit intention that the thing I 
am about to create be a statue; this is important, for my claim is not just that this is 
something that can happen, but that this is typically what happens when artifacts are 
made. And it is not implausible that creators generally have the requisite de re intentions 
towards their creations, at least tacitly. 
Explanatory Adequacy. Let us suppose that it is possible to have the requisite de 
re intentions. If the difference in kind between Goliath and Clay can be grounded in the 
fact that one, but not the other, is the object of a de re statue-creating intention, their 
modal differences can then be explained in terms of this difference in kind, thereby 
solving the grounding problem. So let us now investigate whether these intentions are in 
fact eligible to explain the difference in kind between Goliath and Clay, and whether this 
difference with respect to creative intentions itself stands in need of special explanation.  
The main worry about the explanatory adequacy of this proposal is that it involves 
a vicious circularity. As indicated above, my de re statue-creating intention is about 
Goliath because Goliath is the statue that will result from my present creative act. But 
Goliath is meant to be a statue as a result of my de re intention that it be a statue. 
                                                
91 Cf. Salmon (1987, 49-50) and Kaplan (1973, 517).  
92 Those who wish to avoid commitment to possible objects will presumably have some 
way of paraphrasing away this apparent quantification over possibilia. 
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Arguably, however, there is no genuine circularity. Compare this to the following 
apparent circularity, which most will agree is merely apparent. Suppose that Adam 
poisons Bill, and Bill dies. Bill dies because Adam murdered him. But Adam’s action 
was a murder (rather than a mere poisoning) because Bill ended up dying. It seems that 
the right thing to say here is that there are two notions of explanation at play—perhaps 
something like Aristotle’s notions of efficient causation and formal causation. The 
murder brings about the death, but the subsequent death makes it the case that it was a 
murder. The present proposal is structurally similar. Goliath is a statue because I intended 
for it to be a statue. But what makes it the case that my statue-creating intention is an 
intention about Goliath is that Goliath is the statue that will result from my present 
creative act. So there is no circularity here; there are explanations running in opposite 
directions, but they are explanations of different kinds.  
If this is correct, then things go relatively smoothly in showing that the proposal is 
explanatorily adequate, so long as it is possible in general to have the requisite kinds of 
de re intentions. Regarding whether the differences with respect to creative intentions can 
serve as ultimate ground for the difference in kind between the statue and the clay, the 
fact that we have the creative intentions that we do presumably is not itself explanatory 
bedrock, but it is close enough, and there should simply be a mundane psychological 
explanation for why we have the creative intentions that we do. The other question is 
whether the proposal gets the order of explanation the right way round. I need it to be the 
case that Goliath is a statue because I intended that it be a statue, and not that I intended 
that it be a statue because it is a statue. But it should just be obvious that this is the 
correct order of explanation. First of all, there is a genuine prima facie plausibility to the 
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claim that Goliath is a statue because I intended for it to be a statue. Second, since my 
creative intentions pre-date the statue, it seems that there is no possibility of the 
difference in kind explaining the difference in intentions.93  
 
4. Definitional Differences 
Let us now turn to one last way of grounding the modal differences between 
statues and quantities of clay. The idea is that the statue and the clay differ with respect to 
what it is for each of them to exist, that is, they differ with respect to their real 
definitions. The key will be to show that, if indeed there are such definitional differences 
between the statue and the clay, these differences are poised both to explain the modal 
and sortal differences between the statue and the clay, and that they can plausibly be 
treated as explanatory bedrock.94   
Many will resist the thought that objects other than words and concepts have 
definitions. But it is a traditional view, going back at least as far as Aristotle (in his 
Posterior Analytics), that there can be real, or objectival, definitions. Moreover, it is not 
obvious whether there are any nonarbitrary grounds for ruling out real definitions while 
                                                
93 However, this solution will not be available to one who (like Williamson 2002) thinks 
that Goliath exists prior to its being made and (unlike Williamson) that Goliath is a statue 
prior to its being made. Nor will it be available to one who (like Fine 2005) thinks that 
Goliath is a statue prior to its existence.    
94 Bennett (2004, 354-5) proposes a solution to the grounding problem that bears a 
superficial similarity to the present proposal, insofar as it appeals to the identities of the 
objects in question, though her solution differs from mine in that (a) it requires the truth 
of a highly controversial “plentitudinous” theory of coincident objects, and (b) it purports 
to solve the grounding problem by denying that the modal differences stand in need of 
explanation (as opposed to identifying a grounded differences between the objects in 
question). 
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countenancing definitions of concepts.95 Nevertheless, perhaps there is some good reason 
for resisting real definitions. My intention is only to show that if there are such 
definitions (as many already think), they can be exploited to solve the grounding 
problem; this should be of independent interest even to those who doubt that there are 
real definitions. 
 A real definition of an object specifies what it is for that object to exist. Following 
Mark Johnston, we might understand the real definition of a complex entity as specifying 
the parts of the entity and the “principle of unity” for those parts.96 For instance, what it is 
for this hydrochloric acid molecule to exist is for this hydrogen ion and this chlorine ion 
to be covalently bonded together. By contrast, being covalently bonded is no part of what 
it is for the sum of the hydrogen and chlorine ions (assuming there really is such a thing) 
to exist.97 So despite being co-located and physically indiscernible, the sum and the 
molecule have different principles of unity. 
 It will be more difficult to specify the principles of unity of the statue and the 
clay.98 But to the extent that there is something that there is for each of them to exist, and 
what it is for the one to exist is different from what it is for the other to exist, they will 
                                                
95 “The difficulty with the position is to see what is so special about concepts. It is 
granted that the concept bachelor may be defined as unmarried man; this definition states 
… what the concept is. But then why is it not equally meaningful to define a particular set 
in terms of its members or to define a particular molecule of water in terms of its atomic 
constituents? Why is the one any more a definition or account of what the object is than 
the others?” (Fine 1994b, 14). See also Benardete (1993, 275) who maintains that real 
definition is presupposed by conceptual analysis. 
96 Johnston (2005, 638). 
97 Johnston (2002, 133-6).  
98 As an oversimplified, first attempt, Johnston (2002, 136-7) suggests that what it is for 
the copper statue of a bull to exist is for the copper head-shaped part to be attached to the 
front end of the copper torso-shaped part and for the copper tail-shaped part to be 
attached to the rear end of the copper torso-shaped part. 
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have different definitions. Among other things, the statue but not the clay will be defined 
in terms of its form: part of what it is for it to exist is for its parts to take on that form. 
The question, then, will be whether these definitional differences can serve as a solution 
to the grounding problem. 
 Explanatory Adequacy. On the present proposal, the reason that the hydrochloric 
acid molecule cannot survive the scattering of its parts is that part of what it is for it to 
exist is for the two ions to be covalently bonded. Since what it is for the sum of the ions 
to exist in no way involves their being bonded together, it is possible for it to survive the 
scattering of its parts. Likewise, because part of what it is for the statue to exist is for it to 
have (at least roughly) the form that it does, it cannot survive flattening, while the clay 
can survive flattening because having this or that form is no part of what it is for it to 
exist. 
 One might object that this proposal is not explanatorily adequate, for definitional 
differences are themselves modal differences, the idea being that definition is itself a 
modal notion. If so, then we have failed to meet our stated goal of identifying a nonmodal 
difference between the statue and the clay to ground their modal differences. Arguably, 
however, the notion of definition is not a modal notion, insofar as it cannot be analyzed in 
modal terms.99 As Fine has observed, it is a necessary feature of Socrates that he be the 
                                                
99 Another way of understanding the complaint that definition is a modal notion is that 
something’s being a definition has modal consequences (e.g., that it is necessary). But 
this cannot be right, since something’s being a tautology has modal consequences as well, 
but plainly tautology is not a modal notion in any interesting sense (see Bealer 2006, 27). 
Moreover, if something’s having modal consequences rules it out from serving as a 
ground for modal differences, then the project of grounding modal differences is trivially 
doomed from the outset. 
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sole member of {Socrates}, but this is in no way part of what it is to be Socrates.100 So, 
although it is true that, necessarily, Socrates = the unique element of {Socrates}, it is not 
the case that Socrates is, by definition, the unique element of {Socrates}. Modal notions 
are therefore too coarse-grained to serve as an analysis of definition.101     
 One might still worry that no progress has been made, for if facts about how a 
thing must be and can be stand in need of explanation, then so presumably do facts about 
what it is for a certain thing to exist. Even if one can explain the modal differences 
between the statue and the clay in terms of what it is for the statue to exist and for the 
clay to exist, one still must explain why this is what it is for the statue to exist, while that 
is what it is for the clay to exist, rather than the other way around. So, arguably, we have 
not yet reached explanatory bedrock.   
 To see that progress has been made, let us turn our attention to a somewhat 
different example. Suppose for the moment that, on final analysis, knowledge turns out to 
be justified defeaterless belief. Now consider the question: why is knowledge justified 
defeaterless belief, rather than justified true belief? It would be a mistake to try to explain 
the fact that knowledge is not justified true belief by appeal to the fact that (Gettier’s 
character) Smith has justified true belief and yet does not know, for this seems to get 
things the wrong way round and, anyway, would deprive us of a noncircular explanation 
                                                
100 Fine (1994b, 4-5). 
101 George Bealer makes this point in (2006, 38). He also observes that, whatever its other 
shortcomings, no one has ever objected to the analysis of modality in terms of truth by 
logic and definition on the grounds that it is circular (2006, 27-8). But the charge should 
be legitimate if definition truly is a modal notion. 
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of Smith’s lack of knowledge. Rather, it appears that there is (and need be) no answer to 
this question.102 Knowledge just is justified defeaterless belief.  
 Why is this an acceptable stopping point? Evidently, the relevant feature of the 
explanation that allows it to serve as explanatory bedrock is that it specifies what it is for 
there to be knowledge. It is in virtue of its status as a definition that it enjoys the status of 
explanatory bedrock. By parity, the appeal to what it is for the statue to exist and for the 
clay to exist is also a suitable stopping point, since they share the feature of the appeal to 
what knowledge is in virtue of which the latter is a suitable stopping point—namely, 
invoking a definition. (Of course, the case of knowledge and the case of the statue and 
clay are disanalogous in various respects. But they are analogous in the sense that 
matters, in the sense that is relevant to their explanatory status.) So it seems that we have 
indeed made progress by appealing to the definitions of the coincident entities.     
                                                
102 Perhaps there is some temptation to say that the reason that knowledge is not justified 
true belief is that Smith has a justified true belief that the man who gets the job has ten 
coins in his pocket and yet does not know that the man who gets the job has ten coins in 
his pocket. I suspect that this is again based on a conflation of metaphysical and 
conceptual explanation. This is a good explanation only insofar as it illuminates why 
knowledge must not be justified true belief, but that is just to say that it is a good 
conceptual explanation. As a metaphysical explanation, however, it seems to get things 
the wrong way round. 
Alternatively, one might suggest that knowledge is justified defeaterless belief 
because of the meaning of ‘knowledge’. But, while this may be a plausible explanation of 
the truth of the sentence ‘Knowledge is justified defeaterless belief’, it does not explain 
the fact that knowledge is justified defeaterless belief. First, the correct explanation seems 
to go in exactly the opposition direction: ‘knowledge’ means what it does because it 
denotes knowledge and knowledge is justified defeaterless belief. Second, since 
explanations support counterfactuals, the fact that a certain English word has a certain 
meaning cannot explain why knowledge is justified defeaterless belief—for had the word 
meant something else, or had it never existed, it still would have been the case that 
knowledge is justified defeaterless belief. Finally, it cannot be the case that knowledge is 
justified defeaterless belief because of the meaning of some particular word, because 
there is no principled means of selecting that word: ‘knowledge’? ‘savoir’? 
‘conoscenza’?   
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5. Extending the Solution 
Let us now consider whether, and to what extent, the various solutions can be 
extended to handle versions of the grounding problem involving other kinds of entities. 
As we will see, the pluralist solution and creative intentions solution cannot cover all of 
these grounding problems—at least not without adopting fairly radical versions of those 
proposals. But that does not by itself show that the proposals are inadequate or 
uninteresting. First, it is not obvious that different grounding problems involving 
different kinds of entities require a uniform solution, nor is it obvious that, because (say) 
mereological differences sometimes cannot explain modal differences among 
coincidents, they cannot ever explain such differences. Second, some might deny that all 
of the instances of the grounding problem mentioned below are genuine. Third, even if 
radical versions of the proposals are required to handle some of the cases, this may (on 
final tally) prove less costly than its alternatives (e.g., brute modal facts, eliminativism, 
contingent identities).  
Low-Grade Individuals. In addition to the statue and the clay, there is also the 
lump of clay, which seems to differ modally from both the statue and the clay. Unlike the 
statue, the lump of clay can survive being squashed; unlike the clay, the lump cannot 
survive the scattering of its parts. Some may doubt that these items do indeed differ 
modally,103 but let us suppose that they do. What, then, grounds these modal differences? 
To handle this case by appeal to different parthood relations, one would need a 
more extensive pluralism than the one considered above which distinguished only two 
                                                
103 For instance, on the dominant kinds view defended in Burke (1994) and Rea (2000), 
there are no modal differences between coincident statues and lumps.   
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parthood relations: one for masses and one for individuals. But now one would need to 
postulate two different parthood relations for individuals: one for high-grade individuals 
like statues, trees, and tables, and another for low-grade individuals like lumps, chunks, 
hunks, and pieces (i.e., things which constitute the high-grade individuals). But it is only 
natural to extend the pluralist proposal to cover the present case. One of the main 
motivations for multiplying parthood relations in the first place was that fundamentally 
different kinds of things differ systematically with regard to their relations to their parts. 
Low-grade individuals seem to occupy a middle ground between masses and more 
sophisticated individuals like trees and statues: unlike masses they cannot survive the 
scattering of their parts, and unlike high-grade individuals, they can survive arbitrary 
rearrangements of their parts. So it seems natural for the pluralist to postulate a further 
parthood relation, specific to primitive individuals, and this could ground the modal 
differences between the lump and the statue, and also the modal differences between the 
lump and the clay.  
The definitional solution has no trouble with this case either, since what it is for 
the lump to exist will be different from what it is for either the clay or the statue to 
exist.104 So one may appeal to definitional differences to solve these grounding problems 
as well. The appeal to creative intentions, however, cannot plausibly be extended to this 
case. For what is plausible in the case of artifacts—namely, that they depend for their 
nature and existence on our conceptual activity—is patently implausible in the case of 
nonartifacts such as lumps. Plausibly, our conceptual activity has nothing at all to do with 
                                                
104 Roughly, what it is for the lump of clay to exist will be for the various bits of clay to 
be “joined and connected” in the relevant way. See Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 80-
90) for an attempted explication of the relevant notion of being joined and connected. 
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the modal and sortal features of animals, mountains, or puddles (though this extreme 
view is not without its defenders).105 So the appeal to creative intentions is best treated as 
only a partial solution to the various grounding problems. 
Same-Kind Co-location. Bruce is away on business and in a drunken stupor he 
writes the following letter to his wife: “Dear Bertha, I’m leaving you. Love, Bruce.” 
Bertha receives the letter several days later, and writes the following letter to Bruce on 
the back: “Dear Bruce, I’m returning your horrible letter. Good riddance, Bertha.”106 The 
letter that Bruce wrote and the letter than Bertha wrote coincide exactly, on the 8½ x 11 
piece of hotel stationary. But it seems that they must be distinct. Among other things, one 
was written before the other. Furthermore, they seem to differ modally: if one erases 
Bruce’s inscription, Bruce’s letter but not Bertha’s letter ceases to exist. And this modal 
difference seems just as much in need of grounding as any other modal difference. 
Some might doubt that this is a genuine case of co-location,107 but let us suppose 
that it is. The pluralist solution seems like a nonstarter here, unless one is willing to 
accept a radical version of pluralism on which parthood relations vary even from one 
letter to the next, even amongst things of the same kind; and this looks to be an 
unpalatable and unmotivated extension of pluralism. So, as with creative intentions, 
mereological pluralism is best viewed as only a partial solution to the various grounding 
problems.  
                                                
105 The most explicit proponent of the conceptualist view is Alan Sidelle (1989). 
106 This is a slightly modified version of an example from Kit Fine (2000, 359-60). See 
Johnston (2005, 661-3) for discussion of a related example.   
107 To my knowledge, no objections have been raised in the literature, though one often 
hears it said that the two letters are abstract entities, and that the case involves only one 
concrete item (with writing on both sides of it).  
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The appeal to creative intentions, by contrast, is well equipped to handle this case. 
Bruce intended with respect to his letter that it convey that he is leaving Bertha, which is 
why Bruce’s letter cannot survive the destruction of the words ‘Dear Bertha, I’m leaving 
you’, whereas it can survive the destruction of the words ‘Dear Bruce, good riddance’. 
Exactly the opposite is true of Bertha’s letter because she intended with respect to hers 
that it convey an angry reply. And the definitional response is available here as well, 
insofar as what it is for Bruce’s letter to exist is different from what it is for Bertha’s 
letter to exist. As before, it is difficult to specify the definitions for these items, but they 
will differ at least in the following respect: part of what it is for Bruce’s letter (but not 
Bertha’s letter) to exist is for the words ‘Dear Bertha, I’m leaving you…’  to be inscribed 
on the paper in the relevant order.  
Persons and Bodies.  Finally, there is the case of persons and their bodies, which 
seem physically indiscernible and yet modally different. Arguably, a person can survive 
the death of his body, for instance by having his brain transferred to another body, and 
perhaps in more exciting ways. Again, let us simply grant that a person and his body do 
differ modally.108 This gives rise to an especially difficult instance of the grounding 
problem. As in the other cases, the definitional solution is equipped to handle the problem 
(since what it is for a person to exist will presumably involve psychological facts in a 
way that what it is for a body to exist does not). But the appeal to creative intentions 
appears to be a nonstarter since, as before, there are no artifacts involved in this case. 
And, while one might multiply parthood relations further in order to accommodate this 
case, it is unclear whether this more extensive pluralism can be motivated. 
                                                
108 See Thomson (1997) for defense of a bodily criterion of personal identity on which 
persons and their bodies have the same persistence conditions.  
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However, even if this more extensive pluralism is untenable, it may still be 
possible to explain the modal differences between persons and their bodies in terms of 
mereological differences between the two. A number of philosophers have defended the 
view that persons, unlike their bodies are mereologically simple.109 David Barnett, for 
instance, argues that the mereological simplicity is required in order for an individual to 
be capable of thought. If this is correct then, since the capacity for thought is tightly 
connected to the persistence conditions for persons, it is plausible that the mereological 
simplicity of persons and the mereological complexity of their bodies has a role to play in 
explaining why they have the persistence conditions that they do.110 So one would still 
have a fundamentally mereological solution to this grounding problem. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have explored three avenues for grounding modal differences between 
coincident entities: first, in terms of mereological differences; second, in terms of 
differences with respect to creative intentions; third, in terms of differences in their real 
definitions. My main focus has been to establish that the proposed solutions are 
explanatorily adequate given certain background assumptions. I have tried to demonstrate 
that the indicated differences are suited to explain modal differences (and are not 
explained by them) and that those differences do not themselves stand in need of further 
explanation. A full defense of the proposed solutions would require a deeper 
investigation into those background assumptions, that is, the motivations and potential 
                                                
109 See, e.g., Chisholm (1991), Quinn (1997), Lowe (2001), Zimmerman (2003), and 
Barnett (forthcoming)   
110 Barnett (forthcoming). 
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scope of mereological pluralism, the possibility of having de re intentions toward 
individuals that do not presently exist, the ontological status of such individuals, and the 
existence and nature of real definitions. But, even having left these background issues 
unresolved, it looks as though a satisfactory solution to the grounding problem may be 
within reach. In fact, perhaps the most important problem facing those who hold that 
coincident entities can differ modally is not a poverty of differences but rather an 
embarrassment of riches: for, given the correctness of the background assumptions, one 
must somehow determine which among the candidate explanations is the explanation of 
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IV 
Ordinary Objects Without Overdetermination* 
 
1. The Exclusion Argument  
Trenton Merricks argues that a wide range of the material objects that we 
ordinarily take to exist do not in fact exist, on the grounds that they lack nonredundant 
causal powers. The argument, as it applies to baseballs, may be understood as follows:    
1. If baseballs exist, then baseballs have causal powers.  
2. For all x, x has causal powers only if it is possible that, for some event e, x causes 
e. 
3. So, if baseballs exist, then it is possible that, for some event, some baseball causes 
it. 
4. Necessarily, for every baseball, and for every event e, either the atoms that 
compose the baseball (collectively) cause e or the atoms that compose the 
baseball do not (collectively) cause e. 
5. Necessarily, for every baseball and event e, if the atoms that compose the baseball 
cause e, then the baseball does not cause e.111 
6. Necessarily, for every baseball and event e, if the atoms that compose the baseball 
do not cause e, then the baseball does not cause e. 
7. So, necessarily, for all baseballs and events e, the baseball does not cause e. 
8. So baseballs do not have causal powers. 
                                                
* Thanks to George Bealer, John Bengson, Dave Robb, and Mark Sainsbury.  
111 The argument for (5) runs as follows: (5a) Necessarily, for all objects o, objects 
o1…on, and events e, if o1…on cause e and o is causally irrelevant to whether o1…on 
cause e and e is not overdetermined by o and o1…on, then o does not cause e. (5b) 
Necessarily, for all events e, no baseball is causally relevant to whether the atoms that 
compose it cause e. (5c) Necessarily, no event is overdetermined by a baseball and the 
atoms that compose it. (5) So, necessarily, for every baseball and event e, if the atoms 
that compose the baseball cause e, then the baseball does not cause e. See Merricks 
(2001, 56-73). 
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9. So baseballs do not exist. 
Arguments for the elimination of other kinds of entities may be obtained by substituting 
other kind terms for ‘baseball’ throughout.112  
Merricks denies that persons can successfully be eliminated by this kind of 
argument, on the grounds that persons can cause things to happen that are not caused by 
their constituent atoms acting in concert.113 If persons do indeed have nonredundant 
causal powers, then the sixth premise of the argument as it applies to persons is false. In 
what follows, I defend the view that baseballs themselves have nonredundant causal 
powers. There is a division of causal labor: macro-events are typically caused by 
macroscopic objects and microscopic events are typically caused by microscopic items. 
Let us call this kind of division of labor specialization. 
 There are, of course, other ways of resisting the elimination of baseballs. One 
might deny (1) and concede that baseballs are mere epiphenomena. One might deny (5) 
on the grounds that the baseball is identical to the atoms of which it is composed, in 
which case it trivially causes everything caused by those atoms.114 Or one might deny (5) 
on the grounds that everything that happens as a result of the activities of the atoms that 
compose the baseball is systematically overdetermined by the baseball.115 I will not argue 
that these responses are incorrect. Presumably, however, a view on which baseballs and 
the like have a causal impact that is not systematically overdetermined is to be preferred, 
                                                
112 Merricks takes his argument to work only against material objects, insofar as his 
defense of premise (1) invokes only a restricted version of Alexander’s dictum, according 
to which macroscopic objects exist only if they have causal powers (2001, 81).   
113 Merricks (2001, chapter 4). 
114 The immediate problem is that the baseball and the atoms differ modally, in which 
case they must be distinct (by Leibniz’s Law). See Merricks (2001, 20-28) for further 
discussion of this line of response.   
115 See Sider (2003) and Thomasson (manuscript). 
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other things being equal; and there are good reasons for resisting the identification of the 
baseball with the atoms.   
 
2. The Granularity of Events 
I contend that the baseball causes the shattering of the window but not the 
scatterings of the atoms arranged windowwise, while the atoms arranged baseballwise 
cause the scatterings of the atoms but not the shattering of the window. This is coherent 
only if the shattering of the window is distinct from the scatterings of the atoms. So the 
proponent of specialization must hold that events are sufficiently fine-grained if there is 
to be causal work for both the atoms and the baseball. Of course, it is tempting to hold a 
more coarse-grained view of events, according to which ‘the window shattering’ and ‘the 
atoms scattering’ are two descriptions of a single event.116 But this is besides the point, 
for the defender of the exclusion argument is in no position to deny that events are fine-
grained.  
To see why, let us begin by considering some objects that the defender of the 
exclusion argument does believe in, for instance, atoms arranged baseballwise.117 
Defenders of the exclusion argument must somehow allow for events to be caused both 
by the atoms and by the events involving those atoms (e.g., the atoms arranged 
baseballwise colliding with the atoms arranged windowwise). Otherwise, the exclusion 
argument can be adapted to show that events involving those atoms cannot exist, for there 
                                                
116 Incidentally, Merricks himself concedes that these are distinct events. He reasons as 
follows: the shattering is a single event and the scatterings are not a single event, so by 
Leibniz’s Law they must be distinct (2001, 64). Perhaps not all defenders of the exclusion 
argument will be so easily convinced.  
117 For those nihilists who believes in nothing, a different argumentative strategy is 
required (one which will crucially involve an incredulous stare).   
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could never be anything for those events to cause that is not already caused by those 
atoms. This point generalizes to all events: they cannot do anything that is not already 
being done by their constituents. But if there can be no events, then nothing can cause 
anything to happen, in which case nothing has causal powers, including the atoms 
arranged baseballwise. But if the atoms arranged baseballwise lack causal powers, then 
they do not exist, contra hypothesis.  
 In order to avoid eliminating everything, the defender of the exclusion argument 
must hold that the atoms and their activities are not in causal competition—that this kind 
of overdetermination is unobjectionable.118 However the details might go, the general 
idea will have to be that all of the real causal work that needs to be done is done by 
events, and that allowing object causation does not multiply causes because of the tight 
(perhaps analytic) connection between object causation and event causation—for 
instance, objects cause events by virtue of participating (in the appropriate way) in events 
that cause those events.119  Let us suppose that this is so. 
Now suppose that events are so coarse-grained that the baseball’s colliding with 
the window is identical to the atoms arranged baseballwise colliding with the atoms 
arranged windowwise. Call that event ‘E’. The baseball causes the window to shatter by 
virtue of participating in the event of the baseball colliding with the window, namely, E. 
The atoms arranged baseballwise cause the window to shatter by virtue of participating in 
the event of the atoms arranged baseballwise colliding with the window, namely, E. So 
                                                
118 Specifically, he must deny the fifth premise of the exclusion argument against events: 
(5') Necessarily, for all events e and e', if some object causes e', then e does not cause e'.  
119 Cf. Merricks (2001, 67-8). Of course, the defender of the argument must ensure that 
the explanation does not generalize to show that overdetermination by objects and their 
parts is unobjectionable—lest they undermine premise (5) above—but let us just suppose 
that this can be done.  
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both the causal work done by the baseball and the causal work done by the atoms are 
analyzed in terms of the causal work done by E. And, by hypothesis, events do all of the 
real causal work. So, on the hypothesis that events are coarse-grained, the 
overdetermination of the window shattering by the baseball and its atoms would be an 
unobjectionable kind of overdetermination, in just the same way that the 
overdetermination of the window shattering by the baseball and the associated event is 
unobjectionable—namely, insofar as there is really only one thing doing any causal work. 
So, on pain of self-defeat, the defender of the exclusion argument must concede 
that the baseball colliding with the window and its atoms colliding with the window are 
distinct events. By parity, so must be the window shattering and the atoms scattering. 
Therefore, no questions are begged in assuming that these are distinct—for if they are 
identical, then the exclusion argument is toothless. I will likewise continue to assume that 
object causation may be analyzed in terms of event causation—for, as we have just seen, 
the defender of the exclusion argument is in no position to deny this.   
 
3. Baseballs Shatter Windows 
 I deny (6) on the grounds that baseballs and the like have nonredundant causal 
powers. Baseballs cause windows to shatter. When a baseball shatters a window, the 
atoms that compose the baseball do not cause the window to shatter. They do cause atoms 
arranged windowwise to scatter, but that is about it. The point generalizes. For every 
macroscopic object, some hooligan in some world has found a way to shatter a window 
with it. So they all have causal powers in the sense required by premise (2). And since the 
 
  96 
atoms that compose them succeed only in scattering atoms arranged windowwise, the 
activities of those atoms do not generate any causal redundancy. 
 This is not to deny that it is possible for atoms arranged baseballwise to shatter a 
window. There are worlds in which, purely by chance, atoms converge in a baseballwise 
arrangement just long enough to collide with a window, shatter it, and then disperse.120 
Plausibly, those atoms do not compose a baseball, or anything else for that matter.121 But 
something shattered the window. So it must have been those atoms.122  
This suggests that, when a baseball shatters a window, the activities of the atoms 
that compose it are causally sufficient for the shattering. For had the atoms done what 
they did in the absence of the baseball, the window still would have shattered. But 
causing and causally necessitating are two different things. What the atoms did 
necessitated the shattering but did not cause the shattering; what caused the shattering 
was the baseball colliding with the window.  
Relevantly similar cases of necessitating without causing can be found in the 
literature on trumping preemption (e.g., Schaffer 2000). In cases of trumping preemption, 
each of two candidate causes would have brought about the effect in the absence of the 
other but, when both are present, one trumps the other (i.e., preempts it but without 
“cutting” the causal chain). For instance, when the sergeant and major both order the 
troops to advance, the troops advance because the major ordered them to advance. Had 
the sergeant ordered them to advance in the major’s absence, they would have advanced, 
                                                
120 Cf. Lowe (2004, 710), where he attributes a similar example to Paul Teller. 
121 Here I am assuming, with my opponents, that universalism is incorrect. 
122 It may likewise by possible for baseballs to cause the scatterings of atoms arranged 
windowwise. For instance, if it is possible that there be a baseball with no atomic parts 
(perhaps an “extended simple”), it may be used to shatter a window, in which case there 
will be nothing other than the baseball to have caused the scatterings. 
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and it would have been because the sergeant ordered them to advance.123 But, as it 
happens, the lower-ranking officer’s commands are trumped and preempted by those of 
the higher-ranking officer: the troops are following the major’s orders, and would have 
advanced no matter what the sergeant had ordered them to do. Likewise, had the atoms 
arranged baseballwise collided with the window in the absence of the baseball, they 
would have been the cause of the window’s shattering. But the activities of baseball 
trump and preempt the activities of the atoms arranged baseballwise.  
The specialization response to Merricks’s argument also mirrors a promising 
response to the causal exclusion argument in the philosophy of mind. Stephen Yablo 
contends that, when several events are each causally sufficient for a given effect, the 
cause is the one that is most commensurate, or proportional, to the effect.124 Sophie the 
pigeon is trained to peck at red patches, and has just pecked a scarlet patch. Her seeing a 
colored patch was required but not enough for the pecking to occur. Her seeing a scarlet 
patch was enough but not required for the pecking to occur. Her seeing a red patch was 
required and just enough for the pecking. Among the candidate causes, seeing a red patch 
is the most commensurate to the effect—including no extraneous causal material and 
omitting no important causal material—and therefore has what it takes to be the cause.  
One might think that the baseball (rather than the atoms arranged baseballwise) is 
the cause of the shattering of the window because, like the major, it trumps and preempts 
other candidate causes or because, like seeing a red patch, it is more commensurate to the 
effect than other candidate causes. Either way, there is independent support for the claim 
that the activities of the atoms arranged baseballwise do not cause the window to 
                                                
123 See David Lewis (2000, 183), who attributes the example to Bas van Fraassen.     
124 Yablo (1992, 273-80).   
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shatter—despite causally guaranteeing the shattering of the window—and, hence, to 
reject premise (6).  
(Some might complain that the foregoing observations about trumping 
preemption and commensurability are, in fact, only observations about causal 
explanation, not about causation. But this is far from clear. We not only have the intuition 
that the baseball colliding with the window explains the window’s shattering, but also 
that the baseball colliding with the window is the cause of the window’s shattering. In 
any event, Schaffer and Yablo themselves take their observations to concern causation—
not just explanation—as does David Lewis, who takes his counterfactual theory of 
causation to have been soundly refuted by Schaffer’s examples of trumping 
preemption.125 I will not argue that they are correct. Let us simply note that if these 
examples show what Yablo, Schaffer, and Lewis take them to show, then the 
specialization response to the exclusion argument against baseballs is not without 
independent support.)   
 The same can be said for the quantity of rubber and yarn with which the baseball 
coincides, which, according to some, is distinct from the baseball itself. That quantity can 
exist in the absence of the baseball, for instance, if the yarn is unraveled and the rubber is 
melted down. That quantity might then be placed in a sink in such a way as to clog the 
drain. The rubber and yarn’s clogging the drain causes the sink to back up. So the 
quantity has causal powers. And, for the kinds of reasons given above, the atomic parts of 
                                                
125 Lewis (2000).  
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the quantity do not cause the sink to back up. So the quantity has nonredundant causal 
powers.126    
 
4. Against Specialization: Emergence 
 Merricks anticipates the response that ordinary material objects cause things to 
happen at the macroscopic level that are not caused by the activities of their parts, and 
raises two objections. His first objection is that any such answers “implies the false claim 
that baseballs have ‘emergent’ properties” (2001, 62). His argument appears to run as 
follows:  
(6a) If it is possible that there be an event e such that a baseball causes e but the 
atoms that compose the baseball do not cause e, then baseballs can have 
emergent, causally efficacious properties that its parts lack. 
(6b) Necessarily, no baseballs have emergent properties, causally efficacious 
properties that their parts lack.  
(6) So, necessarily, for every baseball and event e, if the atoms that compose the 
baseball do not cause e, then the baseball does not cause e. 
There are multiple ways of resisting this argument. The first is to deny that baseballs have 
to have distinctive causally efficacious properties in order to cause things that their parts 
                                                
126 Likewise, those who countenance the clump of rubber and yarn, as a still further 
object may hold that it too has causal powers. All this requires is that there be some world 
in which the clump exists in the absence of the baseball (e.g., by being flattened into a 
disc) and in which it shatters a window. It may then be argued that the clump would be 
the nonredundant cause of the shattering on the grounds that the clump trumps both the 
quantity and the atoms with which it coincides as the cause of the shattering or, 
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do not. The second is to concede that they must have distinctive causally efficacious 
properties, but deny that these properties need be emergent. The third is to concede that 
these properties are emergent, but insist that baseballs and the like do have emergent 
properties. 
Let us begin with the first option. In standard cases of trumping preemption, the 
candidate causes do not differ with regard to their causally efficacious properties. Both 
the sergeant and the major have shouted ‘Advance’, are loud enough to be heard, and so 
forth. The one is higher ranking than the other, but this is not a causally efficacious 
property; at best, it is causally relevant to their following his orders. Likewise, it may be 
that the atoms arranged baseballwise (collectively) instantiate all of the same causally 
efficacious properties as the baseball—having such and such a mass and velocity, and so 
forth—and yet the baseball, and not its parts, causes the windows to shatter because it is 
“higher ranking” and, accordingly, its activities trump and preempt the activities of its 
parts. Its “higher rank” may then be taken to consist in its being more commensurate to 
the shattering than the activities of the atoms (cf. Yablo’s pigeon). Premise (6a) would 
then be false: the baseball can cause things that its parts do not irrespective of whether its 
parts share all of its causally efficacious properties.  
The second option was to accept that there is some causally efficacious property 
that the baseball has but that its parts lack. E. J. Lowe argues—and Merricks agrees—
that, while the baseball has a certain velocity and momentum, the atoms arranged 
baseballwise cannot be said to have that velocity and momentum.127 If this is correct, then 
having the momentum that it does can serve as the distinctive causally efficacious 
                                                
127 See Lowe (2004, 708-9) and Merricks (2003b, 728). For continuity, I take the liberty 
of restating Lowe’s and Merricks’s points in terms of baseballs (vs. statues).   
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property in virtue of which the baseball but not its parts causes the window to shatter. It is 
then open to one to either deny (6a) and insist that momentum is not an emergent 
property, or to concede that it is an emergent property and deny (6b).  
The choice is difficult because there are embarrassingly many different notions of 
emergence, and Merricks does not specify which he has in mind. Emergence is most 
commonly understood to be epistemological in nature: for instance, a property of a 
complex object is said to be emergent just in case there is no a priori entailment from the 
features and laws governing the parts of the object to its instantiation of that property. But 
facts about the momentum of composite objects are a priori deducible from, facts about 
the activities of their parts; so momentum plainly is not emergent in this sense.128 Nor is 
it emergent in the sense of not being wholly determined by, and wholly explicable in 
terms of, the features of the object that has that momentum.129  
 But since Merricks agrees with Lowe that the parts of the baseball neither 
individually nor collectively have the momentum that the baseball purports to have, it 
does not much matter what notion of emergence he may have had in mind. If momentum 
does turn out to be emergent in the intended sense, then emergence is not objectionable 
and one may painlessly deny (6b). If his envisaged definition of emergence does not 
apply to momentum, then one can deny that baseballs need to have any emergent 
                                                
128 Alternatively, one might think of an emergent property simply as one that an object 
has but that its parts collectively lack; but, although momentum does come out as an 
emergent property on this characterization, there is no good reason to deny that baseballs 
and the like have emergent properties in this very weak sense. 
129 As Lowe points out, to insist that the relevant causally efficacious properties of the 
baseball not be explicable in terms of features of its parts is to require “much more than 
the plausible demand that [baseballs] ‘earn their keep’ by doing some genuine causal 
work” (2004, 710).  
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property in order to cause things that their parts do not (i.e., one may deny (6a))—for this 
can be explained in terms of their momentum, which is not emergent. 
 Merricks’s reply to Lowe is that Lowe takes the point that baseballs have 
distinctive causal powers to imply that baseballs have nonredundant causal powers.130 Of 
course Merricks is right that the one does not imply the other. But, to the extent that 
momentum is both an unobjectionable property and a causally efficacious property that is 
not shared by the parts of the baseball, it is open to the proponent of specialization to 
deny either (6a) or (6b)—depending upon what is supposed to be meant by ‘emergence’. 
This does not constitute an argument for specialization, but it does constitute an effective 
reply to the argument from emergence against specialization. 
 
5. Against Specialization: Causal Transmission 
 Merricks’s second objection to the view that ordinary inanimate material objects 
cause things that are not caused by their parts is that it is ruled out by the following 
principle: 
The Principle of Causal Transmission: If some objects cause events v1 … vn, and 
v1 … vn compose event V, then those objects cause V.131 
If this principle is correct then, since the atoms arranged baseballwise cause the 
scatterings of the atoms that compose the window, it follows that those atoms arranged 
                                                
130 Merricks (2003b, 728-9). In Lowe’s defense, he never actually claims that the one 
entails the other. Rather, Lowe claims only that the mere fact that the baseball’s causal 
powers are wholly explicable in terms of the powers of its parts does not give us reason 
to think these powers are redundant. In Merricks’s defense, Lowe fails to directly engage 
either of his arguments against the specialization response (i.e., the arguments from 
emergence and causal transmission).     
131 Merricks (2001, 64-5). 
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baseballwise cause the shattering of the window. So the envisaged response cannot be 
correct. 
Merricks provides no argument in defense of this principle. But some such 
argument is sorely needed, for appeal to this premise seems just to beg the question 
against the proponent of specialization. The response was that there is a division of causal 
labor: generally, macroscopic items are causally responsible for macroscopic events, and 
the associated microscopic items are causally responsible for the associated microscopic 
events. Denying the principle of causal transmission is not an unforeseen cost of the 
response; it is the response! So in appealing to this principle Merricks does not supply 
any further reason for resisting specialization.   
Of course, the transmission principle is intuitively plausible, so perhaps that is 
reason enough to accept it. But intuitively plausible general principles are a dime a dozen. 
Here is another: 
The Principle of Macroscopic Efficacy: If the objects that compose O are the 
cause of events v1 … vn, and v1 … vn compose event V, then O causes V. 
Here is another:  
The Principle of Causal Specialization: If the objects that compose O are the 
cause of events v1 … vn, and v1 … vn compose event V, then O is the cause of 
V.132  
These are intuitively plausible as well. But we know that the transmission principle and 
the specialization principle cannot both be correct. What we have here is an intuitional 
                                                
132 Those who think that some things can compose more than one object at a time (e.g., 
both a statue and a lump of clay) will prefer the closely related principle: if objects o1 … 
on cause events v1 … vn, and both o1 … on and v1 … vn have a fusion, then each fusion of 
v1 … vn is caused by a fusion of o1 … on.  
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conflict. There is no obvious reason to favor the transmission principle over the 
specialization principle. So, if the appeal to transmission is to pull any dialectical weight, 
Merricks must somehow explain away the intuitions that support the specialization 
principle, or else provide some other reason for thinking that the intuitional conflict is 
best resolved in favor of the intuitions supporting the transmission principle.133 
The plausibility of the transmission principle may be due in part to the fact that 
there is a wide range of events to which it does apply, what we may call low-grade 
events. Low-grade events are events like the scattering of the of atoms arranged 
windowwise which are ontologically on a par with such low-grade objects as collections, 
groups, sums, and assortments. This low-grade event is composed of the very same 
events as the shattering of the window: this atom’s zooming to the left at such and such a 
speed, that atom’s whizzing off to the right, and so forth. But the shattering and the 
scattering differ with respect to their individuation conditions. The low-grade event of the 
scattering of those atoms cannot have occurred in the absence of a1. The high-grade event 
of the shattering of the window, by contrast, could have occurred even had a1 never 
existed. A low-grade event has parts but, like a collection or an assortment, is nothing 
over and above its parts. So it is perfectly in keeping with specialization that low-grade 
events—which are nothing over and above the parts that compose them—are caused by 
the very things that cause the parts of these events. But Merricks gives us no good reason 
to think that the transmission principle holds across the board, nor does he give us any 
reason to favor the transmission principle over the specialization principle. 
                                                
133 One can of course construct an argument against the specialization principle by 
invoking something like premise (6). But this is exactly the premise that is currently 
under dispute.  
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6. Microphysical Completeness 
 What may be underlying both of Merricks’s arguments is a deeper concern about 
violating a certain principle of microphysical completeness, according to which 
everything that happens can, on some level, be accounted for in microphysical terms. As 
stated, microphysical completeness has a certain intuitive appeal, but it also has a number 
of readings. The proponent of specialization will have to deny the strongest reading of 
this principle—on which it says that the cause of every event is some microphysical 
object or objects—but so will Merricks, since he thinks that some things that happen are 
nonredundantly caused by humans. So let us see if there is some other principle in the 
vicinity that the proponent of specialization alone is committed to denying. 
In connection with his argument from emergence, Merricks says that even those 
who accept that some objects have emergent properties ought to agree that “everything a 
baseball causes is caused by its parts at some level of decomposition” (2001, 62), 
suggesting that the proponent of specialization must deny this. But the proponent of 
specialization can agree with Merricks here. What happens when a baseball causes a 
window to shatter, at one level of decomposition, is that some atoms arranged 
baseballwise cause some atoms arranged windowwise to scatter. So what the baseball 
causes is caused by its parts at some level of decomposition. Perhaps what Merricks has 
something else in mind, namely, that everything that baseballs and the like cause is 
caused by their parts at some level of decomposition of the explanandum but not the 
explanans—that there is nothing caused by the baseball that is not also caused by atoms 
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arranged baseballwise. Of course the proponent of specialization must reject this claim; 
but this is just premise (6). So to raise this as an objection to the proponent of 
specialization is just to reiterate the contested premise, not to raise a new objection.  
There seems to be another way of understanding microphysical completeness 
which is open to the proponent of specialization to accept, and which seems to best 
reflect the sentiment behind the principle. There is evidently a highly coarse-grained 
category of entities for which microphysical completeness does hold. This is the level of 
reality at which empirically equivalent scientific theories which postulate different sorts 
of entities can truly be said to describe one and the same thing. We can think of such 
coarse-grained entities as “conditions of the world.”134 The condition of a window 
shattering and the condition of its atoms scattering, unlike the associated events, are one 
and the same. Likewise, the condition of a baseball colliding with a window is identical 
with the condition of some atoms arranged baseballwise colliding with a window. Every 
condition of the world can be explained by some condition of some microphysical items. 
So microphysical completeness is vindicated, at the level of conditions of the world.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 I have shown that Merricks’s overdetermination argument against baseballs and 
the like may be blocked without holding that events brought about by baseballs and the 
like are systematically overdetermined, that baseballs and the like are epiphenomenal, or 
that baseballs and the like have causally efficacious properties that are emergent in any 
objectionable sense. Rather, I have shown that the argument may be resisted simply by 
                                                
134 See Bealer (1982) on conditions. Facts are often spoken of this way, but facts, like 
propositions and events, are arguably too fine-grained to play this kind of role. 
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holding that there is division of labor between macroscopic and microscopic objects: 
macroscopic objects are typically causally responsible for the events involving other 
macroscopic objects, and microscopic objects are typically causally responsible for 
events involving other microscopic objects. I have not tried to argue that there is a 
division of labor—and so do not expect to have persuaded those who have prefer 
overdetermination or who prefer to do without baseballs for independent reasons—but I 
do take myself to have shown that the exclusion argument can be resisted, at no great 
cost. 
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V 
Eliminativism and the Challenge from Folk Belief* 
 
I regret to say that all too many professors of philosophy consider 
it their duty to be sycophants of common sense, and thus, doubtless 
unintentionally, to bow down in homage before savage 










1. The Challenge from Folk Belief 
Not all philosophers share the traditional philosophical goal of preserving our 
pretheoretical conception of the world in the face of puzzles and arguments that threaten 
to undermine this conception. But virtually everyone agrees that, even after presenting 
the arguments for their positions, proponents of revisionary philosophical theories (those 
that deviate from our pretheoretical conception of the world) are required to provide 
some sort of account of the conflict between their theories and what the folk believe. 
Those who defend seemingly revisionary theories may confront the challenge in one of 
two ways. Some supply a compatibilist account according to which there in fact is no 
conflict with folk belief. Others supply an incompatibilist account, attempting to answer 
the challenge without denying that the conflict is genuine.  
                                                
* Thanks to Eli Hirsch, Rob Koons, Aidan McGlynn, Trenton Merricks, Bryan Pickel, 
Mark Sainsbury, and Briggs Wright.   
135 Russell (1925, 143). 
136 Press interview, c. 1977.   
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How are we to assess whether this or that answer the challenge is satisfactory? Is 
it enough to identify some truth in the vicinity of the allegedly false belief about which 
the folk are not mistaken? Is in enough to show that the costs of flouting folk belief are 
counterbalanced by certain theoretical benefits of the revisionary position? The truth is 
that there are more and less serious versions of the challenge from folk belief, and 
existing attempts to answer the challenge are equipped to handle some of them, but are 
often unequipped to handle the most serious versions—or so I shall argue. I will present 
what I take to be the two most serious versions of the challenge from folk belief and 
critically examine various general strategies that may be employed in answering the 
challenge. The examination will proceed as a case study, the focus of which is the 
compositional eliminativist thesis that there are no statues or chairs: although there are 
“statuewise” and “chairwise” arrangements of atoms, these atoms do not together 
compose anything.137 This example will serve to anchor our examination of various 
general strategies for answering the challenge from folk belief. For ease of exposition, I 
shall suppose throughout that eliminativism is correct. 
 
2. Reasonableness and Resilience 
Revisionary philosophical claims often have implausible implications at the level 
of concepts. Claims of the form ‘Fa’ are true just in case the referent of ‘a’ falls under the 
                                                
137 Peter van Inwagen (1990), Terence Horgan and Matjaž Potrč (2000), Trenton 
Merricks (2001), and Dorr (2005) all embrace some such form of compositional 
eliminativism. See Merricks (2001, 4) for explication of the notion of being arranged 
statuewise. Many of the points raised below will also apply equally to those eliminativists 
who allow that things arranged statuewise compose something, but deny that what they 
compose are statues (e.g., Heller 1990). See Hawthorne and Michael (1996) for a related 
case study, which focuses exclusively on van Inwagen’s compatibilist strategy. 
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concept expressed by ‘F’ (where the ‘a’-position may be occupied by singular or plural 
referring expressions). Eliminativists deny that atoms arranged statuewise ever compose 
something. It follows that the concept compose something does not apply to atoms 
arranged statuewise. Why, then, do the folk believe that there are statues? By hypothesis, 
they have never seen a statue (for there are none). They do sometimes see atoms arranged 
statuewise, but their concept compose something—the very concept that they employ in 
entertaining the question of whether those atoms compose something, in coming to 
believe that they do compose something, and in reporting this belief—does not apply to 
these atoms. It would seem, then, that the folk believe that there are statues, and believe 
of (these or those) atoms arranged statuewise that they compose something, for no reason 
whatsoever.138 So the fact that the relevant falsities should be so confidently believed by 
otherwise reasonable and intelligent folk cries out for explanation. Call this the problem 
of reasonableness. 
Eliminativists must also explain why these beliefs are so resilient. Why is the 
falsity of the belief that there are statues not exposed by narrow a priori reflection, that is, 
a priori reflection that is narrowly focused just on the proposition believed and that does 
not involve auxiliary reflection on puzzles, arguments, general principles, and the like? 
Narrow a priori reflection on the proposition that (Gettier’s) Smith knows that the man 
who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket suffices to show us that he does not. 
Similarly for the proposition that it is possible that Putnam’s super-spartan and Lewis’s 
martian are in pain, that the stuff on twin earth is water, and that Aristotle need not have 
been the teacher of Alexander. Our ordinary judgments about these propositions are the 
                                                
138 This may all be restated in the idiom of ‘being the parts of a single thing’, for those 
concerned that the folk do not possess the concept compose.   
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means by which we assess general principles that imply their truth or falsity, not the other 
way round. The proposition that these or those atoms arranged statuewise compose 
something seems relevantly similar to these other concrete-case propositions. So why, in 
this of all cases, should reflection on arguments and general principles be the only 
available route for coming to see that it is false?139 Call this the problem of resilience 
under narrow a priori reflection or, for short, the problem of resilience. 
A satisfactory answer to the challenge from folk belief must solve both the 
problem of reasonableness and the problem of resilience. In light of this, many attempts 
to answer the challenge can be seen to be unsatisfactory. For instance, the challenge from 
folk belief is sometimes treated as a mere dialectical requirement: philosophers will 
typically cling stubbornly to common sense, even when they cannot locate the flaw in 
one’s argument, so if there is to be any hope at all of persuading them, one must convince 
them that the threat to common sense is less drastic than it first appears. If this were all 
that there is to the challenge from folk belief, then the failure to produce a satisfactory 
account of the conflict could plausibly be treated simply as a cost of the theory, to be 
weighed against its various theoretical virtues. While this is appropriate in the case of 
some theoretical shortcomings—lack of parsimony, lack of unity, lack of neutrality, 
treating this or that as explanatorily basic—explanatory inadequacy (like the failure to 
accommodate clear data) cannot simply be treated as a cost of a theory to be weighed 
against its various virtues. If no solution can be given, then certain phenomena that stand 
in need of explanation go unexplained (and the fact that the false folk beliefs are 
reasonable and resilient certainly is not explanatorily basic). 
                                                
139 Merricks (2001, 74-6). 
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 The challenge is other times taken simply to be a requirement that one show that 
the departure from folk belief is not as radical as it first seems, or that they are somehow 
different from purely delusional beliefs, for instance, the belief that one has an invisible 
companion or that one’s head is a pumpkin. This challenge can be answered relatively 
easily. Although there are no statues, there are atoms arranged statuewise; so the folk are 
not making a fundamental mistake about the structure of the world or about the 
configuration of matter and atoms in spacetime. So there is some sense in which the 
beliefs, although false, are not “inappropriate.” But, as we shall see in §4, simply 
identifying some way or other in which the false folk beliefs are different from purely 
delusional beliefs cannot, by itself, serve as a solution to the more serious problems of 
reasonableness and resilience. 
The failure to solve the problems of reasonableness and resilience is a serious 
problem for any revisionary theory, insofar as something that cries of for explanation is 
left unexplained. In what follows, I consider a number of general strategies that 
eliminativists might employ as a means of reconciling eliminativism with folk belief and 
show how they fall short of solving the problems of reasonableness and resilience. This 
examination will not exhaust the options available to the eliminativist, but it will serve to 
illuminate the general constraints on an adequate response to the challenge from folk 
belief. 
 
3. Compatibilist Solutions 
Let us begin with the most straightforward response to the challenge from folk 
belief: namely, to deny that the theory in question is genuinely at odds with folk belief. 
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Compatibilists maintain that the appearance of conflict is the result of misinterpreting 
everyday discourse about material objects, and supply a paraphrase of the relevant 
sentences of everyday discourse. These paraphrases may be understood in more than one 
way: either as specifying one of two (or more) literal meanings of the sentence in 
question, or as specifying what the folk conversationally intend in uttering the sentence. 
On the first sort of strategy, the folk are taken to be speaking truly; on the second, the 
idea is that what they say is false, but that this is beside the point since all they mean to 
convey, and all they really believe, is the paraphrase.140 Either way, the claim is that it is 
only the truth expressed by the paraphrase that the folk believe, not the falsity expressed 
on straightforward readings of the relevant sentences, in which case the problems of 
reasonableness and resilience do not even arise. 
Peter van Inwagen is a compatibilist. He maintains that there are no chairs, and he 
offers a paraphrase of such sentences of everyday discourse as ‘there are chairs nearby’ 
according to which they mean only (roughly) that there are mereological simples 
arranged chairwise nearby.141 Van Inwagen holds that everyday discourse about material 
objects is of a kind with the “loose and misleading” use of ‘The sun moved behind the 
elms’, but he is not explicit about whether he takes such sentences to literally express the 
relevant paraphrases, or rather to literally express false propositions while merely 
conveying the true paraphrase. But, either way, the contention is that such English 
sentences as ‘there is a chair nearby’ have two established uses; if not, then van Inwagen 
                                                
140 Paraphrases are also sometimes put forward in a revisionary spirit, as specifying not 
what we do say or mean, but rather what we should mean by the relevant sentences. But, 
unless this is combined with the further claim that the folk believe only this thing we 
should mean, and not what we in fact say or mean, this kind of paraphrase strategy is of 
no use to the compatibilist in the present context. 
141 van Inwagen (1990, 108-14). 
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could not coherently say (in English) that the folk do not mean that there are chairs 
nearby when they say ‘there are chairs nearby’.142 
Van Inwagen’s compatibilist strategy has been widely criticized,143 but it is worth 
reviewing its main shortcoming—namely, that it is a linguistic hypothesis for which there 
is no evidence. In typical cases of loose or misleading talk, there is no shortage of reasons 
for understanding speakers to be speaking loosely. For instance, when Joe says ‘the sun 
moved behind the elms’, the first piece of evidence that he is speaking loosely is that, in 
addition to the straightforward reading on which the sentence is false, we can actually 
hear a second natural reading on which he is conveying a true proposition that does not 
entail the relevant falsity. Second, if asked to explain what he really means, Joe will 
produce something like the relevant paraphrase (e.g., that the sun is now obstructed from 
view by the elms). A third piece of evidence is that, if we take his utterance too literally, 
then we must understand him to be saying something that he believes to be false. A 
fourth, important piece of evidence is that, when he finds that his remarks have been at 
face value (“You really think the sun moved? It’s the earth that moved!”), Joe responds 
not as one who takes himself to stand corrected but as one who takes himself to have 
been misunderstood. 
                                                
142 Of course, van Inwagen might insist that his sentence ‘there are no chairs’ is not really 
a sentence of English, but is rather a sentence of the “language of refuge” (1990, 131) or 
the language of the “ontology room” (Hawthorne and Cortens 1995, 154-7; Dorr 2005) or 
the “fundamental language” (Sider, forthcoming), in which familiar words are not being 
used with their ordinary meanings. Those who opt for this form of eliminativism may or 
may not face a challenge from folk belief, depending upon what ‘there are no chairs’ 
means in this pretend language.  
143 E.g., Tye (1992), Hirsch (1993b; 2002a, 108-112), Hawthorne and Michael (1996), 
Sider (2001, 178-80), Merricks (2001, pp. 162-170), and Varzi (2002, 64-5).  
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 By contrast, there appears to be no evidence for the hypothesis that the folk speak 
loosely when they appear to be quantifying over chairs and the like. The sentence ‘There 
is a chair nearby’ does not seem to have a second established reading that does not entail 
that there (really, literally, strictly) is a chair nearby. Nor do the folk ever make explicit 
what they allegedly really mean to be saying—that there are atoms arranged chairwise 
nearby. Nor would the folk be saying something that they take to be false on a 
straightforward understanding of their utterance. (No compatibilist, to my knowledge, 
holds that the folk believe that there are no chairs; compatibilists make only the weaker 
claim that they have no beliefs one way or the other.) Nor do the folk give any indication 
that they take themselves to be misunderstood when they find that their utterances have 
been taken at face value.144 In the absence of any such evidence, the multiplication of 
established usages in the present case has no independent motivation and no explanatory 
value.145 Consequently, since there apparently is no reason not to take what the folk are 
saying at face value, we ought to take what they are saying at face value.146 
 One might suggest that, even though there is no linguistic or behavioral evidence 
for the paraphrase, there is nevertheless philosophical evidence—specifically, the truth of 
eliminativism can be cited as evidence in favor of van Inwagen’s hypothesis. To take 
their utterances at face value is to take the folk to be saying a great many false things; so 
                                                
144 See Merricks (2001, 162-170) for further, amusing discussion of the retraction test for 
van Inwagen’s compatibilist strategy.   
145 Of course, this sort of evidence sometimes is available for reconciling certain things 
that the folk say with what philosophers say. For instance, although they may insist that 
such sentences as ‘It is possible to jump over a building’ and ‘Events are things’ are false, 
the folk can be made to hear the second, true readings of these sentences (e.g., by saying 
“Surely there is such a thing as an event!”).   
146 As Tyler Burge observes: “[U]nless there are clear reasons for construing discourse as 
ambiguous, elliptical or involving special idioms, we should not so construe it. Literal 
interpretation is ceteris paribus preferred” (1979, 88). 
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charity demands that the folk be interpreted as speaking loosely. But this appeal to 
charity is misguided. Charity requires, not that we take the folk to be speaking truly, but 
that we take them to be speaking rationally.147 Is it irrational for them to say that there is 
a chair nearby, despite the fact that there are no chairs? Not at all. The only known 
reasons for thinking that there are no chairs are highly theoretical, so the philosophically 
uninformed folk can hardly be charged with irrationality for not having realized that they 
do not exist.  
One sometimes hears it said that everyday discourse poses no serious problem for 
eliminativism (or other apparently revisionary theories, mutatis mutandis), since 
eliminativists can just say that the folk are speaking loosely. The primary moral of the 
foregoing is that this is not something that the eliminativist can “just say,” for there seems 
to be no serious reason to think that the folk are speaking loosely. Accordingly, there 
evidently is no reason to doubt that the folk believe in chairs and the like. Van Inwagen 
disagrees: 
“It is far from obvious … that it is a matter of Universal Belief that there are 
chairs. In fact, to say that any particular proposition that would be of interest to 
philosophers belongs to the body of Universal Belief is to put forward a 
philosophical thesis, not a trivial one.” (1990, 103).  
Presumably, the question of whether there are chairs is of interest to philosophers, not 
because of its intrinsic richness and subtlety, but rather because there are interesting 
philosophical arguments that have as their conclusion that there are no chairs. But if the 
mere availability of such arguments truly calls into question whether the folk believe the 
                                                
147 Cf. Grandy (1971, 440f), Lewis (1974, 336-7), Wiggins (1980, 198-200), Hirsch 
(2002a, 105), and Varzi (2002, 61-5). 
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relevant proposition, one has to wonder whether the folk have any beliefs whatsoever. 
One can easily conjure up an interesting philosophical argument to the effect that no one 
has a father.148 Given the seriousness with which philosophers have taken arguments that 
there are no chairs, perhaps this argument would be taken seriously as well. But surely 
this gives us no reason to think that the folk have no beliefs one way or the other about 
whether anyone has a father. And, in any event, the postulation of simples and even 
subatomic particles is no less controversial in philosophical circles than is the postulation 
of chairs, so this line of reasoning seems to undercut van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy, 
according to which the folk are expressing beliefs about the arrangement of such things.   
    
4. Nearly True and Quasi-True Beliefs 
The project of re-interpreting everyday discourse as a means of reconciling 
eliminativism with folk belief seems hopeless. But some may feel that this project is 
entirely unnecessary. There is no need to find some reinterpretation of pre-Copernican 
discourse about the movement of the sun according to which the folk said and believed 
something true, since more plausibly they were simply in error. Likewise, there seems to 
be no need to reinterpret our claims about absolute simultaneity in such a way that they 
are consistent with relativity theory. By parity, perhaps eliminativists ought to prefer an 
incompatibilist strategy, according to which the folk really do believe that there are 
statues and chairs. The key will be to explain why these beliefs are both reasonable and 
resilient. At the close of §2, I suggested that the problems of reasonableness and 
                                                
148 Suppose for reductio that it is possible to have a father. First premise: time travel is 
possible. Second premise: if so, then it is possible to be one’s own father. Third premise: 
fatherhood is irreflexive. By reductio: it is not possible to have a father.  A fortiori: no 
one has a father. 
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resilience cannot be solved simply by identifying some truth in the vicinity of the 
falsehood that the folk believe, for instance, concerning the distribution of atoms or 
matter. In this section, I show why that is by assessing three existing incompatibilist 
strategies for answering the challenge from folk belief.   
Trenton Merricks offers the following explanation of why it is reasonable for the 
folk to believe that there are statues: “atoms arranged statuewise often play a key role in 
producing, and grounding the justification of, the belief that statues exist. In general, a 
false belief’s being nearly as good as true explains how reasonable people come to hold 
it.”149 Before we can properly assess whether the explanation of the reasonableness of 
this belief in terms of its being “nearly good as true” is satisfactory, we must know what 
it is for a belief to be nearly as good as true. Merricks is quite explicit about what he has 
in mind, stipulatively introducing the notion as follows: for a false belief that there are Fs 
to be nearly as good as true just is, by definition, for there to be atoms arranged F-wise.150 
So, to say that the belief in statues is reasonable because it is nearly as good as true is 
really just to say that the belief is reasonable because there are atoms arranged statuewise.   
This may at first seem like a perfectly good explanation. But bear in mind that we 
normally take there to be both a tight perceptual connection and a tight conceptual 
connection between statues and atoms arranged statuewise. The eliminativist, however, 
denies that we see statues when we see atoms arranged statuewise and denies that it is a 
conceptual truth that atoms arranged statuewise compose something. Since our concept 
compose something does not apply to atoms arranged statuewise, at most what one should 
find upon reflecting on one’s concepts is that if there could be statues, then the existence 
                                                
149 Merricks (2001, 172). The italics are his. 
150 Merricks (2001, 171). 
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of atoms arranged statuewise would suffice for the existence of a statue. Given only this 
conditional conceptual truth, it would be positively irrational to conclude on the basis of 
atoms’ being arranged statuewise that they compose something—unless, of course, one 
has independent justification for accepting or presupposing the antecedent (i.e., that there 
are, or could have been, statues). But this leaves us right back where we started, that is, in 
need of an explanation of why otherwise reasonable people erroneously take there to be 
statues.  
So Merricks’s answer to the challenge from folk belief cannot serve as a solution 
to the problem of reasonableness. Moreover, he does not even address the problem of 
resilience. He admits that nothing short of philosophical argumentation can undermine 
our reasons for believing of atoms arranged statuewise that they compose something,151 
but he makes no attempt to explain why in this of all cases narrow a priori reflection does 
not suffice. (Some may feel that it is somehow illegitimate to demand an answer to the 
problem of resilience; I address this concern in §8.)  
Other incompatibilist attempts fall short of solving the problem of reasonableness 
for similar reasons. Ted Sider encourages presentists to deny the truth of such 
problematic beliefs as the belief that Lewis admires Ramsey and then answer the 
challenge from folk belief by maintaining that such folk beliefs are nevertheless “quasi-
true,” where to say that the beliefs are quasi-true is to say that there are certain true 
propositions that would have entailed the truth of these beliefs had eternalism been 
true.152 Eliminativists may likewise try to answer the challenge from folk belief by 
pointing to the quasi-truth of the belief that there are statues; there is, after all, a true 
                                                
151 Merricks (2001, 74-6). 
152 Sider (1999b, 340).   
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proposition (i.e., that there are atoms arranged statuewise) that would have entailed the 
truth of the belief that there are statues had folk ontology been correct about the 
conditions under which composition occurs. But the fact that, were folk ontology correct, 
atoms arranged statuewise would compose something goes no way towards explaining 
why it is reasonable to believe that they do indeed compose something until we have 
some explanation of why the folk find it reasonable to accept folk ontology.153 So the 
appeal to the quasi-truth of the false folk beliefs cannot, by itself, solve the problem of 
reasonableness. 
There is a related answer to the challenge of folk belief which, structurally, is far 
better suited to solve the problem of reasonableness. Ned Markosian maintains that the 
folk confuse the relevant quasi-truths with the associated true propositions that would 
entail them were eternalism true, and are misreporting what they really believe.154 What 
makes this different from Merricks’s and Sider’s strategies is that here we have a genuine 
psychological explanation for the folk’s mistake. One might try to extend this strategy to 
the present case, maintaining that the folk confuse the proposition that atoms are arranged 
statuewise with the proposition that there are statues. The problem with this strategy is 
that (like the compatibilist strategy discussed above) it lacks plausibility. If asked 
whether what they believe is that there are statues or only that there are atoms arranged 
statuewise—assuming that one can get them to understand the question—one would 
never expect the folk to respond “that’s right, the second one, that’s all I meant to say.” 
                                                
153 For similar reasons, the appeal to quasi-truth cannot, by itself, solve the problem of 
reasonableness facing the presentist who denies that Lewis admires Ramsey.  Sider 
himself goes on to fortify this sort of answer to the challenge from folk belief with a 
separate explanation of the reasonableness of this belief. I consider this explanation in §7. 
154 Markosian (2003). 
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The folk do not exhibit any of the normal signs of being confused or failing to mark a 
distinction. So there is little if any reason to accept the psychological hypothesis that the 
folk are confusing these two propositions.155  
 
5. Appearances 
The reason that the appeal to near truth and quasi-truth cannot (by itself) answer 
the challenge from folk belief is that it fails to identify any reasons that the folk have for 
believing in statues and the like. A satisfactory answer to the challenge will evidently 
have to identify a source of evidence for the belief in statues. There are three obvious 
candidates: appearances, intuition, and testimony. I will consider each in turn.  
The reasonableness of belief in statues and chairs would be adequately explained 
by our seeing statues and chairs. By hypothesis, however, we have never seen any statues 
or chairs. Eliminativists may nevertheless suggest that the fact that we see atoms arranged 
statuewise plays some role in explaining the reasonableness of belief in statues. 
Arguably, the world looks exactly the way it would look if (per impossible) atoms 
arranged statuewise were to compose statues. So perhaps the reasonableness of the 
relevant folk beliefs is grounded in the fact that it looks as though there are statues and 
that, were there a statue there, its presence would explain the experience that one is 
having.   
But this seems not to be an adequate explanation of the belief in statues. Let us 
suppose (with the eliminativist) that there is nothing composed of my nose and the Eiffel 
Tower. Nevertheless, appearances would have been exactly the same had it been the case 
                                                
155 The implausibility becomes even more pronounced as we consider more and more 
complex cases; cf. Sider (1999b, 330-1).   
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that (contra hypothesis) there were something that had my nose and the Eiffel Tower, in 
their present arrangement, as its parts.156 But does this show that it would be reasonable 
for one to believe—not on the basis of any philosophical reflection but just on the basis 
of looking at my nose and the Eiffel Tower—that there is something composed of my 
nose and the Eiffel Tower? Obviously not.157 Likewise, things arguably appear exactly 
the way they would appear were my experiences the work of an evil demon. But it 
obviously is not therefore reasonable to believe, on this basis, that they are the work of an 
evil demon.158   
For just the same reasons, the mere fact that things appear the way they would had 
there actually been statues does not suffice to make it reasonable to believe that there are 
statues or to believe of atoms arranged statuewise that they compose something.159 So 
this approach fails to solve the problem of reasonableness. One might try to fortify the 
response by saying, not just that things look the way they would were there statues and 
other composites, but that perception positively presents the world as containing statues 
and other composites.160 It looks as though there are statues, and for this reason it is 
reasonable to believe in statues. But one must be careful here to distinguish between two 
                                                
156 Merricks: “one’s visual evidence would be the same whether or not those [atoms] 
composed something.” (2001, 9) 
157 One might agree that this would not be reasonable, but only because we have no kind 
concept that purports to apply to nose-tower fusions. But, as I will contend in the 
following section, the acquisition of such concepts seems not to affect our judgments 
about which arrangements suffice for composition to occur.  
158 Perhaps this is because these skeptical hypotheses are relatively bad explanations of 
our experience. Granted. But this response cannot save the eliminativist, for we would 
then need some reason to think that the existence of statues is a good explanation, despite 
their nonexistence; and that brings us right back where we started, namely, in need of an 
explanation of the reasonableness of the folk belief in statues.  
159 Merricks raises similar points about the inadequacy of appealing to experience in 
defense of statue-beliefs (2001, 8-9 and 73-76).    
160 Thanks to Rob Koons for pressing me on this point. 
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senses of ‘looks’.161 On the one hand, there is the phenomenal sense of ‘looks’ in which 
the way things look is individuated by what it is like for the subject of the relevant 
experience. But it is (at best) misleading to say that the world looks to contain statues in 
this phenomenal sense of ‘looks’ for things look the same even to a subject lacking such 
concepts as statue and even composition.162 It is, rather, in the epistemic sense of ‘looks’ 
that the world looks to contain composites. The way that things look in this latter sense is 
heavily influenced by our concepts and beliefs. Yet what needs to be explained by the 
eliminativist is why we have the beliefs that we do, so the appeal to how things look in 
this epistemic sense threatens to generate an explanatory circularity. 
Finally, the appeal to appearances goes no way towards solving the problem of 
resilience: even assuming that these statue-ish appearances can somehow account for the 
reasonableness of our belief in statues, since our concept compose something does not 
apply to atoms arranged statuewise, it is somewhat mysterious why narrow a priori 
reflection cannot (and does not) by itself expose the error.  
 
6. Intuitional Error 
The fact that things appear exactly as they would if there were statues cannot 
explain why it is reasonable to believe in statues. How else might the eliminativist try to 
                                                
161 See Jackson 1977. 
162 One might try to appeal to the familiar “Gestalt phenomena” in perception, in which 
certain things are presented in experience as belonging together, and contend that it is this 
feature of experience that makes it reasonable to believe that certain things compose 
something. But, in paradigm instances of Gestalt phenomena, e.g., when a rows of dots 
(vs. columns of dots) are presented as belonging together, we do not judge that the 
relevant items compose something but only that they belong together. So the fact that the 
things arranged statuewise are presented as belonging together cannot be itself explain 
why we come to believe that they compose something.  
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solve the problem of reasonableness? One might plausibly take the folk belief in statues 
and chairs to be justified largely on the basis of intuitions—in particular, intuitions to the 
effect that atoms arranged statuewise (chairwise, etc.) always compose something. This 
solution will be available only to the eliminativist who accepts that intuitions are 
generally reliable and bestow prima facie justification on one’s beliefs. Of course, he 
need not accept that all intuitions are veridical and may hold that the intuition that atoms 
arranged statuewise compose something is incorrect. But, since he thinks that intuitions 
are reliable in general, he owes us some explanation of why intuition goes wrong in the 
present case. After all, it is somewhat mysterious that we have clear intuitions that atoms 
arranged statuewise compose something, even though our concept compose something 
does not apply to atoms arranged statuewise.  
One might attempt to explain the source of the intuitional error by arguing that 
our intuitions about when composition does and does not occur are guided primarily by 
our interests (pertaining to survival or convenience) in some but not other arrangements 
of atoms.163 The eliminativist who wants to employ the present strategy cannot make this 
move lightly. For if intuition is so easily misguided by our interests, then it cannot be a 
source of justification. But if intuition is not a source of justification, then the 
eliminativist has no answer to the problem of reasonableness. So the eliminativist must 
supply some reason to think that intuitions about when composition occurs are more 
vulnerable to corruption by our interests than are intuitions about other topics. 
One way to ensure that the corrupting influence of human interests does not 
extend to all intuitions is to show that there is a specific psychological mechanism that is 
                                                
163 Hudson (2001, 91-92). 
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responsible for generating intuitions about when some things compose something, and 
that this mechanism is especially susceptible to corruption by our interests.164 For 
instance, the eliminativist might contend that there is a special psychological mechanism 
that will yield the intuition that a plurality of things compose something just in case there 
is some kind F such that (1) one observes that these things are arranged F-wise and (2) 
one has the kind concept F. Since which particular kind concepts we possess is largely 
driven by our interests, it would then be plain to see how our interests are poised to affect 
our intuitions about composition.  
 There are two problems with this account. The first is that it makes false 
predictions. Someone might lack the concept corkscrew (having never seen or heard of a 
corkscrew); yet, when presented with one, he will have the intuition that things in the 
perceived arrangement compose something. But, since he lacks the concept corkscrew, 
the above account predicts that he will not have an intuition to the effect that things in 
that arrangement compose something.165 Furthermore, one may possess certain kind 
concepts F without having any intuition that things arranged F-wise compose something. 
Consider, for instance, the concept trout-turkey, where an object is a trout-turkey just in 
case it is composed of a trout and a turkey.166 Despite having now acquired this concept, 
we do not now have an intuition to the effect that a trout and a turkey a hundred miles 
from the trout would compose something. Yet the present account predicts that we should 
                                                
164 Christopher Hill (1997, 72-78) employs such a strategy for showing that the modal 
intuitions underlying the argument against the mind-body identity thesis are unreliable.   
165 One might complain that we do have the requisite sortal concept: namely, appliance. 
But one can simply revise the example so that we encounter some item on Mars, radically 
different from any sort of thing we have ever before encountered, but whose parts and 
organization plainly exhibit the sort of unity found in trees, statues, etc. Surely one would 
have the intuition that things in such an arrangement compose something.    
166 Lewis (1991, 8). 
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have this intuition. Consequently, the proposed mechanism cannot be what underlies our 
intuitions about composition.  
The second problem is more general, and will arise for any attempt to identify a 
special mechanism underlying intuitions about when composition occurs. Recall that the 
present strategy for answering the problem of reasonableness presupposes the general 
reliability of intuition. All serious attempts to explain the reliability of intuitions (or a 
priori methods generally) explain their reliability in terms of some general grasp of one’s 
concepts.167 In light of this, it seems unacceptably ad hoc to maintain that intuitions about 
composition are governed by some special module, while all other intuitions are the result 
of understanding one’s concepts. But if they concede that there is no special module, then 
they owe us some other explanation of why human interests are poised to corrupt 
intuitions about composition that does not cast doubt on all other intuitions at the same 
time.  
 
7. Testimony  
 Let us consider one final attempt to secure the reasonableness of belief in statues 
in chairs. Here the idea is that the reasonableness of these beliefs is explained not by 
appearances or intuitions but rather by testimony. We are told from a young age, by 
teachers, parents, and other figures of authority that there are statues in the museum, 
chairs in the cafeteria, and so forth. Beliefs formed on the basis of testimony from a 
reliable source—or even just from a source not known to be unreliable—are reasonable. 
Relatedly, as Sider points out, the psychological explanation of why the folk accept false 
                                                
167 See, e.g., Bealer (2000) and Peacocke (2005).  
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ontological claims has a lot to do with “the ontologically unscrupulous nature of natural 
language … [I]n ordinary life we quantify freely over non-actual objects, and over 
abstracta, without thinking very hard about whether such objects exist.”168 One might 
suggest, along these lines, that the reasonableness of the folk belief in statues derives 
from our immersion in a community in which people speak as if there really are such 
objects.  
This appeal to testimony solves the problem of reasonableness only to have it 
reappear in a different guise. For it is natural to wonder how this all got started. Consider 
the first people to allege that there were rocks, mountains, tables, and so forth (i.e., 
Russell’s “cannibals”). Is there any explanation of why their beliefs would be 
reasonable? One might suggest that they found it more convenient to quantify over things 
that they did not really believe in.169 But this response is not available to the 
incompatibilist, since the response presupposes that the folk do not genuinely believe that 
atoms arranged statuewise compose something. Or are we indeed being asked to believe 
that, unlike present-day folk, our ancestors did not really believe in composite objects? 
This is hard to believe and, in any case, it is at best unfounded historical speculation.   
Finally, and more importantly, we are again left with no explanation as to why 
these beliefs are so resilient. Merricks seems right that nothing short of heavy-duty 
philosophical argumentation could expose the falsity of our belief in statues and the like. 
But why would this be—why wouldn’t narrow a priori reflection suffice, given that our 
concept compose something does not apply to atoms arranged statuewise? What stands 
between the folk and their own concepts? 
                                                
168 Sider (1999b, 333). 
169 Cf. Sider (1999b, 334). 
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8. Resilience Revisited 
We have examined several unsuccessful strategies for handling the problem of 
reasonableness, but have yet to see any answer to the challenge from folk belief that even 
purports to answer the problem of resilience. Perhaps eliminativists will complain that I 
am asking too much in demanding an explanation of the resilience of our pretheoretical 
beliefs under narrow a priori reflection. After all, narrow a priori reflection cannot by 
itself reveal the falsity of the folk belief that space is Euclidean or that there is such a 
thing as absolute simultaneity. Likewise, one cannot be expected to discover the falsity of 
the naive comprehension axiom (that x∈{u: Fu} ↔ Fx) solely on the basis of narrow a 
priori reflection. And we know that philosophical argumentation is needed to convince 
one that the set of all natural numbers is no larger than the set of all even numbers—
narrow a priori reflection does not suffice. So (says the eliminativist) there is no reason to 
expect narrow a priori reflection to reveal that atoms arranged statuewise do not compose 
anything. 
The problem with this line of response is that, in each of these cases, there is an 
explanation of why the beliefs survive narrow a priori reflection, but these explanations 
are not available to the eliminativist. First consider the case of folk beliefs about the 
geometry of space and the nature of time. Space could have turned out to be Euclidean, 
and time could have turned out to be such as to allow absolute simultaneity. 
Consequently, empirical investigation was required to determine whether space and time 
were in fact as we took them to be. The reason that these beliefs survive narrow a priori 
reflection is that these are matters that simply cannot be settled a priori. (Likewise for 
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false folk beliefs about witches, deities, astronomy, and so forth.) This explanation is not 
available to the eliminativist because the thesis that it is possible for atoms arranged 
statuewise to compose something is not an empirical matter and presumably can be 
settled a priori.  
Next, consider the false beliefs about the cardinality of infinite sets. Here the 
explanation seems to be that the concept of infinity is quite elusive, difficult to wrap 
one’s mind around, and one that we are not used to reasoning with. By contrast, there is 
nothing particularly elusive or complex about the concept compose: few notions are as 
pervasive in our day-to-day conceptual activity as the notion of parthood. (We have 
already seen, in §3, that the complexity of arguments surrounding composition does not 
suffice to show that composition is an abstruse and subtle matter about which the folk 
have no beliefs.) So the present explanation of the survival of false folk beliefs under 
narrow a priori reflection is likewise unavailable to the eliminativist. 
 Finally, consider naive comprehension. Here again, there is reason to think that a 
priori reflection should suffice to settle the matter, but not narrow a priori reflection. 
Narrow a priori reflection, recall, is a priori reflection that is narrowly focused on a 
particular proposition, without considering auxiliary propositions and arguments that 
might bear upon the truth of the proposition in question. In particular, narrow a priori 
reflection precludes consideration of potential counterexamples to the proposition that, 
for any predicate, there is a set of things of which it is true. It is common for false general 
claims (such as this one) to seem true so long as most of their instances are true and one 
has yet to consider relevant exceptions. Since consideration of the counterexamples is the 
only real means available to beings like us of coming the see that naive comprehension is 
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false, it is clear why narrow a priori reflection is not sufficient. By contrast, there is no 
question of there being counterexamples to a concrete-case belief of these or those atoms 
arranged statuewise that they compose something. The present explanation is available 
only in the case of beliefs about generalizations, not beliefs about concrete cases. 
This helps to bring out an interesting dialectical point. Eliminativism is in large 
part motivated by the fact that it provides a uniform solution to the puzzles of material 
constitution. These puzzles can also all be solved by denying that it is impossible for 
distinct objects to be wholly co-located. Since we pretheoretically believe (at least tacitly) 
that two things cannot wholly occupy one and the same place, one who adopts the co-
location solution faces the challenge from folk belief just like the eliminativist. But the 
proponent of co-location is in a far better position to answer the challenge from folk 
belief than is the eliminativist. The belief that co-location is impossible is reasonable 
because the generalization holds in virtually all cases (a dog and a computer, a table and a 
water bottle, and so forth). The belief that co-location is impossible is resilient under 
narrow a priori reflection because (like the belief about naive comprehension) it is a 
general belief, and cannot be seen to be incorrect without considering potential 
counterexamples.170 So co-locationalists, unlike eliminativists, have a plausible solution 
to the problems of reasonableness and resilience. 
The observation that the folk have all sorts of resilient false beliefs does not show 
that there is no need for the eliminativist to explain the resilience of false folk beliefs 
about composition. For the resilience of these other false beliefs can be explained, and 
the eliminativist will not always (or perhaps ever) be in a position to help himself to those 
                                                
170 Cf. Hirsch (2002a, 113-5) and (2005, 89).   
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explanations and use them to explain the resilience of beliefs about composition. 
Concrete case beliefs about whether composition occurs in this or that particular case are 
fundamentally unlike false beliefs involving general claims, abstruse topics, or a 
posteriori matters. Rather, the judgment that these or those atoms arranged statuewise 
compose something is more akin to the concrete-case judgment that Gettier’s Smith lacks 
knowledge, and we do expect narrow a priori reflection to reveal the truth or falsity of 
these kinds of beliefs. The eliminativist must provide some reason to think otherwise. 
 
9. Conclusion 
No answer to the challenge from folk belief is satisfactory unless it can solve the 
problem of reasonableness and the problem of resilience. The failure to solve these 
problems is not simply a “cost” of a theory, like being disuniform or unparsimonious, 
which can be excused in light of the theory’s various virtues. I have surveyed a number 
of preliminary attempts to answer these problems and have found none of them to be 
adequate. There may well be paths open to the eliminativist that I have not examined. My 
goal has not been to show that there is no way for the eliminativist to answer the 
challenge from folk belief but only to illustrate how one might attempt—and how one 
might fail—to solve the problems of reasonableness and resilience underlying the 
challenge from folk belief. I hope at least to have shown that the challenge cannot be 
brushed aside simply by observing that we see atoms arranged statuewise, that the beliefs 
are not “as bad as” purely delusional beliefs, or that intuitions are not always correct.  
 Nevertheless, I do take these considerations to show that many of the arguments 
that are made on behalf of eliminativism are unsatisfactory. For most of the arguments 
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provided by both van Inwagen and Merricks are not positive arguments but rather 
arguments from elimination (excuse the pun), which proceed by way of identifying the 
flaws in all alternative answers to various questions and puzzles (e.g., Ship of Theseus, 
coincidence, causal exclusion, the special composition question) and noting that 
eliminativism is the only remaining solution. But, on account of its deep conflict with 
folk belief, eliminativism is just as problematic as the other solutions; and until the 
position has been adequately defended, any such argument from elimination will be 
inconclusive. Eliminativists are no doubt well aware of this; their mistake was to 
underestimate the nature and force of the challenge from folk belief. 
  I suspect that the considerations raised above can be wielded against many other 
revisionary theories in metaphysics and beyond. But the challenge from folk belief is far 
too weak to be used as an all-purpose validation of everything that passes, or has passed, 
for common sense. False and resilient beliefs in witches, in a young earth, and in the 
permissibility of slavery have straightforward explanations, so the challenge from folk 
belief is easily answered in these cases. Nor does the challenge from folk belief provide 
an insurmountable argument against anti-realism about numbers and other abstracta: not, 
at least, if reductionist or fictionalist (compatibilist) accounts are tenable. The challenge 
from folk belief can often be answered. But it must be answered by all theories that 
appear to conflict with folk belief—especially when the answer is not immediately 
obvious—on pain of leaving unexplained something that cries out for explanation. I hope 
to have shed some light on how attempts to answer it are to be assessed.  
 
  133 
VI 
Unrestricted Composition and Restricted Quantification* 
The philosopher advocates a view apparently in patent 
contradiction to common sense. Rather than repudiating common 
sense, he asserts that the conflict comes from a philosophical 
misinterpretation of common language…. I think such 
philosophical claims are almost invariably suspect. What the 
claimant calls a ‘misleading philosophical misconstrual’ of the 
ordinary statement is probably the natural and correct 
understanding. The real misconstrual comes when the claimant 
continues ‘All the ordinary man really means is…’. 
  
  Saul Kripke 1982, p. 65 
 
Under what conditions do some things compose something? The predominant 
answer in the literature on composition is the universalist answer: always.171 The 
popularity of this answer is somewhat surprising, since it entails that there are such 
strange fusions as the object composed of my nose and the Eiffel Tower.172 What is even 
more surprising is that universalists typically take the view to be entirely compatible with 
what the folk say in ordinary discourse about material objects. When presented with a 
bowling ball and a feather, the folk might describe the situation in ways that appear to 
conflict with universalism, for instance, ‘there are only two things on the table’ or ‘there 
is nothing partly white and partly black on the table’. Universalists typically insist that 
that, in such cases, the folk are restricting their quantifiers in such a way as to exclude 
strange fusions, much as one restricts one’s quantifier so as to exclude the beer in the pub 
                                                
* Thanks to John Bengson, Matti Eklund, Eli Hirsch, Mark Sainsbury, Adam Sennett, and 
David Sosa. 
171 See, e.g., Cartwright (1975), Quine (1960, 171; 1981, 10), Lewis (1986, 212-3), Heller 
(1990, 49f), van Cleve (1986/1999, 485-6), Rea (1998), Sider (2001, 121-32), Hudson 
(2001, 105-12), and Varzi (2005).  
172 More cautiously, universalists are committed either to the existence of this fusion or to 
the nonexistence of one or the other of my nose and the Eiffel Tower (which would be no 
less surprising). 
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downtown when one looks in the fridge and says, ‘there is no beer’. If the folk are not 
saying that there are only two things on the table, but rather (e.g.) that there are only two 
ordinary things on the table, what they say is compatible with universalism. Let us call 
the thesis that, in such cases, the folk restrict their quantifiers in such a way as to exclude 
strange fusions “restrictivism.” 173  
Despite its prima facie implausibility, there are powerful arguments for 
universalism.174 By contrast, there is remarkably little evidence for restrictivism, and I 
will argue that there is no good reason to accept it. The universalist is better advised to 
accept that the apparent conflict with folk belief is genuine and to try to explain the 
conflict rather than explain it away.175  
 
1. Preliminaries 
For ease of exposition, I simply assume in what follows that universalism is 
correct. On the face of it, the metaphysical view that composition is unrestricted is 
entirely independent of the linguistic hypothesis that quantifiers are typically restricted in 
such a way as to exclude strange fusions. Universalism can consistently be combined 
with any view of what the folk are saying in discourse about material objects—including 
the natural view that they are saying exactly what they seem to be saying—and 
                                                
173 Although explicit endorsements of restrictivism in the literature are rare—and 
defenses of it rarer still—the view is widespread and is commonly cited as the standard 
universalist account of the apparent conflict with folk belief: see Lewis (1986, 213), 
Ernest Sosa (1999, 142), Ted Sider (2001, 218; 2004, 680), Hirsch (2002a, 111-2), Rosen 
and Dorr (2002, 155-7), Varzi (2003, 213-4), López de Sa (2006, 399), and Markosian 
(forthcoming).   
174 See, especially, Sider (2001, 121-32).   
175 Cf. Merricks (2001, 162-85) on explaining, rather than explaining away, the apparent 
conflict between eliminativism and folk belief. 
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restrictivism can consistently be combined with any theory of composition.176 Some, 
however, might hold that the fact that there are strange fusions can itself somehow serve 
as a reason for believing that the folk are restricting their quantifiers to exclude them, 
even though these fusions have been altogether overlooked by the folk. I consider 
responses to this effect in §3.   
There are various ways of understanding the phenomenon of tacit quantifier 
domain restriction and, in particular, whether it is a semantic or a pragmatic 
phenomenon.177 I will assume (and already have been assuming) that quantifier domain 
restriction is a semantic phenomenon: that the restriction enters into the content of the 
sentence uttered. On the pragmatic approach, the tacit restriction is manifested not in 
what is said but, rather, in what is conveyed. Restrictivists who accept the pragmatic 
approach will admit that universalism is incompatible with what the folk say—since what 
is said is not suitably restricted—but will hold that it can nevertheless be reconciled with 
what they intend to convey. The objections that I raise against restrictivism apply equally 
in a setting in which quantifier domain restriction is understood to be a pragmatic 
phenomenon. 
Since restrictivism is a thesis in semantics—not a philosophical thesis, which can 
be evaluated by a priori methods—some may wonder whether it is appropriate to proceed 
without empirical investigation. I believe that it is. It is standard practice in linguistics to 
rely on one’s own mastery of the language to assess sentences for truth or falsity, 
                                                
176 One might wonder what reason there would be for someone who does not accept 
universalism to embrace a restrictivist thesis about folk discourse, but this only speaks to 
the main point of the paper, namely, that there is no independent evidence supporting 
restrictivism.   
177 See Stanley and Szabó (2000) for discussion of the various approaches to quantifier 
domain restriction. 
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grammaticality and felicitousness, multiple readings, elided clauses, tacit restrictions, and 
so forth. This, of course, is not to say that conclusions reached from the armchair about 
folk discourse cannot be overturned by subsequent field work; but such field work need 
not be the starting point. In any event, if this is not an appropriate way to proceed, then 
that cuts equally against restrictivists, for they themselves venture a semantic hypothesis 
without citing any empirical results. 
Some might wonder why we should care at all about whether metaphysical 
theories can be reconciled with what the folk say. A natural proposal is that what the folk 
say matters because what they say reflects their unadulterated pretheoretical beliefs and 
intuitions. These beliefs and intuitions matter because they are the stuff that 
counterexamples are made of. In §4, I consider whether restrictivism can be adapted to 
resolve the more fundamental conflict between universalism and the intuitions that seem 
to tell against it. Until that point, I will assume (in the restrictivist’s favor) that the folk 
have no beliefs or intuitions one way or the other with respect to whether these strange 
fusions exist.178 Accordingly, when I speak of the folk as excluding strange fusions from 
their domain of quantification, this need not be understood as requiring that they have 




                                                
178 Restrictivists presumably will not say that the folk believe that there are no strange 
fusions, for this is to admit that there is a genuine conflict between universalism and folk 
belief, which is at least as bad as (and presumably worse than) a conflict with what the 
folk say. And the view that the folk positively do (already) believe in such strange fusions 
as the thing composed of my nose and the Eiffel Tower is wholly implausible.   
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2. Finding Evidence for Restrictivism 
The folk say things which seem to suggest that they do not take there to be strange 
fusions. What explains their behavior? The obvious answer is that the only possible 
reasons for believing in these strange things are available only to those who engage in 
serious philosophical reflection. The folk mistakenly insist that there are only two things 
on the table and deny that there is anything partly black and partly white on the table, but 
this is neither surprising nor foolish, for they have no reason to believe in strange fusions. 
There seems to be no more need to reinterpret folk discourse in light of the discovery that 
there are strange fusions than there is to reinterpret pre-Copernican discourse in light of 
the discovery that the earth goes around the sun (more on this in §3). 
Restrictivists provide a more complicated explanation, for they agree that the folk 
do not possess any reasons for believing in strange fusions—which evidently is already 
sufficient to explain their behavior—but then go on to propose that the folk tacitly restrict 
their quantifiers in such a way as to exclude fusions. Not only is the explanation more 
complicated; it simply lacks prima facie plausibility. Of course, it is beyond doubt that 
we do restrict our quantifiers in discourse about material objects. For instance, we 
typically restrict our quantifiers to exclude the parts of highly visible objects (e.g., we 
count the table but not its legs when we count up the wooden things in the room).179 This 
is something that we do automatically and without conscious effort, but all it takes is a 
moment’s reflection to see that this is something that we do. By contrast, it not clear on 
                                                
179 The restrictivist presumably will not agree that we restrict our quantifiers in this way, 
since he holds that tables and other things in the domain of quantification are parts of 
highly visible objects (e.g., the strange fusions of noses and tables). The point, however, 
is that the anti-restrictivist need not deny that we sometimes restrict our quantifiers, and 
that in some cases there are genuine reasons for postulating the relevant restrictions.  
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reflection that we have also been restricting our quantifiers so as to exclude strange 
fusions—even once the existence of those strange fusions is brought to our attention—
any more than it seems to us that we had been restricting our quantifiers so as to exclude 
extraterrestrial trees in saying ‘there are no talking trees’ when we find out that there are 
talking trees on some distant planet.   
Furthermore, the postulation of the indicated restriction seems to be an 
explanatory dangler. In familiar cases of quantifier domain restriction, the postulation of 
the relevant restriction does genuine explanatory work. Consider the semantic hypothesis 
that Joe is restricting his quantifier so as to exclude beers that are not ready at hand when 
he looks in the fridge and says ‘there is no beer.’ First, it does not seem to follow from 
what Joe said that there is no beer at the pub. The indicated restriction to items that are 
ready at hand would explain the absence of the entailment. Second, Joe knows full well 
that there is beer at the pub downtown, so postulating a restriction to beers that are ready 
at hand allows one to explain his linguistic behavior without taking him to be asserting 
something that he knows to be false. Relatedly, when he finds that his remarks have been 
at face value (“There’s no beer anywhere, Joe?”), he responds not as one who takes 
himself to have been mistaken but as one who takes himself to have been 
misunderstood.180 The hypothesis that what he said was that there is no beer ready at 
hand would explain this reaction.  
All of these explananda—these standard marks of a quantifier’s being restricted 
so as to exclude a certain range of items—are missing in case of strange fusions. It does 
                                                
180 Likewise, one who says ‘there is only one white thing on the table’ knows full well 
that the feather has parts that are white, and will take himself to be the victim of a 
deliberate misunderstanding if one reminds him that he neglected to count those parts. 
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seem to follow from an assertive utterance of ‘the feather is not part of anything on the 
table’ that the feather is not part of any unnoticed thing on the table. Since (as we are 
supposing) the folk have no beliefs one way or the other about whether there are strange 
fusions, one can take their remarks at face value without taking them to be saying 
anything that they know to be false. And there is no indication that the folk take 
themselves to have been misinterpreted or misunderstood when they find that their 
utterances have been taken at face value (e.g., “The feather isn’t part of anything on the 
table??).181 Positing a tacit restriction that excludes strange fusions seems to do no 
explanatory work. There are often clear reasons for complicating the semantics of folk 
discourse by supposing that quantifier domains are tacitly restricted in certain ways; we 
should not further complicate the semantics with additional restrictions unless there are 
comparable reasons for doing so. 
(There is even some degree of semantic evidence supporting the Lewisian 
hypothesis that we typically restrict our quantifiers to exclude nonpresent and nonactual 
entities. For at times we seem willing to quantify over such entities, as in ‘There are 
many people who have died for their cause’ and ‘There are many things that we feared as 
children that we no longer believe in’. Of course, there are various ways of understanding 
such utterances. But the point is just that there is not even this minimal evidence for 
restrictivism and that not all seemingly revisionary postulations of tacit domain 
restrictions are as unmotivated as restrictivism.) 
                                                
181 See Hirsch (2002a, 111-12) for further discussion of this “retraction test” for 
quantifier domain restriction. Trenton Merricks (2001, 166) makes a similar point against 
the eliminativist who holds that we speak loosely when we say such things as ‘there are 
tables nearby’. 
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So is there any linguistic or behavioral evidence for restrictivism? Gideon Rosen 
and Cian Dorr point out that, when informed that they failed to count the ball “plus” the 
feather, the folk will perhaps respond ‘Well, if you count that as a thing, then I suppose 
there must be three things on the table after all’; and they cite this as evidence that the 
folk are restricting their quantifiers so as to exclude strange fusions.182 But, pace Rosen 
and Dorr, this need not (and probably should not) be understood as any kind of retraction 
or indication that the speaker takes himself to have been misunderstood. The exchange is 
most straightforwardly understood as involving a kind of presuppositional 
“discommodation.”183 You can participate in a conversation about the happiness of the 
man in the corner, and may even join other parties to the conversation in referring to him 
as ‘the man drinking a martini’, even though you do not believe that the drink in his hand 
is a martini. But rather than being uncooperative—in part because you realize that they 
might know something that you do not, and in part because you do not care whether it is a 
martini—you play along. Likewise, the above assertion is more naturally interpreted as 
the speaker’s realizing that his informant has bizarre views about what kinds of things 
there are and then playing along in the spirit of cooperation—in part because he realizes 
that the philosopher might know something that he does not, and in (large) part because 
he does not care whether there is really some third thing.184   
                                                
182 Rosen and Dorr (2002, 156-7).   
183 See Bonomi (2006, 114f).  
184 Compare: Bill lays out some objects on the table and asks Adam to count the red ones. 
Adam says that there are two. Bill then points to an orange object and reminds Adam that 
he has not counted that one. Adam may respond ‘Well, if you count that as red, then I 
suppose there are three red things’. Adam is just playing along.  
One might complain that, in both this case and the one in the text, the speaker 
uses a demonstrative expression ‘that’, which suggests that he takes there to be such an 
object. But the use of the demonstrative is inconsequential. Prompted by Bill to count up 
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We do, of course, often employ a restricted use of ‘thing’, on which holes, events, 
numbers, and other oddities in the folk ontology are not counted as things. Perhaps what 
Rosen and Dorr have in mind is that the indicated reaction is evidence that we typically 
restrict our quantifiers to exclude entities that are not things in this narrow sense of 
‘thing’. But, while the folk deny that birthday parties are things, they readily admit that 
there is such a thing as a birthday party. By contrast, upon telling the folk that a 
ballfeather is that, if anything, that has a bowling ball and a feather as parts, they will 
readily admit that of course there is such a thing as a ballfeather. So the usual marks of 
being excluded as a result of failing to fall under the narrow use of ‘thing’ are missing in 
the case of strange fusions.  
It may be that the folk (like many philosophers) will take back what they said 
upon becoming convinced that, if one countenances scattered objects at all, then there can 
be no principled reason for excluding strange fusions.185 But this sort of retraction cannot 
serve as the kind of evidence we are looking for: what the folk are willing to say after 
becoming convinced that there are fusions is no indication of what they were saying 
before becoming convinced. Nor is the fact that they can be convinced that there are 
fusions any indication that they were restricting their quantifiers, any more than the fact 
that they can be convinced of mereological essentialism (and just as easily) is any 
indication that they are speaking loosely in saying ‘this tree used to have fewer branches’. 
So we still have yet to find any serious evidence for restrictivism. 
                                                                                                                                            
the different kinds of horses, Adam says “there are exactly ninety kinds of horses.” Bill 
reminds him that he neglected to count unicorns. Bill does not believe in unicorns, nor 
was he restricting his quantifiers to exclude them, but may well respond: “If you count 
those as horses, then I suppose there are ninety-one different kinds.”  
185 Cf. Sider (2004, 680) on what his students say after “innocent coaching.” 
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The restrictivist might try to appeal to the fact that the folk have no beliefs one 
way or the other about whether strange fusions exist as positive evidence that strange 
fusions are typically excluded from our domain of quantification.186 But it is hard to see 
why, for we do not in general take our quantifiers to range only over those things that we 
believe to exist. When Joe says ‘there is no beer’, not realizing that there are some 
Coronas hidden in the vegetable drawer, we take him (and he subsequently takes himself) 
to have said something false—not to have said something true and restricted so as to 
exclude the contents of the vegetable drawer. Nor is the domain of quantification 
ordinarily restricted to kinds of things that the speaker takes to exist. When Joe says 
‘nothing can travel faster than ten thousand miles per hour’, we again ordinarily take him 
(and he takes himself) to have said something false, even though we know that he has 
never heard of the sorts of (microscopic) things that do exceed these speeds. So the fact 
that the folk have no beliefs one way or the other about whether strange fusions exist by 
itself is no evidence that they are not included in the ordinary domain of quantification. 
In the absence of linguistic, psychological, or behavioral data, the postulation of 
the indicated restriction looks to be entirely unmotivated. More importantly, if there is no 
special reason to think that we restrict our quantifiers to exclude strange fusions, there 
will be no good reason to favor restrictivism over competing semantic hypotheses. For 
instance, one might instead hold that, while the folk are not excluding strange fusions 
when they say ‘there are only two things’, they are (as van Inwagen suggests) speaking 
                                                
186 Alternatively, one might hold that we lack the concepts needed to talk and think about 
strange fusions, and that this can serve as a grounds for accepting restrictivism. But it 
seems that we do have all the requisite concepts for thinking about strange fusions, 
simply insofar as we can wonder whether there is anything whose parts are the ball and 
the feather.   
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loosely when they say ‘there are tables nearby’.187 Or that what they say is that according 
to the folk-ontological pretense there are tables nearby.188 Or that, without realizing it, 
they systematically insert and omit negations by a slip of the tongue, and what they mean 
to say is that there are not only two things on the table. Or that they are saying exactly 
what they seem to be saying: that there (really!) are tables nearby and that there is 
nothing (at all!) partly black and partly white on this table. It is unreasonable to prefer the 
restrictivist interpretation over these competing interpretations solely on the grounds that 
if it is correct then there is no conflict between universalism and folk discourse, for this is 
nothing more than wishful thinking. 
 
3. Arguing From Universalism to Restrictivism 
  I have argued that there is no linguistic, psychological, or behavioral evidence 
that we typically restrict our quantifiers so as to exclude strange fusions. But it remains 
open to the restrictivist to hold that something external to the speaker determines how his 
quantifiers are restricted. After all, it is by now well known that the content of our 
utterances is not determined solely by states internal to the speaker.189 Perhaps the 
existence of strange fusions can itself be cited as evidence for restrictivism. But how can 
the fact that they exist serve as a reason for thinking that they are typically excluded from 
our domain of quantification? 
 
 
                                                
187 Cf. van Inwagen (1990, 98-114). 
188 Cf. Rosen and Dorr (2002, 168-71).   
189 See, especially, Kripke (1972), Putnam (1975), and Burge (1979). 
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a. Charitable Interpretation 
One possible explanation is that, in light of the truth of universalism, the principle 
of charity in interpretation compels us to accept restrictivism. For if we interpret the folk 
in such a way that they do not employ the indicated restriction, then we must understand 
them as saying (or at least as being disposed to say) a great many false things. The idea 
would then be that restrictivism supplies a far more charitable interpretation, for it takes 
the folk to be speaking truly. So, ceteris paribus, the restrictivist interpretation is to be 
preferred.  
But, as a number of authors have observed, charity requires only that an 
interpretation rationalizes utterances, not that it verifies them.190 An interpretation on 
which speakers say and believe a great many false things is not in the least uncharitable if 
their mistakes are perfectly intelligible, given their evidence. Is it irrational for the folk to 
say that there are only two things on the table, despite the fact that there is a third thing 
on the table, namely, the fusion of the ball and the feather? Not at all. The only known 
reasons for thinking that this third thing exists are highly theoretical, so the 
philosophically uniformed folk can hardly be charged with irrationality for not having 
realized that it exists. So the principle of charity, properly understood, supplies no reason 
for accepting restrictivism.   
Achille Varzi raises a similar point in his critique of Peter van Inwagen’s 
attempted reconciliation of folk discourse and the elimination of medium-sized dry 
                                                
190 See Grandy (1971, 440f), Lewis (1974, 336-7), Wiggins (1980, 198-200), Hirsch 
(2002a, 105), and Varzi (2002, 61-5). As Wiggins puts the point, the appropriate notion 
of charity “founds interpretation not in maximization but in explanation” (1980, 199). 
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goods.191 Varzi observes that charity demands nonliteral interpretation in such cases only 
if there is reason to think that the speaker is “part of the gang.” For instance, whether 
charity requires that we take someone to be speaking loosely in saying ‘the sun moved 
behind the elms’ depends in part on whether the speaker has informed views about 
astronomy. Charity does not automatically require that we find a way to understand him 
as saying or conveying something true, especially if he is uninformed or misinformed; 
after all, he might really believe that the earth is stationary. Charity does require that we 
take van Inwagen and other avowed eliminativists to be speaking loosely when they say 
such things as ‘there is a table nearby’. By contrast, to take the folk to be speaking 
loosely when they utter these words is not a charitable interpretation; it is plain 
misconstrual. There is no reason to take the folk to be part of the eliminativist gang, and 
there similarly appears to be no reason to take the folk to be part of the universalist gang.  
 
b. The Best Candidate Theory 
Alternatively, one might try to invoke the Lewisian “best candidate” theory of 
content in defense of restrictivism.192 According to the best candidate theory, the 
semantic content of our utterances is determined in part by our linguistic behavior and 
dispositions and in part by the intrinsic eligibility of candidate contents. The correct 
semantic theory is the one that finds the best balance between assigning maximally 
eligible contents and respecting our use of the relevant utterances. The suggestion would 
then be that restrictivism provides a better balance of use and eligibility than do 
                                                
191 Varzi (2002, 65). 
192 See Lewis 1983 and 1984. 
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interpretations on which strange fusions are not excluded from the domain of 
quantification by some tacit restriction.  
The appeal to the best candidate theory is simply a nonstarter if “respecting our 
use” is understood in terms of charitably interpreting the relevant utterances. For, as we 
have just seen, restrictivism is no more charitable than interpretations that do not 
postulate the relevant restriction. Consequently, restrictivist and nonrestrictivist 
interpretations will be on a par with respect to use, so understood. But the candidate 
contents that incorporate this restriction will be more complex, and therefore less natural 
and eligible, than those that do not. So, if the best candidate theory is to be of any help to 
the restrictivist, “respecting use” must be understood in terms of verifying a certain range 
of utterances—for instance, the “platitudes” of folk theory.193  
But even so understood, there is no clear indication that the best candidate theory 
favors restrictivism. Whether it does depends in large part upon the intrinsic eligibility of 
the restriction that is needed to secure the truth of the relevant sentences of folk 
discourse. Its eligibility (as Lewis understands it, at any rate) will, in turn, be a function 
of the complexity and naturalness of the relevant restriction. The problem is that the 
obvious candidates for a natural restriction all fail to respect other aspects of use. For 
instance, one might suggest that the quantifiers are restricted to ordinary things. But we 
                                                
193 If the best candidate theory is to be at all plausible, there must be some restriction on 
the range of utterances whose verification counts in favor of an interpretation; intuitively, 
that an interpretation verifies the pre-Copernican utterances of ‘the sun goes around the 
earth’ is not even a pro tanto reason for favoring that interpretation.  So the envisaged 
restrictivist would have to assume, further, that the utterances that he wishes to reconstrue 
(e.g., ‘nothing on the table is partly white and partly black’, ‘the feather is not part of 
anything on the table) are in this privileged class of utterances that need to be verified by 
a “use-respecting” interpretation. I will simply grant that they are; to evaluate whether 
this is at all plausible would require an investigation into the motivations of this kind of 
best candidate theory that would take us far beyond the scope of this paper.   
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plainly do quantify over highly nonordinary things (bizarre works of art, strange 
organisms, etc.) so long as they exhibit the right degree of unity; so, supposing that this 
restriction is in effect, we miscount when we count such things. Similarly, a restriction to 
things whose parts exhibit a high degree of unity would fail to verify what we say when 
we count such scattered entities as baseball card collections, Michigan, and tokens of the 
letter ‘i’. Likewise for a restriction to things for which we have sortal expressions, for 
even the restrictivist will agree that one would be speaking falsely in saying ‘There is 
nothing on the table’ when presented with an assortment of strange Martian items that 
resist classification. And we have already seen (in §2) that taking quantifiers to be 
restricted to things that the speaker believes in also leads to misconstruals of folk 
discourse. 
It would seem, then, that the only way to specify a restriction that respects all of 
these aspects of use is by “brute force”—that is, by building into the semantics of the 
sentence the highly complex, unwieldy relation that underwrites our ordinary judgments 
about whether some things compose anything.194 In that case, it would be far from clear 
that the use/eligibility calculation would favor the use-respecting restrictivist 
interpretation and its monstrous restricted quantifier over the more straightforward and 
eligible interpretation on which quantifiers are not restricted in such a ways as to exclude 
strange fusions. 
Of course, from the perspective of the best candidate theory, the fact that the more 
natural restrictions fail to verify all of the platitudes of folk discourse does not by itself 
                                                
194 Both commonsense ontologists and their critics will agree that there is almost 
certainly no uniform or elegant way to capture the conditions under which the folk 
(ostensibly) take some things to compose something.. See, e.g., van Inwagen (1990), 
Hirsch (1993b), Horgan (1993), Markosian (1998), and Johnston (2002, 147). 
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reveal those proposals to be incorrect. For the superior eligibility of a given restriction 
might counterbalance these shortcomings. Or it might not. I am aware of no way of 
determining whether, among all of the various ways in which our quantifiers might be 
restricted, the restriction that best balances use and eligibility is one that excludes strange 
fusions from the domain of quantification. Without special reason for thinking that the 
use/eligibility calculations favor a restrictivist interpretation, to suppose that they do is 
simply wishful thinking. 
There are further problems with holding the nature of the restriction hostage to the 
use/eligibility calculations in this way. Suppose, for instance, that the calculations favor a 
restriction to things believed to exist by the speaker. In that case, the proponent of the 
best candidate theory is committed to serious violations of privileged access.195 Consider 
the case described in §2, in which Joe says ‘nothing travels faster than ten thousand miles 
per hour’. He will deny that what he says is only that nothing that he believes in travels 
faster than ten thousand miles per hour. He recognizes that there probably are all sorts of 
things that exist without his knowing it, and he believes that what he is saying would turn 
out to be false if any of them turn out to travel faster than ten thousand miles per hour. On 
the present proposal, he would then be mistaken about what he is saying, and cannot 
manage to say what he is thinking. (Or, even worse, he does say what he is thinking, but 
it seriously mistaken about what he is thinking and what he believes.) Relatedly, the 
present strategy undercuts one central motivation behind restrictivism, namely, to 
dissolve the apparent conflict between universalism and folk belief. The restrictivist who 
                                                
195 See Stanley (2001, 47) for a related point concerning fictionalist strategies for 
reconciling ordinary discourse with revisionary metaphysical theses.   
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opts for the present strategy does not dissolve the conflict; he merely relocates it as a 
conflict between restrictivism and folk belief.196 
 
4. Rephrasing Intuitions 
The trouble with the restrictivist strategy for conflict resolution becomes even 
more apparent when we turn our attention from the conflict between universalism and 
ordinary discourse to the conflict between universalism and our pretheoretical beliefs and 
intuitions. Intuitively, a bowling ball and a feather sitting next to each other on a table do 
not compose anything. Since universalism entails that they do compose something, 
universalism has counterintuitive implications. When a theory has counterintuitive 
implications at the level of concrete cases (vs. general principles), we say that the theory 
is open to counterexamples. Virtually everyone agrees that potential counterexamples are 
a serious problem for any theory.197 There is a long list of theories that are widely held to 
have been refuted by intuitions of just this kind: logical behaviorism, the JTB analysis of 
knowledge, Fregean descriptivism, and individualism about semantic and mental content, 
to name only a few. But one virtually never finds any mention of counterexamples in the 
                                                
196 One might venture a more direct argument from universalism to restrictivism: 
“Universalism is correct. In the envisaged scenarios, such sentences of folk discourse as 
‘there are only two things on the table’ are true. Restrictivism provides the best 
explanation of how these sentences can be true, given the correctness of universalism.” 
But it seems to be getting things the wrong way round to judge whether the relevant 
sentences are true or false before determining what it is that they mean. Plausibly, the 
propositions expressed by sentences are the primary objects of knowledge, and any 
knowledge that we have of the truth or falsity of the sentences that express them is 
entirely derivative. 
197 Weatherson is an exception (see his 2003). But his argument presupposes a best-
candidate theory of content which, as we have seen, fails to render any clear verdict 
regarding restrictivist interpretations of folk discourse. 
invokes the best candidate theory of content in a way that renders it unavailable to the 
restrictivist, for the reasons given in the previous section.   
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literature on universalism, the real issue having been eclipsed by the less fundamental 
issue of apparent conflict with things that the folk are inclined to say.198  
Can the restrictivist strategy be adapted to handle the objection that universalism 
is open to counterexamples? That is, can the restrictivist strategy be adapted so as to 
reconcile universalism with the intuitions that seem to tell against it? Universalists might 
suggest that philosophers themselves restrict their quantifiers when they report the 
alleged counterexamples, for instance, that they are in fact saying that there is no 
ordinary thing composed of the ball and the feather. But this is wholly implausible: since 
the restricted claim so obviously is not a counterexample to universalism, it is 
uncharitable in the extreme to suppose that this is what fellow philosophers claim and 
believe to be a counterexample.  
Alternatively, the universalist might concede that philosophers are making the 
unrestricted claim that the ball and feather do not compose anything, but hold that they 
are incorrectly reporting their intuition. For instance, one might hold that no one actually 
has the intuition that there is nothing composed of the ball and feather: we have only the 
restricted intuition that there is no ordinary thing composed of the ball and the feather, 
and philosophers have been mistaking the latter for the former. In that case, although 
there may be a conflict between universalism and what philosophers come to believe on 
the basis of their intuitions, there would be no genuine conflict between universalism and 
the intuitions themselves, and hence no counterexamples to universalism. 
                                                
198 To my knowledge, Markosian is the only philosopher to have used the word 
‘counterexample’ in print in connection with the problems facing universalism; see his 
(1998) and (forthcoming).    
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Is this psychological hypothesis at all plausible? Occasionally, there is a strong 
case to be made that philosophers are misreporting their intuitions. Kripke argued 
persuasively that we sometimes mistake intuitions of epistemic possibility for intuitions 
of metaphysical possibility.199 Many who initially reported having the intuition that it 
could have turned out that water lacked hydrogen found it plausible that they had been 
misreporting a (veridical) intuition to the effect that one could have been in a 
phenomenologically indistinguishable situation in which some water-like substance 
lacked hydrogen. Had Kripke’s suggestion not seemed plausible on reflection, there 
would have been no more reason to think that we were misreporting the anti-Kripkean 
intuitions than that we were correctly reporting the anti-Kripkean intuitions and 
misreporting the pro-Kripkean intuitions.  
In the present case, by contrast, the intuition is robust; it persists after distinctions 
about restricted and unrestricted quantification have been made. In this way, the case of 
the ball and the feather is unlike Kripke’s cases.200 We do not find it plausible on 
reflection that we have been confusing restricted and unrestricted claims, and so there are 
no serious grounds for holding that we are. Moreover, in Kripke’s case, we had intuitions 
pointing in opposite directions, which was why we suspected in the first place that some 
intuition was being misreported. In the present case, however, we do not have pro-
universalist intuitions in addition to our anti-universalist intuitions. So we also lack any 
prima facie reason for thinking that the anti-universalist intuitions are being misreported. 
Universalists might try to dispel the invidiousness of the suggestion that their 
colleagues are unable to distinguish between restricted and unrestricted propositions by 
                                                
199 Kripke (1980, 103-5).  
200 Cf. Sider (2001, 183) on anti-eliminativist intuitions.   
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insisting that the contents of these intuitions are inscrutable. One cannot tell, by 
introspection alone, whether one is having the restricted or unrestricted intuition. But if 
these intuitions truly are inscrutable, even to the trained eye, there is no better reason to 
think that our anti-fusion intuitions are misreported than there is to think that our anti-
fusion intuitions are correctly reported while our pro-table intuitions are misreported or, 
indeed, that all of our intuitions about composite objects are correctly reported. Indeed, 
the situation is worse than that, for the present proposal calls into question all arguments 
by counterexample. Perhaps the intuition was only that Gettier-man does not know with 
certainty that the man who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket. Or perhaps the 
apparently pro-Kripkean intuition was only that there is no earthly water on twin-earth. 
The restrictivist may take some comfort in the claim that, for all we know, we are 
misreporting our intuitions; but to then conclude that we are in fact misreporting these 
intuitions is again just wishful thinking.  
Universalists might concede that the philosopher does have the suitably 
unrestricted intuition that there is (absolutely) nothing composed of the ball and the 
feather, but contend that philosophers have this intuition only because their intuitions 
have been corrupted by too much theory. But there seems to be no more reason to think 
that these intuitions are adulterated than there is to think that any other intuitions are 
adulterated. There is no indication whatsoever that these intuitions diverge from the 
unadulterated intuitions of the folk. (And is this not the pot calling the kettle black? After 
all, the only people who seem not to find the universalist thesis counterintuitive are those 
who have been exposed to the arguments against restricted composition.)   
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Finally, the universalist might concede that even the folk have the suitably 
unrestricted intuitions, but hold that even the folk’s intuitions are theoretically 
adulterated, namely, by “folk ontology.” But this puts the restrictivist in a deeply unstable 
dialectical position. First, all intuitions are thereby called into question. For if folk 
ontology is a source of corruption, then presumably so must be the folk epistemology that 
guides our intuitions about Gettier cases, and so on for twin earth, multiple realizability, 
and the like. Second, if the restrictivist concedes that the folk have intuitions that 
contradict universalism, it is more difficult than ever to see what is to be gained by 
postulating the relevant restriction: for if there is a conflict even with folk belief and 
intuition, it would seem that there is nothing to be gained in claiming that at least what 
the folk say is compatible with the existence of strange fusions.   
 
5. Conclusion 
One often hears it said in conversation about universalism that the apparent 
conflict with folk discourse poses no serious problem, for the universalist can just say 
that the folk are restricting their quantifiers. What I have tried to suggest is that this is not 
something that the universalist can “just say.” Rather, this is a substantive semantic 
hypothesis, which stands in need of justification, and for which there seems to be no 
evidence.    
Restrictivists are not alone in trying to reconcile revisionary metaphysical theories 
with discourse about material objects. For instance, many philosophers (but no linguists, 
to my knowledge) have endorsed the semantic hypothesis that such English sentences as 
‘there are tables in the next room’, ‘this piece of paper exists now’, or ‘this tree had fewer 
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braches last year’ have two uses in English: a “loose and popular” use on which they say 
something obviously true, and a “strict and philosophical” use on which they express 
substantive philosophical claims.201 Others have argued that there is a tacit pretense 
operator at work in our discourse about material objects: what we say in uttering ‘there 
are tables in the next room’ is that according to the folk ontology there are tables in the 
next room.202 These other reconciliatory strategies are beset by the same problems facing 
the restrictivist, for there seems to be no more evidence for these semantic hypotheses 
than there is for restrictivism.203 Moreover, the abundance of revisionary semantic 
hypotheses only increases the dialectical instability (mentioned at the close of §2) of 
favoring one over the others in absence of clear evidence in favor of the preferred 
hypothesis.    
I strongly agree with John Hawthorne and Michaelis Michael that reconciliatory 
strategies have been “badly abused.”204 And I agree with Kripke (quoted in the epigraph) 
that these claims are almost invariably suspect—though it is crucial to recognize that, 
pace Kripke, these are linguistic hypotheses, not philosophical claims. There seems to be 
a widespread methodological assumption that reconciling revisionary metaphysical 
claims with what the folk say requires nothing more than providing a systematic 
reinterpretation of the relevant domain of folk discourse. It has been all too common to 
put forward reconciliatory semantic hypotheses, which depart—sometimes drastically—
                                                
201 See Peter van Inwagen (1990, 100-3), Mark Heller (1990, 12-14), and Roderick 
Chisholm (1973, 92-104), respectively.  
202 Rosen and Dorr (2002, 168-71).   
203 See Hirsch (2002a, 109-11) on the lack of evidence that we speak loosely when we 
talk about persistence through change, and Merricks (2001, chapter 7) on the lack of 
evidence that we speak loosely when we talk about tables.      
204 See their “Compatibilist Semantics in Metaphysics’ (1996). 
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from straightforward interpretations of discourse, without citing any evidence in their 
favor. But unless clear evidence can be produced to support of these departures from 
interpretations that take ordinary discourse at face value, there is little reason to take 
seriously any of the attempts to show that revisionary ontological theories are consistent 
with folk discourse about material objects. 
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